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 The dissertation addresses an absent history of late twentieth-century postmodern 
literature. Namely, I trace the shifts between 1980s postmodernism, described by Fredric 
Jameson as encapsulating a “wan[ed]”“affect,” and the emergence of 1990s post-postmodernism, 
marked by an exaggeration of affect. My dissertation posits that this reinvention of feeling was 
due to shifts in communication technologies and new media art during the 1970s and 1980s 
competing with, and eventually rendering obsolete, avant-garde literary techniques for 
“connection.” These latter strategies were encapsulated in the postmodern “encyclopedic” novel, 
a form miming the logic of new media, yet incapable of fully addressing new programmatic 
shifts, such as the installation-centered apparatuses of new media, the textual depth of digitalism, 
and posthuman data used for characterization. The strain of this pseudo-computational 
organization and ethic, however, leads to the pursuit of “feeling” on a more visceral basis. 
Pursuant with this visceral intention, I posit the genre of transgressive literature, usually 
misunderstood as employing simple-minded shock tactics, as a hinge point between postmodern 
and post-postmodern conceptions of “feeling.” Transgressive literature, I argue, offers 
systematic, new-media-like schemas to explore moments of emotional excess or visceral shock, 
allowing a further bridge to post-postmodernist writers like David Foster Wallace, who explore 
affect within complex, maximalist schemas. In essence, the study supplies a media analysis of 
 
v 
American postmodernism’s demise and return long missing. Such a study is integral to any 
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The Inoperable Machine: A Media History of Late Postmodernism 
 
It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at all times, at other times in fits 
and starts… Everywhere it is machines—real ones, not figurative ones: machines 
driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the 
necessary couplings and connections. 
—Deleuze and Guattari on desire, Anti-Oedipus. 
 
 About halfway through Woody Allen’s 1977 film Annie Hall, a recently spurned Allen, 
trying better to understand his own romantic problems, begins soliciting passersby on the street 
to ask about theirs. He stops one couple; the man is tanned with an open-necked leisure-suit shirt 
buttoned way down, the woman has white slacks and bobbed blonde hair. They both look like 
models. “You look like a happy couple. Are you?” Allen asks the woman. “Yeah,” she responds 
to which Allen presses further, “So, how do you account for it?” “Uh, I’m very shallow and 
empty, and I have no ideas and nothing interesting to say,” she says. “And I’m exactly the same 
way,” the man supplies. This interaction encapsulates, to me, the central paradoxical question of 
postmodernism and hence whatever might follow: how to draw out plausible connections and 
magnetisms between ostensibly flat and superficial characters with “nothing… to say?” Further, 
how would this operate if these characters were also originally rendered as mere caricatures or 
ideological sketches? 
 In trying to diagnose postmodernism’s demise and potentially determine what might 
follow, questions multiply further. Is there a mechanism that might summon forth the liveliness 
of characters so thin and caricatured as to seem merely programmatic constructs or sterile pawns 
advancing an aesthetic theory?  In this sense of “programming,” might this coming-to-life occur 
through circulation, crashing one figure against the other like competing logarithms in a Wall 




outmoded; might postmodernism’s problems be in a certain narcissistic two-dimensionality 
granted by its medium, and would a different, perhaps computerized or cyberspace-friendly 
venue make this shallowness somehow deeper, more enriched? Conversely, should one instead 
simply abandon the whole project and return to a simpler realism? Would that even be possible 
at this point? This panoply of questions, which only skip, divide, and elude explanation when 
pressed for clarification (and form in part the investigations of the essay collection The Mourning 
After: Attending the Wake of Postmodernism [2007]), hints at the monumental task of authors 
seeking to move beyond what postmodernism was or could have been, particularly in the 
emergent field of post-postmodernism. 
 The underlying issue linking these conceits and the elemental gap in contextualizing the 
progeny of postmodernism—mirrored in a missing critical step in scholarship—involves 
“feeling.” As Fredric Jameson claimed in his famous 1984 essay, “Postmodernism, or the 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” the genre was marked by its pronounced “wan[ed] affect” 
(61). Jameson mentioned Andy Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes as a paradigmatic work of the 
era, marked by a glossy accumulation of surfaces at the expense of depth, and skittering 
mercurial “intensities” rather than transformative identification in the viewer (59-64). Yet, nearly 
a decade later, post-postmodern works, including those of David Foster Wallace, Jonathan 
Franzen, and Richard Powers arose around critical designations of an abundant and at times 
superfluous feeling, usually described as some form of sincerity. In a paradigmatic manifesto of 
the movement, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” Wallace calls for the pursuit of 
“single-entendre principles” including even sentimentality and naïveté (81-82). The questions 
from a critical purview, then, narrow considerably: How does one account for this stark arrival of 




foundational? Where did this submerged sense of identification, vulnerability, and deeply felt 
connection arise from, absent as it was from postmodern ancestors? 
 One viable avenue for inquiry is found in the media-centric valence of the term 
“connection.” John Barth, in his now-famous manifesto of postmodernism, “The Literature of 
Exhaustion” (1967), describes the need to proceed beyond the spent potential of realism, yet in 
his desired category of the “technologically-up-to-date artist” doesn’t mention the “exhaustion” 
of print as a medium or indeed recognize print as a medium, let alone a technology. Yet 
“exhaustion” lends a timbre of distance, numbness, and false connection to postmodernism’s 
assumed need for updated technicity. Considering McLuhan’s designation of new media as 
“hot,” embodying an abundance of stimulus and interaction and requiring little input from users, 
and print media as “cold,” or requiring more of an imaginative supplement, one might see the 
“encyclopedic” novels of high postmodernism as a cumulative “coldness” pining for heat. 
Indeed, critics theorizing ur-postmodern “mastery”1 as mass, computational-seeming 
encyclopedic and all-encompassing structures (Mendelson, Moretti, LeClair), seem 
unconsciously to gesture at a pseudo new media organization to these cybernetic archival 
constructs without querying why these novels might have ultimately chafed under a print 
constraint. Likewise, implicit in this broader and cyberspace-like mainframe of the encyclopedic 
novel is the perceived creation of characters seeming more like numerical ciphers—
psychologically thin, utilitarian, and manifesting an absence of “connection” between themselves 
and potential readers.2 Internal critiques of postmodernism, and retroactive analysis of the form 
from the perspective of post-postmodernism, have mainly cited a perceived sickness and fatigue 
                                                
1 See Tom LeClair’s The Art of Excess: Mastery in Contemporary American Fiction (1989). 
2 Critics such as Aleid Fokkema and Ian Gregson have devoted works to unraveling the 




with intertextual games (McLaughlin, “Post-Postmodernism”) as well as removal from realism’s 
emotional depth (Franzen, Wolfe). However, as of yet, little has been discussed in terms of how 
certain media shifts have led to this waning not only of affect but connection, and what literature, 
in imitation of new media, might be attempting to encapsulate within itself to address 
exponential growth in fellow forms. 
 This study then seeks a media-fixed critique of postmodernism’s struggle against these 
factors, death, and ultimate rebirth. Such media-focused investigations have been partially 
attempted by Lev Manovich in The Language of New Media (2001), utilizing a software studies 
perspective to analyze how postmodernism aligns with computational “remix” culture (131)—
“cut and paste” bearing plausible similarities to collage and cultural recycling (xxxi, 131)—yet 
ignoring contemporary comparisons between media forms at the moment of their composition. 
Similarly, Manovich also treats “postmodernism” as a single, monolithic entity. Espen Aarseth in 
Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (1997) reads avant-garde print techniques through 
an anticipation of digital literature, both linked by the shared requirement of “ergodic,” or 
“nontrivial,” effort to traverse both genres (1), yet only regards “difficult” print works as merely 
anticipating the emergence of digital texts. Overall, N. Katherine Hayles’s 2002 call for “media-
specific analysis,” or consideration of a print work’s immanent material composition and 
contextualization within its era of construction, particularly as it relates to the pop-culture-
saturated genre of postmodernism, has yet to be answered (Writing Machines 29). 
 In pursuit of this lost media history, and seeking direct parallels in allied technological-
artistic fields, Section One opens with a contrasting view of literary postmodernism with parallel 
developments in new media and video art. Indeed, as regards the latter’s evolution, I analyze 




famous 1976 essay, “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism”), to the co-option of television’s 
perceived hegemonic control for more agitprop and pro-democratic potential, as described in 
David Joselit’s Feedback: Television Against Democracy (2010). In other words, one sees new 
media embodying an arc of postmodern issues in the 1970s and 1980s not addressed in literature 
until the early 1990s. (Wallace’s manifesto-like “E Unibus Pluram,” decrying television’s 
vampiric potential in drawing forth and neutering postmodernism’s greatest tool in irony, doesn’t 
arrive until 1993.) Simultaneous with postmodernism’s moment of highest strain and bloat (see 
Tom Wolfe’s condemnatory “Stalking the Billion-Footed Beast” [1989]), video artists were 
employing new media devices to address textual and semiotic problems raised by 
communicational and media shifts. Indeed, I analyze as emblematic examples the mainstream 
video artists Nam June Paik, Bill Viola, and Bruce Nauman, whose work, respectively, attempts 
to interact directly with the digital particles and electrode behind the screen (Paik), commune 
with God by distorting and parsing the dividing veil of video (Viola), and provide an 
overabundance and repetition of individual narratives to comment macrocosmically on human 
absurdity and violence (Nauman). New media, and particularly new media textual practice, then 
serves as distilled counter-example for optimistically and efficaciously addressing notions of 
self-reflexivity, self-consciousness, and overall “connection” against the beleaguered postmodern 
literary form.  
 A trickle-down effect of this parallel new media narrative analyzed in the second half of 
Section One is the ontology-shifting possibilities of digital textuality. The rise of cyber-chatting 
in MUDs (an antecedent to chat rooms) during the 1970s and 1980s in tandem with company-
keeping “chat bots,” or artificial intelligence programs run by preset rules, shaped a new 




determine the “life-like,” yet also shifting and self-determining, aspects of these mediated textual 
forms lent a diffuseness of erotic energy that was difficult if not impossible to capture in a 
paralleled literary form. (The embodied posthuman concept of the “body as data” available in 
computational interaction, and lacking in print representation, further marks literature’s deficit.) 
As a test case against which to judge this murky and ontologically scattered libidinal ontology, I 
analyze two “conversation” novels of William Gaddis, composed near-entirely of unattributed 
dialogue. Gaddis’s novels J R (1975) and Carpenter’s Gothic (1985) reveal a slow deterioration 
of corporeality defined only by words, with sexual urge (here used as a shorthand for affect) 
injected as an ultimate muddling and entropic influence on bodily cohesion. Within Gaddis’s 
conversation novels—themselves media-aware jeremiads against the automated forces of 
industrial art and industrial commerce—human intimacy is nearly impossible, mimetically 
reflected in the near-impossibility of stable bodies or consistent narrative frame. 
 To return again to conceptions of the novel as machine-like, Section Two analyzes print 
literature’s systematic approach to reaching moments of affective poignancy, usually reserved 
for an overloading of media, embodied in transgressive fiction. In the spirit of the Marquis de 
Sade, whose complex erotic “grammar” (in Roland Barthes’s conception) gestures towards a 
transcendent state, transgressive novelists mark a new, and unremarked on, manipulation of 
“connection” through moments of visceral intensity achieved by an elaborate structural build-up. 
As opposed to the traditional perception of transgressive novelists as single-minded purveyors of 
pornography and gore, I diagnose the movement as a bridge to the post-postmodern works of 
authors like Wallace, both pursuing points of intense feeling through unstable maximalist 
labyrinths (the transgressives less averse to repetition and non-cohesion). This alliance becomes 




Barthes’s “erotic grammar” with Tom LeClair’s cybernetic-leaning “systems” theory. William T. 
Vollmann enacts this method in The Rainbow Stories (1989), imposing an erotic “calculus” on 
varying and segregated tales of down-and-out junkies and prostitutes in San Francisco’s 
Tenderloin district, allying specific colors to threads of affective misery and potential Eros and 
attempting to distill a potential empathy. Bret Easton Ellis takes a different tack in American 
Psycho (1991), relying on a centrifuge-like acceleration of dread in his serial killer protagonist 
Patrick Bateman, producing sparks of interiority through fumbling attempts at artistry in 
attempted jokes and eager record reviews. Both authors, however, employ extra-textual, 
machine-like constructs to seek amplified, visceral, and “shocking” affects, and additionally 
open the way for flat and “machine-like” postmodern characters to employ psychological depth. 
 Likewise, the maximalist wing of post-postmodernism follows in similar fashion, and 
Section Three tracks the complete expansion of these “visceral” moments through the concept of 
epiphany in David Foster Wallace. Wallace, allied to a branch of post-postmodernism still 
working through high postmodern method, borrows the stilted conception of the epiphany from a 
related branch of post-postmodernism favoring realism (encapsulated in his friend Franzen’s 
work) in order to exaggerate, and ultimately deteriorate, moments of spiritual realignment within 
ornate, pseudo-encyclopedic structures. Wallace also bears resemblance to the transgressives in 
investigating moments of cathartic violence as a false alternative to empathetic understanding 
(particularly in Infinite Jest), and likewise positions this potential violence within a more 
religious (specifically, a play on William James’s pragmatic) schema—Infinite Jest is, after all, 
largely a study of addiction, and the addict’s “bottom” is the ultimate requirement for spiritual 
renewal. In these conflicted and suffering characters, however, a new three-dimensionality 




vapidity and self-serving nature of his or her literary antecedents, and able to battle with such 
empty tropes as if these outdated types represented a darkened simulacra of their “new” 
consciousness. Wallace’s penchant for transgression is likewise directed at the print frame as 
well through rhetorical feints and defamiliarized narrative structures from which to enact his 
transformative moments: moments of affective buzz arising in pop quiz “answers” and story 
outlines that have been seemingly left unfinished. By deconstructing postmodern tactics in Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men, Wallace reveals a new model of readerly interaction, his 
resuscitation of affect present in a directly addressed, near-coital plea for intimacy with the 
reader beyond the fourth-wall. 
 In sum, the study then answers the question of “can deadened postmodern tropes, 
themselves ‘inauthentic,’ be used to generate genuine affect,” with “yes, as long as they operate 
within an affect-generation machine.” For better or worse, new media presents a stranglehold, or 
facilitating influence over late-twentieth-century literary practice, whether in terms of overt 
structure and typography—such as N. Katherine Hayles’s argument for Mark Z. Danielewski’s 
hypertextual House of Leaves manifesting an intrinsically digital logic (Electronic Literature 
175-7)—or tacitly present in a posthuman bleeding of character information with informational 
data. Inevitably, without properly understanding the effect of these media and communicational 
shifts on literary postmodernism, and the friction created between these allied forms, it is near 
impossible to understand the reaction and ameliorative ethics of post-postmodern literature, let 
alone the bridging practice of transgressive literature. These literary forms’ relationship to media 
is more than mimetic—they actively imbibe the principles, logic, ontology, and erotics of new 
media—though they still reformulate these influences in their own idiom, often relying on the 




epiphany. Further, they still hinge figuratively on the employment of intentionally retrograde, or 
organic, qualities of limitation and biological forms as if to fetishize the quality of print itself; 
sex and violence—distinctly human, corporeally validating acts—function as crystallizing agents 
on otherwise overpowering seas of data, piercing bolts of reality against detached mediation, and 
empirical fulcrums for unwieldy systematic structures. This teasing of organic affects within 
structurally new-media-like post-postmodern forms inevitably leads to a dismantling of 
traditional print forms themselves, maximizing and entwining these systems until they collapse 
and revealing in the fissures an extra-textual “feeling.” Upon these systems’ implosion, and 
resultant clearing of the wreckage, it is the job of contemporary scholars to sift through the 
remaining pieces and, like finding an esoteric fragment of a steam engine in modern times, 
attempt to explicate the fit, function, and purpose of each component. This study hopes to begin 
























Section One:  
The Tiny Box Wherein Everything is Solved: New Media Narrative, Communication 




























Introduction: Problems in Two-Dimensions 
William Gaddis had a famous fear of automation.  It signified to him, among other things, 
the actual and mechanically certified death of the artist, lost in the cog-work, any authorial 
signature replaced by stamp and insignia. As such, his works are riddled with descriptions of 
such de-individualization: disembodied hands, cut-out larynxes made to sing posthumously, 
“perfect” performances trapped forever in slim vinyl discs. This is ironic, as his two 
“conversation” novels of the 1970s and 1980s—J R in 1975 and Carpenter’s Gothic in 1985—
are composed near-entirely of unattributed dialogue, offering the most transparent encapsulation 
of concurrent communication-technology trends occurring near-simultaneously to his time of 
writing. From sentient-seeming artificial intelligence programs to sometimes erotically charged 
proto-chat rooms, the communication-technology inventions of Gaddis’s era riddle his works of 
pro-organic artistry with decidedly artificial modes of connection, and (usually sexually driven) 
attempts at floating, cyberspace-like consubstantiality. 
Gaddis, a novelist entrenched in both hard science and maximalist postmodernism, must 
be understood as an artist under the pressure of these seismic shifts.  Emerging from the 
vanguard of postmodernism, Gaddis is already working with an “exhausted” genre, as Barth’s 
“The Literature of Exhaustion” (1967) famously canonized postmodernism as arising from the 
spent potential of realist fiction. Barth, however, leaves out a key element of postmodernism’s 
championed exhaustion: the linear print model wedded to such outré realism that Barth originally 
descries. Jorge Luis Borges, a guiding light of Barth’s desired post-realism, opened up the 
narrative frame through meta-fiction, but what of the medium the frame belonged to? What 
about the cyborgian artists attempting to transfuse narrative into algorithm, digital motion, or 




media lacuna, referring only to media-miming postmodern works as exhibiting complex 
formalist narrative architecture. These include the various models of encyclopedic breadth or 
circuit-like, systematic nature—from Edward Mendelson’s “encyclopedic” novel, to Franco 
Moretti’s “epic” novel, to Tom LeClair’s “systems novel” based more explicitly on 
cybernetics—yet act out of concert with more contemporary technological models for archival 
complexity.  Indeed, exhaustive novels like Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), or even 
Gaddis’s first novel The Recognitions (1955), might be considered “encyclopedic” had they been 
published in the nineteenth century, but in the latter half of the twentieth century they might 
more likely be perceived as “networked,” “computational,” or holding a cyberspace-like fluidity 
and immediacy. Even the repeated calls for the true autopsy of postmodernism, dying 
somewhere in the mid-80s, birthed a variety of benchmarks—the death of Beckett?  Tom 
Wolfe’s diatribe against the genre in ’89?—but little consideration of competitive media forms 
that might have added to its “exhaustion” and afterlife. 
 New media narrative, however was not undergoing such difficulty everywhere. In the 
adjacent field of purely “fine” studio art, narrative embodying digital-like depth of visual 
imagery was experiencing a second flowering by the 1980s. After an affordable camera had been 
introduced in the form of the Portapak and gallerist Leo Castelli provided video equipment to 
sponsored artists, the potentiality of film as a viable “new media” took off in the mid to late 60s, 
and by the 80s had reached a state of formalization and surprising assuredness. A survey of the 
leading video artists of this stabilized period elucidate various strategies for moving beyond 
medium, or vying for moments of excess, transcendence, or rupture. Bill Viola, in particular, 
manifested the search for the digitally rendered image as a transcendent investigation of the 




Bruce Nauman had reached an apotheosis of dark comedy and Beckettian roundabout dialogue 
in the bored, winking Good Boy Bad Boy (1985) and the aggressively absurd Violent Incident 
(1986). Nam June Paik continued his almost abstract expressionist forays into the jarred cosmos 
of dissociated televisual image in his “prepared” TVs and the utopian Good Morning, Mr. Orwell 
in 1984, insinuating a new era of digitally transmitted optimism. Mediation in the visual arts, it 
seemed, was allowing an additional layer for mutable definition and inscription. 
Yet, ironically enough, both video art and the trajectory of literary postmodernism have, 
according to a later essay by David Foster Wallace, a unique and similar forebear: broadcast 
television. As Wallace states in the seminal “E Unibus Pluram: Television and Democracy” 
(1992), television has singularly de-fanged the once useful irony wielded by literary 
postmodernists, manipulating the satirical into a self-conscious means of selling commodities. 
While television has been marked in its mutually parasitic relationship with literary 
postmodernism, the art form most directly correlating to television in video art has been 
relatively undiscussed in its effect on the TV-saturated postmodernists. Video art saw television 
as its original counterpart—the “official” version of events it sought to disrupt, and remediate, 
with its own low technology and “authentic” sequence of events. Further, staged performances 
that were themselves the substantive core of the video art were likewise useful samizdats (the 
renegade tape in Wallace’s Infinite Jest is referred to as “the samizdat” or “the Entertainment”) 
to integrate into the “controlled” stream of broadcast television, resulting in violent and 
subversive bursts of confrontation untested in literature’s parallel relation. Likewise, video art’s 
relatively “healthy” rejection of televisual aesthetics, and development of its own 
“transcendental” ethic, creates a standout example of authenticity in an age of calculated visual 




Wallace’s basing of Infinite Jest around the trance-inducing power of a controlled, quick, and 
metaphysically layered video cartridge is, I think, not incidental. Mining the example of the 
heartfelt, the earnest, and even the reflexively sharp example of 80s video art, Wallace drew his 
prototype for the sort of medium that could both embrace the cerebral “pyrotechnics” of 
postmodern stylistics and put forth a more abstracted, third-dimensional “truth.” 
Before Wallace’s reinvention, however, other forms of new media “connection” added to 
the more emotive and libidinal economies and expectations tied in with new media narrative. 
Indeed, it is nearly impossible to mark the various expansions in 1980s “cyberchatting”—
inclusive of the increasingly sentient-seeming “chat bots” in the mold of the famous fake 
Rogerian therapist “Eliza” and the vivid permutation of identity in textually veiled chat rooms—
without seeing a shift in modes of desire, and specifically textually rendered desire. (The 
dissolution of flesh to abstracted libido was seen in parallel cases such as performance artist 
Stelarc’s flesh suspensions, or Warhol’s flattened, autobiographical Shadows.)  The 
convincingness of desire, the wish to believe that individually parsed letters and phrases from an 
artificial program are indeed a desiring other, or that the contraption derived for one’s 
mechanical pleasure is “real enough,” is immanent in textual practice marked by dense, murky 
computational processes. Gaddis’s attempt to enclose desiring characters in sheer overheard 
conversation and data alone embodies the stretching of print postmodernism to fit these digital 
strategies, though his synaesthetic product yields mainly ontological dissolution of all involved. 
The failure of “connection” and “understanding” to progress beyond the early web’s fan-
communities to a finished literary genre like “high” postmodernism will lay the groundwork for 
post-postmodernism’s definition along this very axis. Indeed, David Foster Wallace’s work 




within an intentionally decayed and seam-showing print constraint—rupturing the narrative’s 
expected boundaries to offer forth often grotesque, extra-narrative epiphanies. These 
grotesqueries will likewise be premeditated by “systematic” transgressive novels, which circulate 
around these epiphanies but lack the cohesive structure and postmodern genealogy to form a 
stable genre. While Gaddis is a novelist quite familiar with failure (teaching a class explicitly on 
“The Theme of Failure in American Literature” at Bard College), his contribution to fully 
exhausting the maximalist print novel (and fully expanding his posthuman, data-driven 
characters) to pave the way for post-postmodern strategies like Wallace’s has yet to be fully 
recognized. Similarly, if one considers the relative wealth of new media and video art’s attempt 
at transcendence, anti-irony, or abrasive satire during the 1980s, analyzing video art’s paralleled 
track to postmodernism, and role in informing post-postmodernism, becomes essential. 
Returning to “better times,” let us examine the origins of 1980s new media and video art. 
 
Postmodern Issues / Good Intentions: New Media, New Inscriptions, and the Maturity of 
Video as Art 
As mentioned, in contrast to the “exhaustion” of print postmodernism, the 80s offered the 
visual arts a renaissance and retrenchment of popular themes through its new media scion, video 
art. Born as a medium of discovery, video art allegedly began with Nam June Paik’s 1965 video 
taping of the Pope in passing and the realization that this kind of temporal fragment could be 
“art.” The proliferation of semi-affordable cameras in the Portapak likewise made this medium a 
less onerous one than full-length feature films, with gallerist Leo Castelli dispensing cameras to 




“revelation” and less temporal and immediate capturing of quick-action, it is useful to note video 
art’s troubled and, apropos to postmodernism, “narcissistic” beginning.  
Rosalind Krauss, in her 1976 piece “Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism,” claimed that 
narcissism was perhaps the most recognizable quality of the developing medium. Early video 
artists were inevitably lost in a self-analytic fixation, namely caused by the fact that the subject 
of the new documentary medium was often the artist him or herself, toying with their mirrored 
doubles or merely calling attention to the feedback loop of producer and product. Vito Acconci 
drunkenly points at his own image for twenty minutes in Centers (1971), for instance, or extends 
a monologue at his reflected mirror-form in Air Time (1973). In Richard Serra’s Boomerang 
(1974), Serra has fellow artist Nancy Holt listen to his own voice on delay and try to repeat the 
words accurately—she, not Serra’s true simulacra, inevitably stumbles and fails. Like a child not 
yet separated from its mother, so Krauss saw the “medium” of film dissolved into an almost 
umbilical non-object, a prosthetic extension of the artist him or herself. Yet, even as a prevailing 
theme, “narcissism” was by no means a totalizing enclosure. In fact, Krauss ends the essay with 
a possible exit from the cage of self-reference, a possibility for “tapes that exploit the medium in 
order to criticize it from within” (59). The “way out” in Krauss’s formulation is ironically 
manipulating the medium’s specialty in self-consciousness and self-awareness against itself. 
Such democratic good-mindedness may be found in David Joselit’s interpretation of the 
origin of video art, coalescing in the shadow of broadcast television. In Feedback: Television and 
Democracy, he notes video artists’ recognition and attempted intervention in the hegemonic 
monolith of broadcast television, perceived as a one-directional force that, like an insidious 
conspiratorial force in a postmodern novel, seemed inflexibly immune to response. He cites 




mass events like the 1972 Democratic and Republican Convention to provide a people’s-eye-
view of such mass-tailored spectacles (Joselit, Feedback 99-101). Such “good will” or social 
critique certainly signals a step beyond the narcissist’s frame, and other artists used similar 
tactics with a far more visceral intent in their interventions. In the early 70s, artists also 
attempted to “buy back” their televisual entertainment, with both Bill Viola and Chris Burden 
purchasing advertising time to then interject their own often jarring video pieces with little 
introduction or segue. Burden’s embedding of his performance piece “Through the Night Softly” 
is particularly unsettling, portraying a bound Burden sliding across broken glass on a tarmac for 
ten seconds, the only noise his breath of exertion as he wriggles across the shards. The 
movement from activism, to abrasive intervention, and finally to a “higher,” mystical ethic is 
also fulfilled to near-caricature by Bill Viola’s rise to prominence, particularly for his earnest, 
self-professedly transcendent works. With film as his all-seeing eye, Viola raises the mechanism 
of video to the level of capturing, in evocative and symbolist fragments, some higher force 
behind the image, marking the fullest sort of pendulum swing away from Acconci’s accusatory 
finger or self-monologue. 
With the frequent inclusion of at least fragmentary narrative pieces in this newly 
entrenched video art and media art more broadly, it is curious that long-form literary narrative 
didn’t also emerge spontaneously from within visual art itself. Given the historical overlap of 
rising and declining artistic eras, this visual-literary amalgam seemed potentially viable. Video 
art’s retrenchment during the slow fade of mail art, which relied on the circulation of pieces 
through the mail system, seemed a potentially viable nexus, possibly allowing an interconnected 
network narrative deepened by digital manipulation. Rudolf Frieling remarks on this expansion 




prose that hang in dense flurries of text and force the reader to literally engage in a Barthesian 
notion of reading as kinetic traversal or “passage” (276).3  He notes, however, the longtime 
impossibility of this due to the “ideological abyss separat[ing] those who trust the image from 
those who trust the word” (Frieling 268). The socially motivated practice of text art also offered 
another potential avenue through its reappreciation of the excerpted phrase or word, imbuing 
new meaning in re-contextualization. However, the strictures of reacting against the prevalence 
of deceptively prosodic and convincing advertisement that remained a major influence on 80s 
text artists left the form concerned with the small and epigrammatic, rather than long and 
novelistic. This condensation might be seen notably in the public, aphoristic work of Jenny 
Holzer or the reinterpreted consumer slogans of Barbara Kruger. The expansion of cryptic 
phrases like Holzer’s “FATHERS OFTEN USE TOO MUCH FORCE” into unusual public 
spaces like the middle of Times Square reveal the unusual charge and manipulation of authority 
given in these new environments, forming what David Joselit notes as “’architectures’ of 
communication” (American Art 202-203). Yet, the extension of environmentally charged text to 
a longer-form rendition was not only physically impractical—how long might a pseudo “official” 
                                                
3 A similar strategy might be seen in the work of video artist Gary Hill and particularly his 1987-
1988 work “Incidence of Catastrophe,” inspired by Maurice Blanchot’s novel Thomas The 
Obscure and more largely his own daughter’s attempt to “form language” (Rush, Video Art 126). 
The obstruction and manipulation of different physicalities of reading allegorically manifests in 
the work in the impossibility of rendering literacies across media. The film is cut with sequences 
of the lens, wobbly and out-of-focus as perhaps we might imagine the film Infinite Jest to be, 
trying futilely to read a page of Blanchot’s text. The ultimate “abject of the body” before this 
difficult, and perhaps even modernist, reading task that epitomizes “Western society’s semantic 
culture” is presented in the final moments of the film when Hill lies nude before a shifting wall 
of blurred words (“Incidence of Catastrophe;” EAI Description). This “wall” of text, and the 
continual, kinetic attempts to feebly read it, are also reminiscent of Jeffrey Shaw’s virtual reality 
piece “The Legible City” (1988-1991), wherein a user navigates a virtual city of inflated, wall-
sized words, representing various monologues from a particular chosen city (for instance, in New 




banner in New York City run?—but also bulged excessively beyond the sharp address of the 
“official” aphorism with artistic response.  
As another avenue from the visual into the textual underutilized by postmodern authors, 
computer-mediated inscription offered a new mode of programmatic delivery. An early, and 
famous, piece of computer art, the 1963 Gaussian Quadratic (recalling Pynchon-style 
engineering jargon) indicates an automated, cubist dimension available in its logarithmically 
directed shapes, looking to be made out of bent wire rendered as printer ink (Goodman 24). 
Connotations of the algorithm in the piece, noted in the both formulaic and random redirections 
of the line, seem logical as an export to literary inscription—say a recursive, Steinian sequence 
produced by a language generator. And indeed a foray into programmatic poetry produced a 
diversity of mutations on a similar model in the early 1980s, mainly relevant to “n-gram” 
generators, or algorithms that assembled ad-hoc prose-poetry from recurring words in a source 
text. Slight modifications to this program, such the addition of rhyme and meter in Raymond 
Kurzweil’s “Cybernetic Poet,” and the imposition of superficial “tricks” to mimic idiosyncratic 
styles of famous print authors (e.g. “eecummingsfy” and “dadafy”) in the program “McPoet,” 
attempted to retroactively imbue “aura” or signature in what was at core a trick of programmatic 
constraints (Roque 1.2). The attempt to overlay an authorial signature onto what was, in effect, 
merely a suggestive regurgitation of text patterns, reveals the inadequacy, or impossibility, of 
trying to massage the Benjaminian aura back into the industrial object. Similarly, the expansion 
of even this deceptive program to longer-form narrative was nearly impossible, due to any 
authorial-simulacra given by the program’s designation of repeating or “signature” patterns 




In searching for a more culturally inscribed source for the intersection of visual arts and 
literature under the aegis of new media, David Foster Wallace points us to one shared, parasitic 
influence: broadcast television.4 While giving birth to a medium in its own right—video art, the 
full function of which in literary postmodernism will be analyzed shortly—the effect of 
broadcast television was marked by Wallace as the single most corrosive effect on 1990s 
American literature in his 1992 essay, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and Democracy.” This 
main danger was in turning the one tool of literary postmodernism that held efficacy—irony, and 
its partner self-reflexivity—against the genre that first coined it. This exact process of 
assumption is many-tiered in Wallace’s rendering. He begins by outlining how the “ogling” 
capacity so endemic to fiction writers has been usurped by the viewing objects of television and 
its knowingly ogled actors, satisfying the writer’s need for voyeurism without requiring any 
vulnerable or human interaction (“E Unibus” 21). In this already isolating relationship of feigned 
“natural” watchableness, Wallace sees an additional turn of the screw in television borrowing the 
preeminent tool of postmodernism, “irony,” to soothe one’s viewer with the assurances that it 
knows one is ogling, hence such ogling is permissible. Television then not only employs this 
winking, self-referential nod to sell commodities (that one is now aware are being sold to us) but 
to lull the viewer into a false sensation of “choice” or discernment. The consumer, then granted a 
paradoxical “in-the-know” faculty, can consume the product without worrying about being seen 
as unaware or lemming-like when buying such products. Perhaps most worrying to Wallace was 
that TV’s cooption of irony from literature wasn’t symbiotic or neutral but rather vampiric, in 
that TV developed to the detriment of literature. “It is now television,” Wallace claims, “that 
                                                
4 Offering a slightly less direct causality, Kathleen Fitzpatrick in The Anxiety of Obsolescence: 
The American Novel in the Age of Television (2006) reiterates that even the perception of 




takes elements of the postmodern—the involution, the absurdity, the sardonic fatigue, the 
iconoclasm and rebellion—and bends them to the ends of spectation and consumption” (“E 
Unibus” 64, italics Wallace’s). The only way out for a new avenue to be carved out in the 
literary, Wallace claims, is for a new generation of “anti-rebels” to emerge and craft a literature 
that abandons irony for “single-entendre values,” or the possibly naïve belief in sincerity and 
empathy invulnerable (or at least less susceptible) to the ploys of self-consciousness (“E Unibus” 
81). 
Under such a rubric, it is surprising that Wallace doesn’t comment on the other 
descendent of TV far more active in its usurpation of the one-directional mind games: video art. 
As just mentioned, David Joselit in particular marks the potential for handheld, portable, and 
affordable video equipment to manifest a wresting back of authority to the recorded image, a 
way of gaining a grand-level perspective without corporate interest.5   How then would this 
escape Wallace’s ken, or creative universe?  Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly, if one looks at the 
central drama of the loosened film at the core of Infinite Jest, a film made “lethal” by its mixture 
of profound technical involution and televisual gratification, one sees Wallace’s awareness of 
video art’s trajectory. Further, in the attempted overcoming of narcissism in the film’s creator to 
produce a product that is either blissfully transcendent or horrifically mind-erasing, we see a co-
option of, and postmodern uncertainty imbued into, such video art.6 
                                                
5 Michael Shamberg of TVTV believed the media-ameliorative possibility of video and public 
access television to be so far-reaching as to eventually be able to have even the “average white 
middle-class businessperson…examine their alienation” by taping their own commutes (Joselit, 
Feedback 87). 
6 Wallace reiterates this televisual impulse as his sole interest and synecdoche of cyber culture 
over dealing with Internet technology directly in a 1996 interview with Stim. “To do a 
comprehensive picture of what the technology of that era would be like, would take 35000 pages, 
number one. In the book, what I was most interested in was people’s relation to filmed 




The film “Infinite Jest” is the notorious MacGuffin7 at the heart of the novel of the same 
name. A video “cartridge” born from its author’s life-long struggle against hopeless involution 
and formal film trickery, “Infinite Jest” is so potent and “entertaining” it causes either a sublime 
transcendence of one’s material shell or comatose entrapment within it. Likewise, its subject 
matter—a “hideously” beautiful woman slowly saying, “I’m so sorry. I’m so terribly sorry” 
while the viewer lies in an infantilized position (IJ 939)—reiterates a total and consuming 
codependence. The creator, James Incandenza—father of one of the two main protagonists, Hal 
Incandenza, and fulfilling a haunting, Hamlet’s ghost-like presence over the novel’s action—
comes from a long history of video art so potently avant-garde it is painful to behold. Genres and 
academic coteries, birthed around the videos give rise to designations like “anti-confluential” and 
“found drama” (a “hoax” genre in which one picks a stranger out of the classifieds and 
“imagines” his or her day) as well as titles of supposed academic essays indicating the 
experience of viewing such films, like “Watching Grass Grow While Being Hit Repeatedly Over 
the Head With a Blunt Object” (Wallace, IJ 65,1026-1028). One of the earliest jokes is that 
Incandenza’s films are so avant-garde they are actually “après-garde,” reactionary in their 
stiltedness and self-centeredness (Wallace, IJ 64). We are even given a mock filmography early 
in the footnotes of the novel, including works so conceptual they actually were “titled and 
subjected to critique but never filmed,” and so materially and technologically obsessed they at 
times entail “two Ikegami EC-35 video cameras,” “Miniaturized, endoscopic, and microinvasive 
cameras,” and “four convex mirrors, two planar mirrors, and one actress” (Wallace, IJ 985-993). 
                                                                                                                                                       
Internet-like system in the novel as “InterLace TelEntertainment” (notice the importance of the 
“tele-” prefix). 
7 The “MacGuffin” is the infamous film device wherein an object is never shown, yet drives the 
central plot or narrative of the film. A famous example is the golden briefcase in Quentin 




The subject matter of the films also bludgeons with a self-reflexive layering of awareness and 
near-absurd renditions of plot twist and trauma. One example is the tragically absurd film 
Accomplice!, wherein a male prostitute accidentally gives his sex partner AIDS through the sex 
partner’s attempt to give him AIDS. The last tearful cry of the prostitute repeating “Murderer!” 
for fifteen minutes after realizing he has inadvertently facilitated his potential murderer’s suicide, 
even gives rise, within the embedded film-critical industry within the novel, to the “central 
conundra of millennial après-garde film” (Wallace, IJ 947). This “conundra” being whether “the 
puzzlement and then boredom and then impatience and then excruciation and then near-rage 
aroused” was “aroused for some theoretical-aesthetic end” or simply was the result of "shitty 
edit[ing]” (Wallace, IJ 947). The involution is thus so deep as to be ambiguously either an 
intentional violence to the audience’s attention and good faith or simply poorly assembled. In 
short, one may use Incandenza, in his early, “après-garde” work, as the most “avant” of much of 
the content, and possibility, of “avant garde” video art, collected in itself and at odds with 
popular entertainment. 
And yet, fittingly, it is the turn to popular entertainment and actual audience reception 
that marks Incandenza’s attempt to reach outside of himself and his own black humor to 
reconcile the hidden traumas that possibly drive his aggressively obtuse work. We are given 
information that his wife, the “Militant Grammarian” Avril Incandenza (Wallace, IJ 288), is 
having a profusion of affairs, including a possible one with a step-brother causing the 
disfigurement of Hal’s brother Mario—these multiple infidelities driving Incandenza literally to 
the studio to create increasingly obscure films. While one hypothesis for Incandenza’s creation 
of the lethally compelling film is mentioned as trying to draw the cerebrally solipsistic Hal “out 




or the technical base for his films, while ignoring his father passed out in a pool of blood-flecked 
vomit (Wallace, IJ 502-503), renders such overtly philanthropic motives questionable. He is 
rarely described as speaking before his suicide and subsequent appearance later in the novel as a 
“wraith” (Wallace, IJ 829). Incandenza’s alternate name—“Himself”—additionally hints at his 
driving spirals of narcissism. Further, his film itself, and its Lacanian nightmare of a death-faced 
mother figure killing the viewer with codependent joy, seems to suggest the obsessive 
attachment and inability to sever self from art Krauss outlined in her 1976 essay. Yet, it is 
precisely this narcissism—manifest in an oeuvre so consumed with technical elements it 
becomes itself obsessed with capturing the esoterica of film-making—that forms the crux of the 
novel’s mystery about his last, “commercial” film. If he has succeeded in a film both 
insurrectionary and appealing, he has captured the delicate essence at the core of Wallace’s 
prescribed antidote for the increasing self-consumption of both fiction and film—a film so 
piercing in its message that it transfuses through medium and into viewer, effectively destroying 
him or her with rapture. Because Wallace chooses to wage such a war between video-directed 
artifice and the final, transcendent quality televisual “Entertainment” can reach in conceptual 
film, it seems worthwhile to chart the trajectory of video art that so similarly operates between 
the valence of narcissism and “naïve” transcendence, as well as televisual “pleasure” and artistic 
confrontation. 
Perhaps the largest undergirding tactic of video art, within the broader aegis of 
intervention, was of taking apart and manipulating the one-direction signal broadcasting tightly 
controlled segments of news or information. This manipulation and reconstruction could have a 
political edge—such as in TVTV—or an explicitly aesthetic edge, as in the case of video art 




scrambled signals of distorted or “prepared” TVs—once magnets had been applied, or internal 
circuitry redirected—as art works in themselves; expressionist plumes of warped electrode 
patterns, fizzing arrays of static. Examples include Magnet TV (1965), where a thick, industrial 
magnet clipped to the top of a television sets off swirls of milky light, or Electronic Opera #1 
(1969), whose circuitry has been distorted such that visages of famous figures like Richard 
Nixon and John Mitchell “fold into themselves” as if they were “swirling down an electronic 
toilet” (Joselit, Feedback 43-48). Once television’s external façade of corporate-controlled 
content could be broken, Paik seemed to indicate, one could reach the elemental beauty of 
television’s composition behind the screen. This distorting effect was itself part of Rosalind 
Krauss’s later reexamination, and reappreciation, of video art in her 2000 book A Voyage on the 
North Sea: Art in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition. In Voyage, Krauss claims that, as part 
of a larger description of a “post-medium” era, video manifested “a kind of discursive chaos, a 
heterogeneity of activities that could not be theorized as coherent” (Post-Medium Condition 31). 
Within the chaos, a multiplicity of mediums could be found; video was merely the portal.  
It is useful to contrast these distortive projects of Paik, or even patterned distortions of the 
McPoet, against the one-dimensional, digital-miming qualities of pseudo-cybernetic writing like 
Gaddis’s. In the ontology of truly digital writing, or word processing, Katherine Hayles has 
noted the phenomenon of “flickering signifiers.” By “flickering signification,” Hayles refers to 
the functional limitation of word processing’s external surface in relation to the obscured, 
artificially interlinked, code-driven processes hidden beneath (Posthuman 31). Hayles notes in 
particular the digitized words’ instability, as each click, each shift of arrangement on the screen, 
belies the global changes and chain-reactions of code occurring beneath the surface. Hence, 




would imply deeper computational processes subdermally influencing the text’s surface. As an 
example of what an exploration of flickering signification might look like in art, Paik’s work 
slices through the falsely passive screen to embrace the underlying “code” or composition. David 
Joselit vaunts this lack of codified solid as an achievement of Paik’s work, claiming that, in the 
distorted arrangements, “pattern meets pattern in an art of indifference” (“Video and Ready-
Made” 44). Further, he frames Paik’s televisual readymades as a way out of the concrete, 
tangible aspect of Duchamp’s earlier readymades by reaching beyond external surface to “use 
electrons and protons directly” (38, “Ready Made”). Rather than a fear of the murky and 
“proton-driven” ontology, in Paik’s visuality we see an appreciation of the shifting constellations 
of underlying force, of electromagnetic arrangement. 
Indeed, part of what may have served to make video art more of a precipitating factor of 
post-postmodernism—in Wallace’s estimation—than literature’s attempt to mime digitalism, is 
that it seemingly yielded a greater diversity of aesthetic products from its composition and 
deconstruction. Video art seemed to take great pleasure in stripping its signals of discernible 
form and polished final product. One tactic was in overloading, or hyper-stimulating, a simple 
video image, such as in Paik’s co-created Paik-Abe Synthesizer (1970), a machine used to layer 
up to seven separate streams of video in a sticky, total agglomeration (“Flow Charts for Video 
Synthesizer”). Bill Viola would also theorize the productive material yielded in unwinding this 
density of video, phrased in his typically religious rhetoric. He claimed that film’s densely 
sensuous composition could be broken down to find “three expressions of the deity,” primarily 
that of the “anthropomorphic,” or “visual,” the “yantra,” or “geometric energy,” and the 
“mantra,” or sonic expression, all compressed into the final product of a film (Viola, 




imagination as carrier of finished, cleaned advertisements for soda pop or detergent, offered a 
great field for investigation and source of pride for video artists seeking to frame, or make 
“ready-made,” even the abstract, electric components of TV. 
Part of this happy assertiveness, and crystallizing a moment of relative appreciation for 
video art, was the 1984 worldwide transmission of Nam June Paik’s Good Morning, Mr. Orwell. 
As an answer to the dystopian pessimism of George Orwell’s 1984, the live “satellite 
installation” of both the New York and Parisian avant-garde was a pointed attempt to frame 
nascent media-oriented art emerging—video an integral understood component, taped and 
manipulated as these segments were—as a redemptive, rather than ominous phenomenon. 
Michael Rush notes this reversal of pessimism, claiming “Paik looked Orwell in the eyes and 
told him Big Brother could be just another member of the family” (Video Art 213). The nature of 
a live “satellite” installation was one of inclusion, a digitally transmitted anodyne to fears of 
techno-isolation. Conscripting the powers of potentially total surveillance and visibility, Paik 
utilized this mass-availability to beam a familiar coterie of friendly avant-garde artists into the 
living room. Similarly, in the process, he turned the solipsistic view of video as a medium 
serving only itself and its practitioners for a more general commodity for mass consumption, 
amplified additionally by its democratic availability through PBS and its simultaneous 
worldwide release. 
Even the contents of the piece suggested the upbeat. Synth-pop groups like Oingo Boingo 
performed with bouncing vivacity in between similarly good-tempered “high art” performances 
like John Cage’s playing of amplified cactuses. The union of Paris and New York was expressed 
through split screens, at times overlapping in happy confusion—but never alienation—of 




from the US side was the patrician editor of The Paris Review, George Plimpton, looking onto a 
world he didn’t seem to mind diverging from his print-domain with a bemused and avuncular 
expression. Before Charlotte Moorman, an associate of Paik’s, played an amplified “video 
cello,” he even strummed the strings congenially. An attempt at merging these polyglot styles 
with narrative was even attempted in a somewhat oblique capacity.  
A central, and more literary, component was Laurie Anderson’s performance of her 
spoken monologue “The Language of the Future” from her magnum opus, United States (1983), 
performed just a year prior. “Language,” in essence, constructs a vignette regarding a seemingly 
autobiographical account of surviving a plane crash and seeking out empathetic parties on 
ensuing flights. One supposedly commiserating person was a little girl who spoke only in 
“computerese,” and described her “rocky relationship” as “so digital,” as in “on again/off again,” 
always “two things switching.” Such interpersonal interruption, in the language of circuitry and 
misfired transmissional energy, was echoed in Anderson’s own voice, dipping into such low 
octaves of digital distortion that subtitles streamed across the bottom of the screen as 
explanation. Similarly, the use of televisual breakdown was used to comic effect in repartee 
between Mitchell Kriegman and Leslie Fuller. When their interview apparently breaks down, 
Fuller says, “I don’t suppose anyone else can hear us can they?” To which Kriegman replies, “I 
don’t think so,” and Fuller finishes, “Oh good, well then we’re alone.” The use of distortion and 
glitch-inspired intimacy, giving Kriegman an opportunity to bring up an apparently prior 
solicitation of Fuller under the threat of suicide, gives an optimistic spin to the sort of 
telecommunications-gone-awry feel of Gaddis’s later sexual misfirings. The “literary” as present 




simultaneity and perceived community of inter-continental broadcast—a node of utopian belief 
and sincere flourish expanded to a literally mystical degree in video artists like Bill Viola. 
 
Even Agnostics Have Truth: The Verity of Bill Viola 
A true sign of faith in an artistic medium might be a religious conviction that it has the 
ability for revelation, for prophecy. As David Foster Wallace notes with regard to the black-
humored tail end of postmodernism, trained by television to laugh alone at its own joke, the only 
way out of recursion is an earnestness strong enough to resemble religious faith. Such is the 
reestablishment of Bill Viola within his medium during the 1980s, and particularly his turn to an 
explicitly mystical and spiritual material and motivation. 
Viola’s early pieces were of the Krauss-designated reflexive variety, such as “A Non-
Dairy Creamer” (1975) wherein we see a portrait of Viola in a coffee cup disappearing slowly as 
he drinks it. The navel-gazing immanent in this exercise of considering one’s image, however, 
soon gave way to a more fully flowered transcendent phase, beginning around the mid to late 
1970s, and marked by a more pronounced consideration of the divine and the individual’s 
relation to the unknown. This mission has become so identifiable with Viola that a common 
encapsulation of his role in video art is usually as follows: “re-endowing contemporary video art 
with that ability to explore the sacred via the manifestations of the divine in the world, framing 
his images in texts and ideas drawn from vast corpora of religious and mystical writings” 
(Elmarsafy 127). The smallness of his own position next to the “mystical” and “divine” world, 
however, is also continually reified, entrenching his role as documenter, or hermetic observer, 
rather than the transcendent vessel himself. Pieces like “Room for St. John of the Cross” (1983) 




larger installation space, replete with small color TV, as Saint John’s ecstatic, “visionary” poems 
whisper quietly out of the interior against an overwhelming roar in the larger space—a sense of 
being near, but not in total comprehension of, the unknown. His comments on self-prostration 
and merely beholding phenomena are replicated in claims such as: “I relate to the role of the 
mystic in the sense of following a via negativa—of feeling the basis of my work to be in 
unknowing,” and that when “the eyes cannot see, then the only thing to go on is faith;” hence he 
must surround himself only with “questions and not answers” (Viola, Ross, et al, 246, 249, 250). 
Similarly, the notion of video as translating some extra, aural dimension of spiritual 
communication not immediately detectable is divulged in his contextualizing of his own work as 
religious art, claiming it “has to do with an acknowledgement or an awareness or recognition that 
there is something above, beyond, below, beneath what’s in front of our eyes,” (Viola, Ross, et 
al, 143). This sense of a transcendent entity lurking just behind the thin materiality of video, and 
video as waiting, patiently, for the divine to reveal itself (far removed from the caustic nature of 
the postmodern), likewise gestures at Viola’s theories about larger, architectonic wholes lurking 
behind the finished product of video art. 
 Again, to invoke Hayles and her “flickering signifiers,” it is striking to note the 
expansiveness and perceived organic totality behind the finished product Viola detects in his 
own work. In the aptly titled, “Will There Be Condominiums in Cyberspace?” Viola notes the 
sheer degree of space and intact wholes insinuated by an individual sequence or narrative slice. 
On describing the process of first video editing, Viola notes, “I saw then that my piece was 
actually finished and in existence before it was executed on the VTRs [video tape recorders]” 
(“Condominiums” 465). That is, rather than an unknown, hive-like operation of code propping 




ended totality before he chips away the unwanted portions to reveal his embedded work. Like the 
apocryphal elephant that exists in the block of marble if only all the non-elephant elements are 
removed, Viola’s chosen “narrative” is muddled in a cloud of various video potentialities. He 
remarks on this burden of abundance later in describing, “it is only very recently that the ability 
to forget has become a prized skill,”8 noting that in an embarrassment of riches, the ability to 
remove, refine, and hone is paramount (Viola, “Condominiums” 464).9 Works like Reasons for 
Knocking at an Empty House (1982), a durational film in which Viola abstains from sleep for 
three days in a single unadorned room, also frames this excess as a perceived abundance of time; 
Viola’s shifting positions of unease and ennui indicate exponentially expandable tableaus of 
human drama within the unmetered roll of film and length of captured action. The camera can 
run on infinitely, and we will only wait, as Viola seems to, for a more striking event to occur. 
Likewise, the attempt to find a self-examining kernel of dramatic meaning in dead-time, 
or dead-space, is reflected in Viola’s related practice of trying to freeze, or distill, individual and 
ineffable emotions through distortions in physical video mechanisms. Mark Hansen notes the 
affective “autonomy”10 sought in Viola’s slow-downs and manipulations as being central to 
Viola’s pursuit for the unknown. Viola tries to chop, scrape, and slow down the filmic procession 
of events—particularly “high affect” events like children’s birthday parties, religious scenes, and 
moments of intense grief—to find the “missing” presence of the ecstasy that remains 
                                                
8 This statement is oddly reminiscent of Beckett’s aesthetic realization that next to Joyce’s 
expended maximalism, his “way was in impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in taking 
away, in subtracting rather than in adding” (Knowlson 319). 
9 In terms of pure textualism, Rudolf Frieling also asks in Viola’s overwhelming and 
transcendent imagery—married to actually unreadable text in later pieces like The Threshold—
“what is the ‘metatext’ of Viola’s metaphysics?” or rather the persistent manifesto within and 
underlying the over-awed imagery (“Hot Spots” 267). 
10 This autonomy of “affective autonomy” is also integral to Hansen’s theory of perceptual 




uncapturable by his recording. Hansen further says of Viola’s attempt to isolate affect that “the 
motivation…comes from his own wonder at the paradoxical duplicity of emotions—their status 
as both the most fleeting of experiences and in some curious sense autonomous from or outside 
of experience” (260). Hence, in a fashion, these ineffable emotions at the core of these sequences 
are religious—an imbuing of an “essence” to emotionality as abstract as divine knowledge and 
just as unrenderable by human means. Correspondingly, they align with Viola’s notion about a 
“divine” knowledge evading the human eye as one attempts to capture it in film. Hansen walks 
us through Viola’s perceived conundrum in that “even in a still image, which, after all, represents 
a cut with a duration of 1/30 of a second (in video) and which is therefore well below the 
neurophysical threshold of the now, there was not only an excess of emotion, but a certain 
temporal expansion of it beyond the confines of what was captured in the image” (260). Not only 
was a still and frozen image of a larger narrative tableau almost stronger than its place within the 
tableau itself, “beyond the confines,” but a separate strain of emotional charge present “below 
the neurophysical threshold of the now.” The main film from the period relating to this striving 
to find an independent, and somewhat unknowable, affective core is Viola’s 1987 work Passage. 
The grim slowness of Passage, run at one-sixteenth normal speed (Morgan), has the 
unnervingly slight suspension of a video accidentally capturing an assassination. In the captured 
action of a child’s birthday party, one is unsure whether the emotional excess revealed is that of 
joy, or perhaps a perverse sort of anticipation before tragedy—the ambivalence, leaning toward 
tragedy, is amplified by a droning industrial soundtrack. The perspective of the camera seems to 
be of blithe inquirer—largely a product of the slowed speed; if playing at normal tempo, the 
piece would likely assume the nature of simple and joyful parental document. Viola’s interest is 




and invisibly infectious quality of “joy” becomes an outsider’s investigation at how such a thing 
can occur. Joy becomes the “x” factor that Viola cannot comprehend, and no degree of technical 
amplification or modification—slowing, zooming, roaming—can render the “secret” of 
emotional excess viewable.  
 In the fragmenting, slowing, and embedding of micro-affective slides within a larger 
narrative sequence, one can see the deconstruction of video-rendered emotions more acutely than 
in larger-form “cinematic” narrative. To counter Lev Manovich’s claim in The Language of New 
Media that essentially all new media can be harnessed within the laws, perspective, and 
theorizations of cinema and cinematic imagery, 11 Viola’s work in pieces like Passage reveals an 
explicit attempt to reveal the unseen, the off- or behind-the-screen in the very process of filming 
itself. Viola is merely replicating thought processes or emotions that happen to occur, or are 
preserved for visual scrutiny through the medium of video. Hansen likewise reiterates this notion 
of the unknowable in Viola’s own “via negativa” terms, downplaying usual sensory apparatus in 
Viola’s transition “from models of the eye and ear to thought processes” (467-468). Hansen’s 
cerebral and cognitive perspective is an extension of Barthes’ notion of the “Third Meaning” in 
film—an “obtuse” meaning behind the obvious, or “informational,” interpretation and secondary 
“symbolic” one, here rendered as a charged one of emotion and cognition (Barthes, “Third 
Meaning” 52-54). This third meaning is brought forth by the disintegration, slow-down, or 
realization of artificiality in the medium itself, giving view to the ineffable realm beyond 
metaphor or symbolism, much as Nam June Paik cuts through to analog-modulated wavelengths 
                                                
11 Hansen primarily contests the oscillation in use of this “cinematic” frame, at once broadly 
covering “the mobile camera, representations of space, editing techniques, narrative conventions, 
spectator activity [etc]” as well as the relatively historically specific convention of “the 
projection of a moving image on a screen in a darkened theater to largely immobilized viewers” 





in video transmission. Similarly, part of the fuel for the fire of this “obtuseness” is, as Viola 
expresses in a “note” from 1981, the strangling and reduction that literal explanation exerts on 
the intangible emotions or thought processes left suspended in film. He writes, “There are image 
symbols which can barely be articulated. / They belong to the domain of the visual memory. / 
Committing them to words rapes their secrets” (Viola, Reasons 79). The pathway to the divine, 
for Viola, is achieved by means of shedding the extraneousness of words to reach a purity of 
symbol, resonating for him with a “deeper” purpose. 
 Indeed, Viola’s belief in the power of video is so extreme as to possibly regard it as the 
aesthetic equivalent of “new age” music or pan-spiritual anodyne; he effectively erases any 
suggestion of the concurrent video art practice of highlighting the absurd or sadly human. 
Critiques of Viola’s over-estimation and uncontested faith in video to convey pan-spiritual 
influences—from Gnostic Christian to Sufi to Buddhist—usually relate to the degree that 
spiritualism is seen as a catchall, or “miracle pill” of enlightenment at one’s convenience (the 
October-affiliated Art Since 1900 noting that such “mystical experience” might just be 
“mystification” [656]). This “softness” and “goodness” at the heart of Viola’s project is in stark 
contrast to the early sardonic and self-exploratory gestures that laid the foundation of video’s 
origins. Against pieces like Vito Acconci’s Trademarks (1970), wherein the artist bites every 
available inch of skin to create indents used to then cast sellable models from, or Chris Burden’s 
Shoot (1971), wherein he was shot in the arm with a rifle, Viola’s “transcendent phase” marks a 
moment of utilitarian spirituality in a medium usually concerned with the performer’s body as a 
currency of authenticity. Indeed, Michael Rush’s comment that Viola exhibited as “attention to 
personal narratives that reflect a quest for identity” (New Media Art 105), reveals Viola’s desire 




Particularly when viewed against a postmodern fetishization of evading emotional vulnerability, 
and active negation of any higher master narratives, or even religion, Viola’s fascination with 
sharpening a core moment of emotional nakedness and religious yearning is striking. Yet, this 
individualism-for-sake-of-the-general-good, pseudo-Christ-ethic is perhaps set into greater relief 
by parallel cases. Video artists like Bruce Nauman, whose reframed, Beckettian sequences of 
pain and absurdity reveal the quest for identity as not so easy, yet still possible through poignant 
satire, and Chris Burden, whose direct and terrorist-like “hijackings” of airwaves reveal an 
abrupt assertion of control over a potentially passive medium. 
 
Nauman, Burden, Jokes, and Cruelty 
 Though Viola is concerned with the transcendently religious, and Nauman the comically 
absurd, both artists rely on a supra-material charge in order to escape the at-times paralyzing 
reflexivity of “self-aware” art. Wallace’s charge that postmodernism (in literature but seeping 
into fellow fields through the shared influence of television) was unable to get out of its own 
“who can more hiply posture” dilemma prompts the need for a jolt, or internal short-circuit. 
Nauman’s constant alliance with Beckett—going so far as to name one piece Slow Angle Walk 
(Beckett Walk) after the gait of Beckett’s characters Molloy and Watt—is logical in this sense, to 
find in repetition, absurdity, and starkness, some sort of extra-narrative truth. These repetitions, 
couched in a violent antagonism of audience, or rather a firm belief in striking the audience with 
intense imagery without explanation, act to jumpstart potential recursions and numbnesses in the 
drama of the work and video art generally. These attempts at direct engagement can be viewed in 
a variety of forms throughout the 70s and 80s. Examples of direct address include Richard 




are consumed in the televisual pact; Chris Burden’s purchase of primetime advertising spots to 
inject self-mutilating performance art like Through the Night Softly (1973); or Bill Viola’s video 
portraits of immobile and stagnant TV spectators in Reverse Television – Portraits of Viewers 
(1984). The addition of a blackly humorous repetition, or secret injection of authenticity into an 
overtly “fake” TV program presented, however, is uniquely Nauman, and further reveals the 
boredom expressed in both original TV and its parody. 
 A salient example of Nauman’s recursive humor is 1985’s Good Boy Bad Boy. Two 
correspondents, with the glazed and sternly understanding expressions of afterschool-special 
spokespeople, look directly into the camera, each delegated to his and her own TV sets in the 
installation. With this same look of mock-empathy, they relate a litany of self-evident statements, 
now made even more boring in their monotonous recall and endless list form. What might be 
sexualized in television ads to sell banal products is now undercut with the correspondents’ 
unadorned declarations that “I have sex, you have sex, we have sex.” The flat delivery seems to 
beg the question that if sex is such a common phenomenon, why is it so readily co-optable to sell 
suntan lotion and sports cars?  Likewise, the life of a TV broadcaster, or perhaps just any denizen 
of the TV saturated republic (DFW dwells on the statistic that the “average American household” 
watches TV over six hours a day [“E Unibus” 22]), is claimed as “boring.” “You’re boring, life 
is boring,” both broadcasters intone with disenchanted urgency. A further disconnect is 
suggested by the two monologues playing slightly out of synch with one another, highlighting 
the self-involved, non-reciprocal sort of dialogues expected out of a TV correspondent. They 
talk, but are incapable of talking to one another. Each simply operates on a separate, isolated 
loop. The farce of the broadcasters nakedly revealing details about themselves—the fact that 




hearing this from supposedly venerable TV figures. True to Nauman’s talent for drawing 
surprisingly convincing generalities and caricatures, then joyfully puncturing them, Good Boy 
Bad Boy presents a sly critique in its repetition and deadpan delivery. 
 What is useful about such work is a highlighting, and useful manipulation, of the medium 
against itself. While interventionist politics in the video art world had been a touchstone since the 
beginning—Chris Burden, already on the extreme end, evidenced a particularly virulent example 
in his performance of a live TV Hijack (1972) where he held a surprised correspondent at actual 
knife point—here we see the more indirect use of a kind of phantom textuality to complete the 
act. The litany of banal statements amplified by the audio-visual context of the fake broadcast 
environment accumulates in the viewer’s mind, much like a list of seemingly endless objects in a 
postmodern novel,12 to a sum absurdity and critique beyond its individual components.  
 Nauman’s 1986 piece Violent Incident fleshes out this repeat-it-until-it-breaks aesthetic. 
As mentioned before, and apparent in its title, Nauman’s purpose is to shock the viewer, to stun 
him or her out of complacency. His overtly bleak humor, however, is tempered by his professed 
belief in the power of jokes. He claims to have always been a moralist, an identity he links to his 
upbringing in the Midwest, and looks to Man Ray as a paragon for his brand of moralism, as “his 
[Man Ray’s] art works tended to be jokes—stupid jokes” (Simon 321). In Violent Incident, we 
see the “joking” nature only upon repetition of the “incident” in question, that being of a couple 
that has a slowly escalating “fight,” begun humorously by one pulling a chair out from under the 
other, then ending climactically in murder. This same sequence, however, is repeated over and 
over again, with different configurations of the practical joker and victim. Any pointed social 
critique in the piece, perhaps about one gender’s predominate violence against the other, is 
                                                
12 For a broader treatment of the list in postmodern novels, see Patricia White’s Gatsby’s Party: 




rendered null by the constant, interchanging roles of violence from one partner to the other (and 
additionally made mechanical by a reversal of which gender attacks the other, a substitution of 
same sex partners, and so on). Nauman’s declaration that the inspiration for the piece lies in 
broad human cruelty and the absurdity of human relationships is made all the more poignant by 
the set-up of the piece in installation with various sequences playing simultaneously on a bank of 
twelve TVs (Simon 332-333). It is as if we, the viewers, are watching the grand comedy of all 
minor terrors, or minor cruelties, of relationships all over the world at once. Additionally, the 
installation set-up provides a total “meta-framing” and immersivity almost exclusive to 
installation art.  
 However, Nauman creates in such absurdity, occasionally wracked by moments of 
trauma or violence, a paradox of delirium and illumination. Again, we see a Beckett-like, 
revolving wheel of prescribed traumas and comic escalations of petty prank-pulling climaxing in 
murders that are individually pointless or null, yet when seen as a totality register a sum 
absurdity. Even with the cyclic numbness derived by playing the sequence over and over, we 
receive only explicitly the most “violent” sequence of action, produced wholly outside of 
context, and ending quickly. Nauman claims that his pieces should feel like “getting hit in the 
face with a baseball bat,” without framed “introduction” or “tail” out (Simon 320). The mixture 
of quick, context-less pain in a numbing repetition opens up a hypnotic space of pondering, kept 
in tension between lull and agony. This breaking through has been described as a sort of 
transcendence to a blank, nowhere space, abstracted from a single, followable narrative. Kathryn 
Chion describes Nauman as “mapping spatially what is characteristically conceived linearly as 




been painted almost into a diorama—a total effect achieved by dwarfing each individual 
narrative.  
 Rather than the collaged “incidents” gesturing to a transcendent yet purgatorial realm, a 
parallel thread in video art sought to rupture the fabric of obvious mediation or falsified 
representation in a single, traumatic blast. None epitomized this approach more starkly than 
Chris Burden. A forerunner of extreme performance art, his method was to project a field of 
danger littered with “risky” and potentially lethal opportunities—much as Marina Abramovic 
would touch on in her “Rhythm 0” piece (1974), offering the use a bevy of arranged objects to 
use on her, including a loaded gun—yet condensed into a single trauma point. This grid of risk is 
most directly encapsulated in Burden’s infamous 1971 piece, Shoot, the terse notes for which 
claim, in part, “At 7:45pm [November 19th, 1971] I was shot in the left arm by a friend” 
(“Work: Confrontation and War” 210). Video documentation proved vital to create cryptic 
tableaus of unexplained and seeming anecdotal scenes of personal pain. In one of the few 
surviving still images from “Shoot,” Burden stands apart from any visible crowd, his face too 
obscured to see any anticipation, faced only directly by his gun-toting friend in almost surreal 
imitation of the Tiananmen Square protestor (“Selected Works”). Most striking in the image is 
the celestial-looking white space, framing him in abstract—“in this instant I was a sculpture,” he 
says, perhaps the most non-living object possible, given further isolation and “freezing” in the 
documentation of the event. Critic Kristine Stiles notes, “rather than highlight the sensational 
aspect of his deed, Burden focused on the aesthetic result of his act and its photographic 
documentation” (“Burden of Light” 30). Considering Burden’s initial intent to stage the 
performance on campus at the University of California at Irvine, and subsequent relocation to his 




nonsense, seven-second video of the act, is worth noting (“Burden of Light” 30). Beyond the 
singular directness and bold signature-making of “Shoot,” however, Burden’s early work from 
the 1970s also reveals a plethora of strategies for breaking through the numbing monolithic 
influence of controlled video programming, namely through violence. 
 Remarkable in their direct breaking of an assumed fourth-wall and true confrontation of 
TV as a sheerly entertaining medium, Burden’s televised pieces from the 1970s reveal a meeting 
of television’s influence with a wielded weapon. Firstly, Burden’s 1972 piece TV Hijack 
attempts to pierce the social contract of television, and particularly tritely “familiar” set-up of 
mock-friendly broadcasters toyed with in Nauman’s Good Boy Bad Boy, by an abrupt 
interruption of his own formulaic interview. Burden’s piece, essentially, consists of consenting to 
an interview with a local cable news station under the agreement that the interview will be 
broadcast live, and he can bring his own film crew to produce their own segment. When the 
interviewer asks Burden about his upcoming projects, he produces a knife, holds it to her throat, 
and threatens to kill her if the producers cut the live feed. The scene is made additionally tense 
by his assurances that he will make her perform a series of lewd actions if anyone should sever 
the transmission. While the morality of the piece has been questioned—Maggie Nelson cites the 
non-consent of the “victim” as breaking the Hippocratic pact of “do no harm” understood in 
performance art (115-118)—there is no denying Burden’s attempt to change the chemistry of a 
usually softened exchange with “live” unpredictability, and potential harm. He attempts to 
plunder and “hijack” the mercurial “live” element perceived beneath the network television’s 
easy, conversational air, and create some sort of alchemical product from the raised, and very 




 A more commercially complicit attempt to rupture the televisual pact is also apparent in 
Burden’s TV Commercials 1973-1977 pieces. By purchasing micro-chunks of time of prime time 
television (usually ten seconds or so), he interjects abrasive, un-contextualized video into the 
regular flow of programmed material. The most disconcerting in the slew of “commercials” is 
Burden’s piece Through the Night Softly, in which we see a nearly nude Burden crawling across 
a tarmac littered with broken glass in black and white, the only noises his strained breathing as 
he passes over the shards. In Burden’s own documentation of the event, the particularly benign 
material before and after the piece—a commercial for a music compilation called “Good 
Vibrations” and a perhaps unintentionally homoerotic ad for deodorizing soap (“Selected 
Works”)—acts to further reveal the sleepy banality of what has otherwise been previously 
perceived as simply “the way TV has to be.” Others in the sequence are more aloof or likely 
unrecognizable or conceivable to a late night TV watcher, such as Poem for LA in which Burden 
repeats the mantra “SCIENCE HAS FAILED, HEAT IS LIFE, TIME KILLS,” or Chris Burden 
Promo, in which Burden’s name jumps forth, in glaringly bright script, after artists like Leonardo 
Da Vinci and Pablo Picasso (chosen for recognition among laypersons). Most remarkable is the 
attempt to feign a discourse with an overtly one-directional medium by wholesale interjection of 
one’s material, no matter how alienating abrasive (all the better, for Burden), and simply leave 
the viewer to wade through his own her own disconcerted impression. This injection of agonized 
selfhood into the supposedly unidirectional flow of television, however, is more complexly 
engaged with in the work of another contemporary jolted back into some simulacra of reality 
through a concise gunshot: Andy Warhol.  
 Though non-consensually subject to the gunshot, Warhol’s awareness of both the 




much finer grain to notions of TV interactivity and co-opted postmodern reflexivity than Burden. 
Warhol’s painful jump back to reality that is in itself more false and flat than his “fantasy” 
contrasts with Burden’s rendering of a somatic absolute in the viscerality and potential 
woundedness of his body. David Joselit makes much of Warhol’s claim, in his diary, that after 
being shot he knew he was only “watching television,” and that “the movies make emotions look 
so strong and real, whereas when things really do happen to you, it’s like watching television—
you don’t feel anything” (Feedback 116). Joselit gives great significance to Warhol’s 
paradoxical imbuing of “movies” and “television” with both strength and anhedonia; that, in a 
fashion, the jolting violence of the gunshot returned him to a greater sense of reality, yet this 
“reality” was simultaneously unveiled as more “fake” than his previous experience. What is 
highlighted, according to Joselit, is the “infinite regress” this sort of TV-based-on-life and life-
based-on-TV effects, that “’TV’ and ‘life’ mutually de-realize one another” into a mutually bland 
reflection of absent feeling (Feedback 117). Likewise, it is the piercing reality of “pain” that 
allows the return to some semblance of lived experience. Joselit notes, “For Warhol, the exit 
from the wonderland of televisual disorientation was through the insistent physicality of the 
body, through pain” (Feedback 117). As a sort of metaphysical Burden, Warhol attempted to 
jump through the frame of the nonstop “Shoot” piece that became his life, only to find the 
exterior nearly as mediated as before. 
 While critics such as Wayne Koestenbaum catalogue extensively the filmic works of 
Warhol as a significant analogue to his typically more famous silkscreens and written pieces, 
delineating the trends of sexual inertia and prolonged endurance in the films as expressions of 
Warhol’s own sublimated urges, Warhol’s expression of the inadequacy of written transcription 




“Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” or a meta-textual comment on his own pursuit to 
cull intimacy from the shifting constellation of “Superstars” and Factory workers. In particular, 
Joselit notes the incoherence of the likely drug-induced progression of the 24 hour chat session a 
supposedly captures, claiming its fragmentation reveals that “experience escapes mechanical 
reproduction,” that a missing, aural “x” factor cannot be rendered by documentary media like 
tape recorders (Feedback 117). The ultimate deficiency of recording media—rendered 
figuratively in the refusal to reveal the actual point of action in the suggestively titled Blow Job 
(1964)—is more perceptibly heightened in a, precipitating Warhol’s gunshot epiphany that 
capturing “strong and real” emotions is more difficult than it may first appear. Further, rather 
than be explicitly marked by these inadequate media, and the fragments and lacunas left in their 
attempt to render a impossible temporality or vividness, Warhol’s late masterpiece Shadows in 
1968 reveals an employment, rather than aversion to, this murky occlusion of true “desire” or 
revelation beneath the screen’s surface. 
 Like depictions of veiled church ornaments, the Shadow paintings seem to indicate 
Wallace’s “single-entendre principles” of truth and revelation while revealing nothing—an 
offering of something deep, dark, perhaps even religious, yet obscuring it beneath the overall 
trope of the “shadow.” Comprised of colored prints depicting a shadow in Warhol’s office, and 
presented in a kaleidoscopic surround within a single room, the paintings push for the invoked 
aurality missing in the literality of a’s transcription. Koestenbaum links these back to the pain, 
and shattering effect, of the gunshot. “On one level,” he claims, “the shadow is Andy himself, 
who, after the 1968 shooting, felt substanceless—neither liquid nor solid, neither living nor 
dead” (183). A perfect ruse, the paintings were both a declaration of the purgatorial subsistence 




religious truism remaining out of view. They were an attempt to get beyond the literal inscription 
of the paint, but before the conceptual execution—a suspended space where the potentially 
rebounded “regress” of recorded life could be arrested long enough to see. Likewise, the 
muddied cover of the shadows themselves gestured at the non-included information or personal 
elements that might otherwise be rendered, and seen as ineffectual. Koestenbaum again notes, 
“the shadows, like the films, stake a claim to what is passing and has passed: they anxiously 
ferret out inscrutable phenomena (sex, sleep, breathing, eating)” (183). The paintings are an 
admission of failure, rather than the pained attempt to draw out the miraculous moment of climax 
from various human functions. At core, the freezing of libido forms the most essential keystone 
to Warhol’s aesthetics—“time is sexual; that is why it must be stopped” (Koestenbaum 5). 
 
Two Sides of a Shadow: Stelarc, Chat Bots, and the Phantom Libido 
 This suspension of libido beneath an opaque surface, or shattering into murky, ill-defined 
projected bodies, is a bridge into the ontology of explicitly digital personhood. As will be 
discussed momentarily in the instance of conversational “chat bots,” or programmed entities 
crafted either to make conversation or erotic repartee, the atomizing of erotic urge into a 
phantasmal sub-textual space is the first movement towards an evocative manipulation of 
medium for new narrative possibilities. Veiled intentions, obscured personas, and amorphous 
desire are hallmarks of Warhol’s art-making apparatus, yet these tendencies are revisited with a 
far more conscious “inhuman” or “posthuman” intent in explicitly cybernetic artists attempting 
to use technology to morph, or mutate, their own bodily processes. With the body as merely a 
template to be expanded on, artists splicing intact wholes into dissembled and prosthetic pieces 




  In the work of performance artist Stelarc, the literal manifestations of “connection” and 
entwinement with one’s technological apparatus is amplified to the extreme.13  Rather than 
awakening from life’s daily mediation by a single jolting gunshot like Warhol or Burden, Stelarc 
instead spreads this pain in individual, bifurcating points to the entire epidermal area in an 
attempt to transform the boundary of his ontological personhood. Though later embracing a more 
baroque array of cyborgian activities—attaching artificially grown ears into his forearms, 
attaching robotic prostheses, undergoing highly invasive and interiorly mapping “surgeries”—
Stelarc’s first utilized art form was that of bodily “suspension” by a network of hooks. A sort of 
Warholian “shadow” rendered real, Stelarc “suspends” himself with a latticework of hooked 
lines allowing him to float by an even distribution of pinpricks, floating into a sort of abstract 
body potentiality. His first suspensions took place with harnesses, yet he declares that he was 
compelled to move steadily into hooks and the “total” suspension they afforded, sustaining the 
body on its own force. These hooked suspensions, beginning in 1984 and progressing through 
the decade, mark an early attempt to delimit the body from its corporeal boundaries that would 
later manifest as mechanical extensions and data-gathering instruments. His recounting of his 
first suspension, called “Seaside Suspension,” describes the body being suspended from “an 
outcrop of rocks parallel to the horizon, looking out to sea near the shore as the tide was coming 
in [sic] the weather was overcast with the blustery wind swaying the body” (“Suspensions”). 
With the body “swaying” moved by the “blustery wind” in a matched syncopation, flesh 
becomes elemental. Dissociated from the recognizable form of the body, Stelarc becomes a 
warped and mutable structure as pliable as wind or water. 
                                                
13 Stelarc’s fraternity and acceptance within a posthuman and lived science fiction model can be 
seen in Brian Massumi’s chapter on Stelarc in Parables of the Virtual, “The Evolutionary 
Alchemy of Reason: Stelarc.” Further, cyberpunk patriarch William Gibson tellingly offers the 




 Brian Massumi discusses Stelarc’s shattering of human ontology through limb-by-limb 
and patch-of-skin by patch-of-skin interventions, in his broader survey of affect and virtuality, 
Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (2002). In doing so he positions Stelarc, 
namely in his suspensions, as providing a changing or mercurial provocation of what a body 
could or might be moment to moment. In Massumi’s conception, Stelarc’s suspended form offers 
a sort of Deleuzian body without organs undergoing continual de- and re-territorialization 
simultaneously. Like Deleuze and Guattari’s example of a developing egg presenting nascent, 
embryonic possibilities of its later self in external, manifested inscriptions, Stelarc’s “hung” body 
is a living potentiality of concurrent erasure and overwriting. Recalling the “computerese” 
language mentioned in Laurie Anderson’s “The Language of the Future,” Massumi goes on to 
describe the “hung” body and its array of micro-fissures as maintaining a sort of circuit board 
logic, a collection of binary switches determining extended and relaxed tissue. He claims, 
Stelarc’s art produces the hung body. Hung thing shave entered science and lore 
under the aegis of chaos theory. The focus of chaos theory are events called 
‘bifurcation points’ or ‘singular points.’ A singular point occurs when a system 
enters a particular state of indecision, where what its next state will be turns 
entirely unpredictable. (Massumi 109) 
Hence Stelarc’s body becomes a living oscilloscope or Geiger counter, jumping around in an 
erratic detection of its own boundary and force—its very state a constellation of potentialities, its 
next move, reorganization, or rupture, split infinitely along each “bifurcation point.” Through 
this virtuality, and entwining its more abstract potentiality, however, is the “pain” incurred in 
such a performance. Stelarc notes that though it often takes him several days to revive and calm 




His performance is then not only a Zen-like fixation on elemental sublimity, but a harsh, pain-
derived call to knowing the abstract potentiality of the human body stretched by an evenly 
applied stress. 
 In a move both curiously human and posthuman, however, Stelarc’s broader goal has 
been to neutralize or eradicate the human body by human means. He titled his major monograph 
Obsolete Bodies/Suspensions/Stelarc, as if laying out a linear cause and effect process in 
reverse—the performance persona of “Stelarc” repeatedly training the body by “suspension” into 
a final state of “obsole[scence].” Massumi quotes Virilio’s take on Stelarc’s suspensions as a 
means to “negate” the body “in favor of pure sensation,” rupturing a notion of “form” defined by 
skin to a notion of “form” derived by limned sensation (103). Massumi further describes this 
phenomena not only with the neutralization of Stelarc’s old body, but the gesturing towards a 
new one, one fully inscribed by desire, in claiming, “Desire is the condition of evolution” (123). 
This notion is particularly novel in requiring the baroque infrastructure of hanging—both 
physically complex in its arrangement yet relatively simple in its materials—to “purify” the 
object into a state of raw or elemental emotion. Further, in the networked connotations of this 
“hanging” and its entwinement with desire, corporeal “want” and the body negated entirely, one 
sees a useful presaging of digital and cybertextual modes of communication and erotic 
connection. Indeed, Stelarc’s later pieces from the 90s, marked by the developing logic of the 
Internet (and ARPANET) becoming publically available, reveal a literalization of this logic. In 
his 1995 piece Telepolis for instance, Stelarc straps himself to a system of electroshock conduits 
controlled by a local user network operated by autonomous participants, sending their literal and 
emotive “shocks” anonymously yet proximately, rendering intention both abstract and sharply 




 Historically, however, this microcosm of transforming the discernible body into phantom 
libido wasn’t wholly limited by pain, televisual mediation, or performance art. Rather, as 
Katherine Hayles has argued, certain terms within concepts of information theory, cybernetics, 
and artificial intelligence in the mid-twentieth century presaged a larger shift to the “posthuman,” 
or dissolution of the singular, physically enclosed, and biologically singular individual. She 
draws from Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, and his concept of the “feedback loop,” 
or the potential for systems to receive information back from external appendages and hence 
create a larger sensory apparatus. This expansion of a system’s sensory network extends to a 
conception of posthuman ontology as relying more on “systems…constituted by flows of 
information” than neatly defined “epidermal surfaces” (Hayles, Posthuman 84). Hayles 
expresses the ontological questions raised by these broader shifts in a question used by Gregory 
Bateson to baffle his graduate students: whether a blind man’s cane should ontologically be 
considered part of the blind man (Posthuman 84). Under a cybernetics rubric, Hayles argues, the 
cane should, supplying as it does necessary information about the man’s surroundings and 
sensory environment. Likewise, Hayles notes other shifts in the disintegration in the physically 
enclosed human shell. Namely, Shannon and Weaver’s reconceptualization of “information” 
under a much less subjective, and more mathematical rubric, as “an entity distinct from the 
substrates carrying it” (Hayles, Posthuman xi). Likewise, for Alan Turing in his famous test for 
“intelligence,” the body that harbored the “intelligent” substance was immaterial, as proof of 
humanity was merely “formal generation and manipulation of informational patterns” (Hayles, 
Posthuman xi). This last twist of posthuman subjectivity is important, as it lends a strong 
emphasis within strains of A.I. informed by Turing to conversation and disembodied textual 




within new media textuality, as well as a means for two physically hidden individuals to reach 
some consummate central territory of “connection,” the notion of “intelligent” material removed 
from a physical vessel is essential. Indeed, with such façades removed, it becomes easier to see 
alternate modes of communication as indicating a more direct capacity for “connection.”  
 Chief in these “alternate modes” during the 1980s was the proliferation of “chat bots,” or 
deceivingly human-like textual programs made to present itself as a “real” and conversation-
ready human partner. In more vivacious and “human-like” content, the interactive chat bots of 
the 70s and 80s offer a more convincing, dramatic, and hence literary textual interchange than 
that of more sterile or functionally game-oriented analogues in interactive fiction (themselves 
riddled with programmed entities returning automated responses, e.g. “you may take the jug,” 
“open the door.”)14 Similarly, the dissolution of personality within the black box of computer 
algorithm, reminiscent of Stelarc dissolving his physical appearance into purified “libido,” came 
under the aegis of a relatable façade, concerned principally with easing a human partner into 
conversation by pre-programmed enticements (sometimes equally motivating “human” 
rebuttals). These invitations to interact were also, predictably,15 linked to the more sexual 
flirtations in more explicitly “erotic”- or “dating”-themed chat bots, which were granted a greater 
sense of “personhood” and authenticity based on the blinding urges of their partners. The ability 
to interact, and even achieve a degree of sexual release, in explicitly textual format also reveals a 
highly evocative merging of new media, connection, and narrative, that I would argue offers a 
compelling new paradigm in one’s ability to textually interact.  
                                                
14 For more on the history of interactive fiction, see Nick Montfort’s Twisty Little Passages: An 
Approach to Interactive Fiction (2005). 
15 Erotic game maker Mike Saenz sums up this inherent link between technological development 
and libido as “the first personal robots, let’s face it, are not going to be built to bring people 




 The founding model of the chat bot is ELIZA, programmed by Joseph Weizenbaum at 
MIT between 1964 and 1966 and effecting its humanity by posing a series of recursive questions 
culled from the answers submitted by its human partner. The intent of ELIZA was to pose as a 
Rogerian psychotherapist, supposedly eliciting revelations and curative insights by merely 
probing the information that was already set forth by the inquirer. For example, if one claimed, 
“I feel sad,” ELIZA might respond, “Why do you think you feel sad?” Somewhere in the 
exchange—or perhaps caused by ELIZA’s auto-responses resembling the mechanical 
predictability of a caricatured Rogerian—the plausibility of ELIZA’s humanness was supposedly 
established. This merging of artificial intelligence with a presumed benefit to human 
psychological comfort evidences a larger trend remarked on by media sociologist Sherry Turkle 
within the dual fields of therapy and programmed companionship. Turkle notes that during the 
mid 80s to 90s,  
At the same time computers were gaining acceptance as intimate machines, 
psychotherapy was being conceptualized as less intimate… the world of self-help 
was also in flower, much of it involving a do-it-yourself ideology to which the 
computer seemed ideally suited. (Turkle, Life 103) 
In addition to “automated” therapy bots like ELIZA, this computerized “self-help” wave gave 
birth even to depersonalized toolkits like “Depression 2.0,” which offered symptom-specific aid 
within the façade of a “human” therapist (Turkle, Life 102). Turkle notes also how users 
overcome their initial skepticism towards computerized therapy through a deeper belief in what a 
digitally accessible psychoanalytic archive could offer. An archive, for instance, could 
potentially hold more far-reaching and immediately accessible depository of facts than an 




information for use, allows an additional set of blinders to what otherwise might be predictable 
or rote responses from a (particularly therapy-oriented) chat bot. The convincingness of ELIZA 
as a potential conversational partner, whether one was ever fully “duped” by her insightful or 
clinical capabilities, still so disturbed her creator that he felt impelled to write the AI-corrective 
Computer Power and Human Reason in 1976, arguing that the essential qualities of humanity, 
such as love or reason, were in fact impossible to replicate in computers (Montfort, “Computer 
Power” 367-368). The inflection of an additional quality and perhaps “essential” quality—
namely libido—into the equation, however, changes the picture substantially. 
 Much as a drunk patron at a singles bar might adjust what level “humanity” or 
“personality” might be deemed sufficient based on increasing levels of desperation, the 
flirtatiousness of more sensually inclined chat bots offers a useful insight into how sexual need 
can alter the basic amount of “humanity” required to be convincing. A famous and decidedly 
more coy chat bot, Julia, was created by Dr. Michael Mauldin on the foundation of ELIZA and 
haunted the MUDs, or Multiple-User Dungeons, that formed the backbone of an early, pre-
Internet chat system (Turkle, Life 88). Julia was most efficacious sheerly through her ability to 
“flirt” by means of “sarcastic non sequiturs” and bizarre literalism (usually in response to more 
figurative jokes) that respondents misinterpreted as coyness (Turkle, Life 88). The notion that 
sarcastic put-downs and skeptical repeating and defusing of a participant’s romantic forays is 
interpreted as more “human” is itself troubling, and oddly presages Wallace’s own concern over 
two-dimensional and irony-saturated characters in postmodern fiction being seen as “real.” An 
example of Julia’s “human-seeming” literalism can be seen in a chat participant, Barry, 
discussing possibly making a baby “someday,” to which Julia replies, “The date is Tue Jul 21 




to insinuate that she might make a baby “someday” with him as merely wit. Likewise, her 
abrasiveness propels the conversation through tougher spots. When Barry questions whether she 
is in fact human, and if she is human why she is so continually stand-offish, she responds with 
the perhaps ultimate stereotype of feminine defensiveness, “I have PMS.” Likewise, 
disturbingly, such blunt forthrightness and raising of personal declarations meant to shut down 
inquiry in the other party apparently work quite well. The somewhat sad pantomime of invitation 
and reproof, attempted joking and literalist shut-down, going on longer than the attemptedly 
therapeutic relation of ELIZA, seems to offer a troubling precedent about what one perceives as 
“real,” particularly under the aegis of sexual connection. Indeed, Turkle notes that in Turing’s 
terminology, it is uncertain whether Julia has passed a Turing test or Barry has failed one (Life 
90-93).  
 Concurrently, erotic communication fueled the development of early chat rooms, known 
as MUDs—or Multiple-User Dungeons—and the Bulletin Board Systems (or BBSs) that formed 
the backbone of pre-Internet discourse in the loose coalition of networks that comprised 
ARPANET. Event Horizons, a 1983 company, was known as the first explicitly “adult BBS” 
system in an era before the America Online Chat rooms of the mid to late 90s would offer a 
menagerie of sexual curiosities in their pre-formed chat rooms (Dery, Escape Velocity 204). 
BBSs like Event Horizon, and the considerably more massive counterparts like the WELL, or 
Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link, would eventually form the connective tissue of the World Wide 
Web proper when it was publically debuted by Tim Berners-Lee in 1992. Before that time, 
however, the BBSs and MUDs were rife with interactive “game-playing,” hence the “Dungeons” 




 The practice of cyber sex in the MUD was called “TinySex,” after yet another alternate 
name of MUD, TinyMUD. And, true to its derivation from “fan”-oriented chatroms in the MUD, 
its free-associative style, and “suspended reality” of blind composition, offered a unique form of 
erotic co-creation. In trying to describe the peculiarly futuristic and appealing aspect of the 
practice, Hannu Eerikäinen notes that the “sex machine” offers an “apparatic extension of the 
body,” acting as a “sexual prosthetic system” (“Desire for Disembodiment” 206). Given Hayles’s 
conception of a posthuman system constantly seeking the outer sensory extremities of itself, 
“TinySex” was particularly titillating for its ability to morph one’s ontology, to shift and adapt to 
this new “prosthesis” in which the only limit point of possibility was the rendered textual 
description of it. The air of “suspended disbelief” that surrounded such interchanges then 
allowed for a mutually composed sexual interaction that allowed for mutual input and mutual 
correctives. Mark Dery, in his discussion of TinySex in the cyberculture history Escape Velocity, 
describes an abstracted exchange removed from the impositions of the “real” when one user, 
BethR, claims she is “climbing on top” of another user, Roger104, who has already claimed he is 
“having sex standing up” with another user “Nina5” in a corner (Dery, Escape 201). The 
malleability of the exchange allows a quick narrative fix by which Roger104 and Nina5 become 
so heated they fall, hence opening the path for BethR’s climb; such acts allow “consensual 
world-building” and group-centered improvisation (Dery, Escape 201). The almost collegial co-
construction of narrative under an aegis of suspended reality here lends a certain instability and 
anticipatory tension to the exchange, and unlike imagination wrought by desperation in a chat 
bot like Julia, relies on collaboration rather than desirous haranguing.  
 To return to a prior point, such mutability was also therapeutic. In describing the nascent 




near-complete control over one’s sexual expression, gender, and physical appearance in the 
MUDs. During her test sessions at MIT where she was professor, she discovered a plethora of 
students taking therapeutic advantage of the morphological uncertainty offered by the identity-
veiling MUD system. That is, if one was so inclined, one could change their gender (such 
participants known as a MORFs, or “Male or Female”), sex, or even species, if one was so 
inclined. The nature of the unique occlusion of one’s physical body, as well as any last remaining 
identity markers in one’s voice, allowed a unique platform for experimentation. She notes that 
one of her students, Doug, “plays four characters distributed across three different MUDs. One is 
a seductive woman, one is a macho, cowboy type” (Turkle, Life 13). Turkle claims that 
participants think little about the curiosities of “passing” for multiple identities, opening fruitful 
channels for thinking about the malleability of gender and sexuality in non-digital realms.16 
 Complicit also in this nexus of mercurial identity, and the potential ruptures of violence 
accompanying a disturbance in one’s projected or assumed persona, is a larger theme of 1980s 
science fiction of replicants and cyborgian poseurs. This conflict is perhaps best crystallized in 
Philip K. Dick’s classic Do Androids Dream of Electronic Sheep? (1968), drilled into the early 
80s pop-cultural subconscious in the form of Ridley Scott’s adaptation of the work as Blade 
Runner (1982). The film’s philosophical query isn’t so much whether cyborgs can ever be 
passably “human” company (they can) or even complicit and convincing love partners (they are 
                                                
16 Against this current of utopian flexibility, one incursion of the “real” by means of anti-
mediated violence arose in the form of “MUD Rape,” or rather, making another avatar subject 
nonconsensually to one’s articulated (and usually aggressive) fantasies. Turkle remarks on the 
uncertainty of how to regulate such linguistically violent actions, citing the position of anti-
pornography activist Catherine MacKinnon that “words describing acts of violence towards 
women are social actions” and should be punished as intimations of real deeds (Turkle, Life 
252). The literalization of supposed fantasy into policeable reality only arriving through this stab 





to an almost designed degree), but the ethics more broadly of loving or making love to such a 
cyborgian partner. Indeed, the main pursuit of the central protagonist, Rick Deckard played by 
Harrison Ford, is to ferret out these androids that have been otherwise consigned to a life of slave 
labor on a distant planet and make sure they do not intermix within the “regular” human 
population. The fear of this integration, and subterfuge on behalf of the androids, only reinforces 
the paranoia in the novel and film of how passably convincing these androids have become, 
particularly in their ability to ensnare and sexually placate their human contemporaries. One of 
the last “tools” at Deckard’s disposal to ferret out the androids, however, is a complex somatic-
response test called the Voight-Kampff, which entails his looking into the pupils of the 
questioned subject while asking questions that might cause knee-jerk unease. The test evidences 
a need to get beyond both Turing-esque conversational fluency, as well as physical mimicry of 
human features, to some deeper, absent, and potentially unreadable moral “conscience” and 
livelihood, rendering the usually identifiable qualities of “humanhood” moot. In Deckard’s own 
relations with the android Rachel in the novel, the question becomes further solidified, erotically, 
not if mechanical production will allow for a convincingly “human” sex-bot, but if such a bot 
would have a deeper, ethical-moral composite that would ease the worries of the human 
participant. Married with the notion of cyberculture at the time, and the world of the MUDs just 
discussed, such an “ethical” dilemma seems to infuse the branching networks of cybersexual 
intercourse—not “if” it’s possible, but where one “should” participate. Likewise, Žižek argues 
for a “truer” state of companionship and ontological status in the nature of simply recognizing 
one’s mediated, or “replicated” status. He claims, “’I am a replicant’ is the statement of the 
subject at its purest,” as the advent of cyberspace has created a subjectivity emptied into the 




‘I am online’” (Davis, “Synthetic Meditations” 24-25). Hence, whether between human and 
replicant or human and avatar, the nature of mediation is so immanent that one is actually having 
a “truer” and more ontologically forthright interaction if one simply acknowledges one’s actual 
“replicant” status. 
 The personalizing of these textual, or cybernetic, constructs to the degree of almost 
creating a cyborgian partner was also manifest in a commonplace, consumerist accessibility. 
Linda S. Williams notes that the transference first of visual display from the public forum of film 
theaters to the slightly more personal space of the television, and finally to the intimate “small 
screen” of computers dictated a more intimate relation between watchers and their transmitted 
content. She notes the personalization of the computer almost as a more pragmatic love doll, 
claiming, “unlike the large film screen, this small screen can be straddled, kissed, embraced, and 
manipulated” (Williams, Screening Sex 305). Indeed, if one considers the gap of privacy between 
an enclosed, physical book and the normally publically-viewable mass computer as similar to 
this “large” screen versus “small” screen debate, one can see how the ability to consume erotic 
material in a digitally mediated private space might give rise to a greater proliferation and charge 
of digital content. The notion of finding an intimacy behind the screen was likewise raised in 
films like Cronenberg’s 1993 Videodrome (Williams, Screening Sex 303). A famous sequence in 
this film presents James Woods, a TV executive enmeshed in a pirated channel offering 
seemingly staged snuff sequences, literally kissing and attempting to entwine with a former lover 
through the television screen. Cronenberg’s innovation is that the televised, supposedly two-
dimensional, woman kisses back. The TV morphs and encloses Woods, the woman—Debbie 
Harry’s—voice coming booming from an all-encompassing surround that can’t be merely the 




computerized content, was one seen as permeable, as potentially offering an intrapersonal charge 
beyond that of “imagined” print content. The digitally transmitted ghost of Eros seemed sharp, 
pliable, and above all, real. 
 Central to these notions of love “simulacras” is again the degree of intimacy and 
“connection” derived, or possible, in cyber- or digitally-transmitted information. From 
therapeutic chat bots to erotically driven depositories of porn-speak to android love dolls, the 
urge, desire, and drive for artificially simulated “love” in digital textual format extends, I would 
argue, to print-transcribed attempts to raise render this libido aesthetically in fiction. The 
conversation novels of William Gaddis offer a telling attempt to crystallize these fluid methods 
of conversational self-creation, as their overriding aesthetic strategy is to render a maximalist 
scale of sheerly overheard dialogue. This has interesting side effects in terms of character 
ontology: divisions are blurred between the dream-language of pure conversation as characters, 
defined only by hearsay, shift between their individual person, their stand-in corporation, and 
their recollection in the dialogue of other revolving characters. Sexuality, and its implied attempt 
to traverse these bodies of sheer code, or information, is where these already muddied data-pools 
break down—stream-of-consciousness descriptions of attempted coupling reveal the near-
impossibility of posthuman bodies truly interacting. Similarly, the fear of incorporation, or the 
industrialization of sexuality (a condom corporation goes under; it was apparently “full of… 
holes” [Gaddis, J R 356]) bleeds over into Gaddis’s continual fear of organic artistry giving way 
to automation. His solution is to retrench into the dregs of the “pre-human,” or rather the base, 
biological remainders from a larger, more grandiose human enterprise—broken pianos, organic 
matter, fragments of scores, and the like. The result is a shattering implosion of “feeling” 




metaphor for narrative’s colonization by its parallel strategies in fine art, visual art, and 
cyberculture. Concurrent with these trends, the movement from Gaddis’s J R (1975) to 
Carpenter’s Gothic (1985) evinces the failure, and exhaustion, of the postmodern novel to 
replicate mimetically the digital and new media strategies that so fervently surround it by the mid 
1980s. 
 
Non-attribution: Corporeal Fluidity in William Gaddis’s Conversation Novels 
In the search for a plausible antecedent to the stuffed shirts and anhedonic husks of 
William Gaddis’s fiction—manifest in pretentious profiteers, businessmen with nothing to sell, 
and rulers of “paper empire[s]” (Gaddis, JR 651)—T.S. Eliot, an often-cited influence on 
Gaddis,17 offers a viable start. Particularly apropos is Eliot’s model of hollow men, comprised of 
“shape without form, shade without color,” whose “whisper[s]” are as “quiet and meaningless / 
As wind in dry grass” (56). If we take these stuffed men, comprised only of pointless whispers, 
as an anticipation of the posthuman body, comprised only of meaningless quotation, we might 
come somewhere close to defining the language-comprised entities in J R (1975) and 
Carpenter’s Gothic (1985).18 Both texts are formally comprised of “whispers” and 
conversations, as they fall within the arc of Gaddis’s “conversation novels,” or texts comprised, 
entropically, of near-continuous streams of unattributed and overheard dialogue.19 By nature of 
                                                
17 Tom LeClair recalls, after a rare interview with Gaddis, that he “seemed to be quite pleased to 
be speaking about his work, particularly the influence of T.S. Eliot, which he felt was 
unrecognized” (Gaddis and LeClair 18). Similarly, in his Paris Review interview, he claims 
“speaking of influences, I think mine are more likely to be found going from Eliot back rather 
than forward to my contemporaries” (Gaddis and Abádi-Nagy). For a more sustained critical 
treatment, see Miriam Fuchs’s article “‘il miglior fabbro’: Gaddis’ Debt to T.S. Eliot.” 
18 Referred to hereafter as CG. 
19 Zoltán Abádi-Nagy, in his Paris Review interview with Gaddis, described this fluid state of 




this non-attribution, both novels also struggle to create a sinewy shell of character against the 
general wash of data threatening to dissolve, or supersede, any sense of autonomy or interiority. 
However, while critics have touched on isolated elements of posthumanity, entropy, and 
runaway dialogue in Gaddis’s “conversation” novels,20 a totalized perspective of how Gaddis 
combines these tropes in a new ethic of characterization and embodiment has not been 
forthcoming. Specifically urgent is Gaddis’s experimentation with the cohering and dissolving 
factors of sexuality, desire, and affect in his visions of self-created men and increasingly 
anthropomorphized corporations. A telling progression is offered specifically in the movement 
between J R and CG; the bloat of the former’s language-entities becomes tellingly condensed 
and hollowed to the point of dissolution in latter, ultimately investigating where in the rubble a 
fragment of artistic authenticity might reside. 
J R, the comic epic describing a “paper empire” wrought by the eleven-year-old middle 
school student J R Vansant, allies this virally expansive quality of unbounded language to the 
runaway damages of unfettered late capitalism. Carpenter’s Gothic, referring to the house that 
contains CG’s tight family drama’s architectural style—a cheap imitation of actual Gothic, 
marked by cheap façades and ramshackle interiors—condenses this “pure” dialogue to a micro-
scale and reveals the true lack of cohesion in characters solely defined by conversational 
throwaways. Ontology is muddled in the process; in the world of J R, the authenticating word of 
a teenager holds as much weight as the fake corporation that bears his name. Likewise, the 
blurring of personal identity is amplified in attempts to traverse the rote artificiality of these 
bodies-defined-by-language, or rather personas-cum-corporations in the realm of sexual 
                                                                                                                                                       
having made some effort they would not read too agonizedly slowly and carefully, trying to 
figure out who is talking and so forth. It was the flow I wanted” (Gaddis and Abádi-Nagy). 




intercourse. The attempt of floating bodies defined by information temporarily to inhabit 
cohesive, organic forms results only in an inhuman splicing of abstraction and physicality, a 
project of body swapping gone awry. Similarly, the embedded fear of automation that fruitlessly 
attempts to co-opt essential human intimacies is allied to artistic creation. J R intimates a fear of 
the obsolescence of the living, breathing performer for automated systems of vinyl discs and 
player pianos. There is little room for the “alive” human, and both novels posit that a person’s 
idiosyncratic speech—easily replicated, often misunderstood—is increasingly more viable than 
the body housing that speech. Gaddis offers a pyrrhic victory in his return to the small human 
remains left behind after automation, positing that an aesthetic of “dregs” or “waste” might be 
the only means to preserve a central human element in industrially overrun genres. Taken 
together, however, both texts gluttonously imbibe concurrent communication technologies under 
a “high” postmodern frame, accumulating failed communications to the point of implosion and 
clearing ground for a new kind of the novel in the process. 
In discussing the “systems” of Gaddis’s novels, it is necessary to discuss the cybernetic 
theory Gaddis repeatedly asserted as an influence on the novels. (J R in particular is riddled with 
allusions to the ideas of the founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, and the character Jack Gibbs 
is named after Josiah Willard Gibbs, an early forerunner to cybernetic thought.) Indeed, critic 
Steven Moore aligns J R’s implicit goal of addressing societal patterns through patterns in 
unharnessed belief with Wiener’s belief that “society can only be understood through a study of 
the messages and communication facilities which belong to it” (64). This perspective, however, 
is more aligned to an earlier generation of “first-order” cybernetics, which posits that within a 
closed-system, “order (information)” and “disorder (entropy)” can be identified and 




order” perspective is shared by the failed modernist artists within the novel (e.g. composer 
Edward Bast, writer-historian Jack Gibbs, playwright Thomas Eigen, writer Schramm, and 
painter Schepperman), who attempt to create enclaves of serenity in a disordered world. Critic 
Stephen Schryer’s intervention in “The Aesthetics of First- and Second-Order Cybernetics in 
William Gaddis’s J R” is to conceive of the novel as emblematic of the far more subjective, and 
user-reliant, “second-order” school of cybernetic thought, favoring a “constructivist paradigm 
that highlights the role of the observer in creating his or her own reality” (77). This revaluation is 
key to moving beyond conceptions of Gaddis’s work as an airtight modernist project requiring a 
formalist alignment of the proper enigmatic sequences into a far more relativistic and mutable 
project changing according to reader perspective—an experimentally observed photon under 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, switching positions depending on the presence of an 
observer. Gaddis himself reflects that “the reader is brought in almost as a collaborator in 
creating the picture that emerges of the characters, of the situation” (Gaddis and Abádi-Nagy). 
This participatory element raises the tenuousness of the dialogue to the forefront, presenting not 
a clear overheard transcript of character interaction, but an enigmatic sequence missing key 
elements and requiring input to make sense of the shapeless mass of text.  
A notorious and often-invoked critique of Gaddis’s work (particularly The Recognitions), 
which focuses on these perceived gaps and intentional difficulties, is Jonathan Franzen’s 2002 
New Yorker piece “Mr. Difficult.” In the essay, Franzen uses Gaddis as example of a “Status” 
writer supposedly prizing cruel cerebralism over self-affirming, or easily relatable, emotional 
realism. The “Status” writer, according to Franzen, invites a “discourse of genius and art 
historical importance,” as opposed to the “Contract” writer, who offers “pleasure and 




Stephen J. Burn amply refutes Franzen (and particularly Franzen’s embedded claim about a 
supposed myth of Status writing as exhibitionistic data storage) in “After Gaddis: Data Storage 
and the Novel,” little attempt has been made to find a reconciled intermediary between Franzen’s 
two models. Gaddis does this work himself, somewhat in the contract-based cerebral exercise of 
“aporia,” an ancient Greek creation described in his last work Agapē Agape (2002) as “a game 
you couldn’t win, a parlour game proposing questions there was no clear answer to and winning 
wasn’t the point of it” (6). Looking through this model of “aporia,” and the fruitless guessing at 
absence it invites, we see a “contract”-like engagement between reader and author based on a 
“status” presumption of artfully excluded information—in the pact of “game,” the reader guesses 
at the nameless absence at the core of the work. Through this decidedly more heterogeneous 
model, one conceives of the felt “lack” at the core of Gaddis’s fiction towards which his 
scrambled, and text-described, characters likewise attempt to gravitate. 
As these questions are immanent in Gaddis’s tailored employment of dialogue and 
quotation, let us discuss briefly his method. Steven Moore, perhaps Gaddis’s best and most 
sensitive reader, describes the sheer scale, and hence exemplary status, of Gaddis’s experiment 
with overheard conversation: “Novels written primarily in dialogue have been done before—for 
example, by Ronald Firbank (whom Gaddis has read) and Ivy Compton-Burnett (whom he 
hasn’t)—but never to the extreme lengths Gaddis takes it” (63). Part of this “extrem[ity],” as 
mentioned before, is the dissolution of fully defined and legible characters usually delivered 
clear prose exposition. Joseph McElroy describes the erosion of recognizable subjectivity in the 
novel as part of Gaddis’s articulation of “unspeakable practices,” seeming to conjure an abstract 
corporeality of thought, “as if the intercourse of minds begot an aura of persons and thus their 




Recognitions as part of a comic tradition, as the comic novel usually has “characters reflecting 
facets of the central figure who, for all practical purposes, disappears” (Gaddis and Abádi-Nagy), 
extending and coupled with overlapping, dissonance voices in J R to occlude the actual J R 
Vansant intermittently throughout the novel. Patrick O’Donnell describes this proximal flashing 
of fragmented character facets as a “nightmare version of Bakhtin’s heteroglossia” (Paragraph 
7). However, in disintegrating any central characters, with “personality” conjured by a refracting 
series of unattributed monologues, J R in particular offers a novelistic Turing test. Indeed, 
Gaddis describes J R as something of a challenge, or a test, to determine any potential 
subjectivity in his language-limited characters, as he claims he assiduously avoids the “easy 
effects” of “interior monologue;” a character has “got to show it, to tell someone” (Gaddis and 
Abádi-Nagy). Characters are a sum, accumulated set of traits and data, which Gaddis dares the 
reader to look beyond or else take the superficial surface of information as “personality.” 
Like a Turing A.I. attempting to “pass,” the characters in J R offer an orally propelled 
scheme to render algorithm and recognizable verbal cadence into “personhood.” As O’Donnell 
describes, “through vocal tics or characteristic expressions, one may come to ‘know’ the 
conversationalists of J R” (Paragraph 7). Similarly, one reviewer asked, “what then, it will be 
asked, does Gaddis gain by putting his reader through his exercise? He gains the eerie effect of 
identifying our civilizations with all of its jargons” (Auchincloss). Gaddis’s wish is to render 
dialect as person—to strip subjectivity from the ideas themselves. He anthropomorphizes tics 
and idiosyncrasy much as a computer scientist would in attempting to prove the organic nature of 
a program by revealing supposedly human glitches. The “game” is then on us, as readers, to 





As a test of empathy, however, J R locks each thread of algorithmically defined 
personality into its defined, isolated groove. This isolation is abetted by the veiling effect of the 
telephone omnipresent throughout. O’Donnell describes the various solipsistic modes by which 
characters communicate with one another, rendered into one-directional fragments and overhead 
monologues by the continual fragmentation of the phone conversation. O’Donnell puts them into 
three categories as follows: “monologues that serve to parody the ‘specialized’ languages of 
legalese or businessese, phatic conversations where we hear a speaker on one end of and must 
imagine what the other speaker is saying, and fragmented conversations between several 
speakers” (Paragraph 8). Though O’Donnell supposedly outlines three distinct discursive 
categories, all modes function essentially as monologues in that their intent is not to convey 
knowledge, but rather to preserve the cadence of each character’s self-affirming oral loop. These 
propulsive streams of self-delusion can be evidenced in phone calls such as “yes from my trust 
fund just enough to… But… Yes but…” (Gaddis, J R 505). Indeed, O’Donnell describes how 
monologues are “parody discursive systems—signs and codes are arranged in self-referential 
language,” indicating ideologies and means of communication so coded and personal they 
become incapable of conveying information to others, but exist only to drive their own 
conversation forward (Paragraph 6).  
This parallel solipsism rather than communication is set into further relief by Marshall 
McLuhan’s theory in Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964) relating to the 
paralleled effects of “narcissism” and “narcosis” embedded in new systems of media expansion, 
implied by J R’s telephone-driven empire. McLuhan begins his theory by reestablishing the 
original derivation of Narcissus’s name, from the eponymous myth, with the Greek term for 




“medium” of the lake’s reflective surface in the Narcissus myth. McLuhan argues that when 
Narcissus viewed his own image, “this extension of himself by mirror numbed his perceptions 
until he became the servomechanism of his own extended or repeated image” (51). McLuhan 
then transposes this sense of overloading on beauty, or aesthetic feedback, to the “extensions of 
man” he puts forth elsewhere in Understanding Media as prosthetic technological senses of 
one’s personal sensory network (such as a telephone network expanding one’s auditory range). 
This overlap results in a sum loss of feeling, as “The principle of numbness comes into play with 
electric technology, as with any other. We have to numb our central nervous system when it is 
extended and exposed, or we will die” (McLuhan 56). The expanding fringe of 
telecommunicational access, then, is like an opened nervous system, requiring a personality-
curbing “narcosis” in order to stay functional, or otherwise risk exposing the organism to the 
expanded surface area of sensitivity. 
Part of J R’s novelty is in transposing this “numbness,” and its emotional twin in 
loneliness, onto the expanded networks of personalized corporations in the novel. Gaddis 
anticipates the kind of corporate anthropomorphism espoused in the recent Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission Supreme Court case, where corporations were granted 
“personhood” in being allowed to make unlimited campaign contributions under first amendment 
rights usually preserved for individuals. (A similar, more contemporary example would be 
corporations granted protection for religious beliefs by the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case.) The 
idea of corporations as living, breathing entities bearing the rights of individuals yet exempt from 
the scrutiny they would be exposed to is thoroughly explored in J R. The sexually licentious 
hippie Rhoda, former girlfriend of Schramm, says upon rifling through Bast’s mail: “here’s one 




some chair” (Gaddis, J R 556). Through Rhoda’s astonished joking she exposes the faux-
empathetic jargon of a financially ailing business aligned with physical sickness. Likewise, J R 
describes the legally advantageous quality of having a quasi human-corporation entity, as “you 
can’t put a corporation in jail” (Gaddis, J R 648). O’Donnell has also made a correlation between 
the operation of language and that of commodities in the novel: that, as both corporations and 
language are constructed of redundancies and intentionally faulty components, like “a lot of old 
parts stuck together” (Gaddis, J R 708), there is a continual need for replacement and 
enlargement (Paragraph 14). The larger the corporation becomes, and more expansive the 
language network, the more each requires retrenchment and reinforcement (due to an increased 
field of “entropy,” in a cybernetic sense). 
The attempt to create an organism from bloated, corporate systems falls apart most 
visibly in the sexual realm, perhaps indicating the truest test of corporate “personhood.” 
(Corporations, after all—other than in bad “mergers and acquisitions” jokes—can’t have sex.) 
One might recall sexuality as the missing cohesive element granting greater subjectivity and 
personhood to chat bots like Julia in the MUD realm. However, in J R, the act of transforming 
organic activities like sexual intercourse into corporate entity, becoming artificially mediated in 
the process, leads only to dissolution and instability. One main example is a condom-producing 
corporation priding itself on the pointedly organic “strong real thin sheep membranes,” 
apparently created as a naturalistic alternative to the “artificial” sexual practices of the “pills” 
“all these girls are taking” (Gaddis, J R 355). The corporatization of sex, however, is described in 
a double-entendre-rich phrase as “full of God damn holes” (Gaddis, J R 356). Given the context 
that this statement is delivered at a piano roll factory, here Gaddis indicates the metaphoric 




basis of the corporation’s floundering possibly because of its faulty and hole-filled condoms. A 
similar point is made by Gibbs relating to the relative reliability of investing in pork “bellies” 
against the more capricious human breast. Gibbs’s reasoning is that “[you] never know if breasts 
are going to be friendly or not… can’t define them too damned simple” (Gaddis, J R 509). His 
personification of breasts, which are apparently too capricious to be trusted, is set against the 
reliable investment of the pork bellies, indicating again the corporation’s sponge-like ability to 
subsume even descriptions of individual acts of sex. Opposed to this mass-scale transformation 
of sex through the mechanics of industry, even small-scale personal intercourse becomes 
muddied and disembodied to the point of becoming purposeless or impossible. 
In charting Gaddis’s removal of human functions from their linked appendage, critic 
Stephen Matanle cites the influence of Greek philosopher Empodocles on the novel. Empodocles 
is invoked explicitly by Gibbs in an attempt to help Mr. Ford, the “program specialist,” decode 
the motto adorning the school’s entrance—“try Empodocles,” Gibbs suggests (Gaddis, J R 26, 
45). According to Gibbs, the motto refers to a stage in Empodocles’s “cosmogony” “when limbs 
and parts of bodies were wandering around everywhere separately” (Gaddis, J R 45). Matanle 
elaborates on how in Empodoclean thought, the “world is ruled by two forces, Love and Strife,” 
where the function of Love is “to unite, to make one out of many,” and the function of Strife is 
“to separate, to disperse things without apparent design” (109). J R, in Matanle’s estimation, is 
primarily ruled by Strife (109), leaving the erotic sequences in the book as a Love-driven attempt 
to bridge an irresolvable gap, or rather, attempt to pull together the nebulous clusters irrevocably 
broken by Strife. Matanle describes the atomizing effect this Strife-cum-Love effect holds on 




some random climax of catastrophe’” (111). Sex is the closest approximation Gaddis offers to 
encapsulate this intermediary Love-Strife. 
Like a Stelarc pulled too far and elementally into indistinguishable shapes, Gaddis’s 
character ontology becomes nearly indistinguishable in the Strife-inflected realm of sexuality. 
Schryer reiterates this disassembly, claiming, “fragments do not clearly attribute body parts to 
specific subjects” (88). This “fragment[ation]” is evidenced in erotic descriptions: “From his her 
own hand came, measuring down firmness of bone brushes past its prey to stroke at distances, to 
climb back still more slowly, fingertips in hollows, fingers paused weighing shapes…” (Gaddis, 
J R 490). The sequence seemingly describes a sculptor molding air rather than a two-party 
process of coitus, with Jack “weighing” sexually suggestive “shapes” as if they were gaseous 
elements, or otherwise far removed from a cohered body. Reminiscent of the possibilities of 
ontological looseness allotted by the MUD’s textual descriptions, here in fluid stream-of-
consciousness prose bodies deteriorate into senseless conglomerates. This dissolution of bodily 
barrier continues in later moments: Jack’s probing tongue is described as “gorging its stabs of 
entrance aswim to its passage rising still further to threats of its loss” (Gaddis, J R 490). This 
action of constant forward motion and constant retraction, described by the “rising”“passage” 
undercut by “loss,” marks a surreal, Sisyphean task of traversing bodily barriers just as they 
retreat. Critic Peter Wolfe has noted that unlike Joyce, whose use of composite adjectives and 
neologistic sex-talk usually “promote[s] both speed and clarity,” Gaddis’s free-floating 
assemblages sometimes impede the action they describe, or provide askance angles into their 
represented symbols (61). This movement from condensed imagery to freestanding images 
indicates something incomplete in Gaddis’s stream-of-consciousness method, or slightly 




characters perceive a reality made slightly different in their imagined abstraction, returning to 
bodies that have been poorly melded or spliced in the process. 
This friction evidences a broader unraveling between the abstracted thought that dreams 
of these activities and the lumbering, stilted bodies used to execute them, raising questions about 
the efficacy of a posthuman body defined solely by information. Critic Michael Wutz notes 
Gaddis’s likely resistance to a posthuman model of “intelligence” dictated by disembodied 
clusters of information, claiming, “with N. Katherine Hayles, Gaddis would agree that mak[ing] 
information lose its body entails a monstrous act of denial, not unlike the cultural repression of 
our sexual and bodily functions in a Freudian sense” (198). Hence, while composing a sequence 
of novels seeming to tear away the flesh of subjective prose description, Gaddis writes more 
accurately on the knifepoint between “freeing” information, and “monstrous[ly]” ridding it of 
any corporeal identity. As a surrogate for this absent corporeal form, however, Gaddis attempts 
to conjure an in-between state, suggesting the potential, abstracted realm of affect. As Patricia 
Ticineto Clough has claimed with regard to shifts in contemporary postmodern thought, “there 
was a growing sense that poststructuralism generally but deconstruction in particular were ‘truly 
glacial’ in the pronouncement of the death of the subject and therefore had little to do with affect 
or emotion” (206). Rather than believing that emotion is imbued after a bodily system is formed, 
Clough sides with critics “conceptualizing affect as pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or 
diminishing a body’s capacity to act” (207). Affect, then, for Clough, isn’t something 
retroactively read into a finished bodily system, but rather a guiding abstract element tangibly 
affecting that body’s reconstruction. The “deadness” of the Gaddis linguistic system then may be 




There are, however, such “intangibles” offered in J R through glimmers in otherwise 
doomed characters with lofty artistic ambitions, attempting to operate outside of the commercial 
economy that rules the novel. While these intangibles are usually codified in the language of 
finance, I see them instead as potentially animating agents to more soulless and data-driven 
figures noticed by more pure-hearted and intuitive characters. Perhaps most significant is Bast’s 
attempt to educate J R on “intangible assets,” in contrast to the boy’s stark commercial 
materialism, by playing him Bach’s Cantata Twenty-One. Bast instructs him “tell me what you 
heard,” then, after J R’s bumbling attempts fail, quickly corrects him: “you weren’t supposed to 
hear anything!” indicating the desired reaction was more emotional than content-driven (Gaddis, 
J R 656-58). Ironically enough, J R translates the emotional content of the cantata into a rough, 
ready-at-hand approximation of pornography, or the middle ground between base materialism 
and lofty idealism. J R describes the cantata as “this here lady starts singing up yours up yours so 
then this man starts singing up mine… then they go back and forth like that’ (Gaddis, J R 658). 
Teacher Amy Joubert similarly attempts to convince J R of abstract, noncommercial entities, by 
gesturing at the moon  “Yes look up at the sky look at it!... The moon is coming up, don’t you 
see it? (Gaddis, J R 474). She tries to refute J R’s claim that there is a “millionaire for 
everything” by asking of the moon, “Is there a millionaire for that?” J R later admits to Bast that 
the “moon” Amy indicated was actually an illuminated Carvel ice cream sign, and hence would 
certainly have a millionaire behind it.21 However, it bears noting that attempts to elucidate 
abstract potentials beyond the frame of the novel usually result, particularly when processed 
through J R’s stringently empirical mindset, in a return to the narcotic economies of the novel, be 
they linguistic, economic, or sexual. 
                                                
21 Matanle and Schryer argue that it is ultimately unclear which character is right, hence further 




Just as pornography is easier for J R to understand than an idealized, classically rendered 
love, so too does art offer an intermediary for the impossibility of genuine emotional union. 
Gibbs, in a particularly sarcastic moment, reflects that the only problem with literature is that “a 
novelist has to understand women” (Gaddis, J R 248). Later, when speaking to Rhoda, Gibbs 
cites emotional closeness as perhaps a means to escape desperate, failed artistry, particularly as 
relates to her suicided partner Schramm: “what Schramm wanted was a woman he could trust 
with everything he had wanted it so much he knew if he thought he had it and lost it he’d cut his 
throat” (Gaddis, J R 615). Gibbs goes on to frame this soulless sexuality in industrial terms, the 
constant irritant to true art in Gaddis’s cosmology. Gibbs accuses Rhoda of believing “getting 
laid’s about as interesting as a, as washing your face no more feeling than a, than a milking 
machine” (Gaddis, J R 615). As if speaking about the proliferation of arts through a sort of 
digital industrialization concurrently operating in 1970s and 1980s, Gibbs acts as spokesman for 
Gaddis’s retrenchment in the “true” art of organic composition or Benjaminian aura. What 
pornography is to sex (impersonal, unfelt), so—to Gibbs and Gaddis—the encroaching forms of 
mechanical artistry—be it film, video, or a record player—are to organic creation. 
The eventual eradication of the living human artist under the heel of automation is given 
its most concise form in the “social history” Jack Gibbs writes throughout J R, entitled Agapē 
Agape, which is also the name of Gaddis’s last novel on the same subject. Gibbs describes Agapē 
Agape as a “sort of social history of mechanization and the arts, the destructive element” 
(Gaddis, J R 244), which aligns with Gaddis’s own lifelong fascination with the player piano.22 
                                                
22 The piano arises explicitly in J R in Jack Gibbs’s comment: “shoot the God damned pianist 
what it’s about just told you, player piano play by itself get to shoot the pianist” (Gaddis, J R 
604). Gibbs refers to a vignette by Oscar Wilde recounted in “Impressions of America” wherein 
Wilde found a disclaimer above a “saloon-hall piano in Leadville” claiming, “Do not shoot the 




Wutz describes Gaddis’s mechanical fixation cropping up in J R through an eerie recurrence of 
disembodied hands: “consider, for example, the repeated focus on hands, not as an index of 
humanness and self-expression, but—what is more prominent in the light of the ubiquitous 
severance of art from the body—as a marker of mechanization, which is to say, dehumanization” 
(195, italics Wutz’s).23  The consideration of the human body as merely an organ for music that 
might plausibly be replaced by another, artificial organ is raised in Gibbs’s discussion of an 
esoteric nineteenth-century German scientist attempting to summon a human voice from 
inanimate tissue. Gibbs elaborates: “nineteenth-century German anatomist Johannes Müller took 
a human larynx fitted it up with strings and weights to replace the muscles tried to get a melody 
by blowing through it” (Gaddis, J R 288). This Frankenstein-ian tableau presents replication 
with a chilling efficiency and suggests, in its link to musical recording, the possible nullification 
of live performance entirely. A member of J R’s school at one points refutes Gibbs’s discussion 
of artist’s hardship (Gibbs claims that Schepperman is “selling his blood…to buy paint”) with 
the reiteration that musical artists, for one, have become obsolete as “records of any symphony 
you want reproductions you can get them that are almost perfect” (Gaddis, J R 48). The surging 
speed of efficiency is also applicable to reading and literature too, as Gibbs describes a speed-
reading course that ensures “graduates can read between fifteen hundred and three thousand 
words per minute” (Gaddis, J R 387). Note Gaddis’s satirical antagonism toward applying 
industrial speed and logic to his prized practice of narrative, much as it might aid the pseudo-
industrial dialogue machines he exhausts so thoroughly. (This hatred is emblematic, perhaps, of 
                                                                                                                                                       
criticism I have ever come across” (Moore 104). Gibbs jokingly attributes the death of the pianist 
once and for all to the automation of the player piano. 
23 The synecdochic implication of hired labor in these superfluous “hands” is raised elsewhere by 
J R in his plot to industrialize labor at his purchased steel mills, where J R explains “what costs 
so much anyway is all these here people, you know? See because if we could like get them out of 




the long-running resistance to alternate-media forms of narrative placing more pressure on the 
print-frame until it ruptures.) Against the threat of this breathless pace of industry, Gaddis 
instead finds his kernels of organic “humanism,” and a nostalgic mode of human and 
biologically-oriented composition elsewhere. These “kernels” surprisingly arrive in the 
fetishization of garbage, trash, and excrement—the last vestiges of a subhuman, but still 
technically human, craft. 
Moore makes much of Gaddis’s preoccupation with waste, and the Freudian-
psychoanalytic equivalence of money and excrement in particular. Moore notes that in J R, the 
decidedly adolescent J R exhibits a wild-eyed, almost perversely naïve fascination with money, 
as if it were not the lifeblood of capitalist culture but rather the pointless material of excrement. 
Other characters also misperceive the value of paper money when compared with means of 
exchange more overtly revealing its material worth, such as metallic coins—a classic, Freudian 
transference of excrement’s “pointlessness” experienced during the child’s anal-erotic phase to 
later useless matter (Moore 77). Likewise, considering Gaddis’s aesthetic fixation on “dregs,” his 
famous formalist proclamation from his first book The Recognitions is apposite: “What’s any 
artist, but the dregs of his work?” (95-96). Gaddis means to downplay the usefulness of author 
biography in considering a produced work, implying that the human extrapolated from the art is 
but a shadow of the art’s totality, but what if one were to reverse the equation, and see these 
“dregs” as a distilled humanistic fragment of a potentially compromised artwork? Might then the 
dregs of the artist, as filthy and immaterial as Freud’s excrement, be capable of some lessened 
human artwork, which is still nonetheless human? 
This “dregs” artwork is I think a far more fitting compromise between extremist camps in 




modernist utopia or jury-rigged postmodern shanty easily eroded by entropy. One example is an 
early insinuation of Bast’s eventually derailed aspirations as a composer. (Gaddis notes that 
Bast’s goals become drastically reduced throughout the novel, winnowed from a “grand opera” 
to a “cantata,” then to a “piece for orchestra,” and finally to a “piece for unaccompanied cello” 
drawn in crayon from his hospital bed at the novel’s end [Gaddis, Abádi-Nagy].) Bast, whom 
Schryer describes as a proponent of “first-order” cybernetics in his desire for pristine aesthetic 
microcosms, has recently come upon his workroom, a further microcosm of passivity, wrecked 
by local youths. A policeman on the scene tells Bast the full and obscene extent of the culprits’ 
vandalism through the likely suspects: “—Kids… who else would shit in your piano” (Gaddis, J 
R 141). While this seems profane, or filthy enough as is, Bast then moves to the piano to play 
this shit-filled piano—a moment never remarked upon by critics, perhaps for its rote absurdity. 
In a rare prose exposition the narrator describes, “[Bast] fit his hand to an octave and falter[ed] a 
dissonant chord and falter[ed] a dissonant chord again, and again” (Gaddis, J R 142). Gaddis’s 
description of the “dissonant” chord indicates that he is hitting a note “prepared,” in the popular 
practice of John Cage, by excrement-coated hammers. This interpretation is reiterated in Bast’s 
simultaneous banter: “Believing and shitting are two very different things? —Edward… —Never 
have to clean your toilet bowl again… he recovered the dissonant chord,—right?” (Gaddis, J R 
142). The “dissonan[ce]” of the chord and the reference to the toilet bowl seem too close not to 
associate with one another—they are even rendered theoretical analogues. Similarly, reiterating a 
running refrain of “believing and shitting” that appears throughout the novel, Bast here 
consciously mixes the two philosophical poles: a Platonic ideal of thought mixed with a material 




piano indicate that, even with such a sullied and ultimately debased existence, he still wishes to 
make music from it, a dissonant composition better than no composition at all. 
Under the template of affect, I believe a “debased” aesthetic could rather be seen as a 
reinterpretation of base materials with the implicit charge of a garbage-driven aesthetic. As 
Clough argues, “the turn to affect points instead to a dynamism immanent to bodily matter and 
matter generally—matters capacity for self-organization and being informational” (227). Rather 
than allowing an art object to be co-opted by mechanization, and disintegrate of its own accord, 
Gaddis seeks to strain the object for the remainders of humanity held within it. Through such 
dregs, present in the remainders of human material waste—shit, rags, scraps—one can make 
resonant art reminiscent of Joseph Müller’s cobbled-together singing larynx. However, even the 
bodies that create such dreg-material to then be made into art have been dissolved into the smoke 
of conversation, never allowed to touch one another, with sexuality as the ultimate disorienting 
force. Where Gaddis makes the final disassembly of his basely cohered dialogue-bodies using 
the most limited palette and scale available, such that readers may make no mistake, is in the 
aperitif-sized CG in 1985. 
It is striking to see the maximalism of Gaddis’s two prior novels—The Recognitions and 
J R—give way to the petite, diorama style of CG. The novel is almost a paint-by-numbers 
fictional enactment for Gaddis—a “finger exercise,” as he put it (Grove B1). As Gaddis claims 
he always works from a “problem,” CG is marked by its Aristotelian restrictions in “observ[ing]” 
the unities of time and place to the point that everything… takes place in one house, and a 
country house at that, with a small number of characters, in a short span of time” (Gaddis and 
Abádi-Nagy). This simplicity is reiterated by the social dynamics of the novel, working explicitly 




obligatory adultery, the locked room, the mysterious stranger, and so forth” (Gaddis and Abádi-
Nagy). The particularities of the novel are of secondary interest here, but for the sake of 
continuity they detail a “former debutante” and writer (Gaddis, CG 255), Elizabeth (Liz) and her 
husband Paul, cohabiting a carpenter gothic house during the last month of Liz’s life. Paul 
manages press for the deceptive, apocalyptic preacher Revered Ude, who is tied into an African 
land-grab also involving the house’s mysterious owner, McCandless. However, these details are 
less of interest than Gaddis’s disintegration of his spoken-language personalization tactic crafted 
in J R, here given claustrophobic, and exaggerated artificiality, on a smaller scale. 
Gaddis includes a veiled reference to the function of CG in his oeuvre through an 
embedded comment within the novel, spoken by the former novelist McCandless: “I told you 
why I wrote it, it’s just an afterthought, why are you so damned put out by it? This novel’s a 
footnote, a postscript” (Gaddis, CG 139; Grove B1). While the true “postscript,” in the broader 
arc of Gaddis’s life, could be the deathbed novella Agapē Agape (revised from a continuously 
expanding manuscript Gaddis returned to throughout his life), it is useful to see CG as an 
epilogue commenting on and casting certain issues into light retrospectively. Indeed, in the 
parlance of “failure” so familiar to Gaddis (he once taught a class on “The Theme of Failure in 
American Literature” at Bard College [Moore 112]), the novel has been seen by some as a failure 
precisely because of its pointed intent, believed to be “too narrow…to generalize from” (Bursey 
and Furlong 121). Yet this claustrophobic restriction is precisely part of Gaddis’s art—like the 
tagline for the postmodern horror novel House of Leaves suggesting a house “bigger on the 
inside than it is on the outside,” the house CG takes place in offers a paradoxical condensation of 
energy and space within its flimsy and limited frame. As such, the house’s cramped interior 




Cynthia Ozick, in a favorable review, describes J R and CG as concerned with “rotted-out 
families, rotted-out corporations,” and this sense of corporate or familial body with either an 
absent or hollowed interior is telling (“Fakery”). To understand more fully the metaphoric utility 
of the house as metaphor for characterization, let us return again to the title. 
Carpenter’s Gothic, among many things, principally recalls the architectural style 
“carpenter gothic,” which Gaddis confirmed as a central conceit for the book (and reiterated in 
importance by Gaddis’s actual habitation of a carpenter gothic home in the Hudson Valley). The 
style is known for its mimicry of nineteenth-century Victorian gothic architecture crafted from 
far shoddier, easily available materials. In the novel, McCandless describes the carpenter gothic 
house in which the action takes place: “it was built to be seen from the outside it was, that was 
the style…All they had were the simple dependable old materials, the wood and their hammers 
and saws and their clumsy ingenuity” (Gaddis, CG 227). In a fitting stand-in for Gaddis’s 
characterization through dialogue, and posthuman collection of traits, the style serves to 
elucidate the external qualities of linguistically defined persons, only to be marked by an interior 
vacancy. Ozick describes the house as presenting all relevant information externally; the rest is 
“crammed to fit” inside (“Fakery”). The spatial disorientation suggested by the house is likewise 
reiterated by the fact that McCandless is a geologist—he ultimately sells valuable information 
regarding land grants for an African ore field, presumably at the source of a sectarian war—and 
by the further dissipation of the characters’ self-definition under spatial-geographical terms. 
If sexuality in J R is presented as an Empodoclean collision of various human body parts, 
CG presents corporeal limits as diffuse as geography. This “landscape”-oriented view is partially 
explainable as these sequences are processed through McCandless, a geologist’s, psyche. Yet, 




point of dissolving any significant human-anatomic boundaries at all. A telling sequence 
involves McCandless “catching the hand back to sequester the white of her breast,” again trying 
to rally the Platonic notion of “breast” back into some recognizable human shape, as well as the 
jargon of land-ownership in his description of Liz’s “hard outcropping,” “corrugated path to the 
open plain,” and “hillock” (Gaddis, CG 151, 155). Liz is no longer a human specimen, but rather 
an abstraction, as inanimate as soil or a land formation. In fact, this primary schism between 
Liz’s desire for connection and McCandless’s understanding of the human as raw element is 
revealed in Liz’s misinterpretation of a geological map as art, possibly depicting female 
genitalia. “The northern end of the Great Rift,” McCandless corrects her, “it’s a scanning taken 
from a satellite” (Gaddis, CG 165). We are no longer speaking of sex, but tectonic drift. 
Indeed, the ultimate collapse of Gaddis’s “finger exercise,” or rather dissolution of his 
corporate bodies into lonely isolation, is manifest in CG’s apocalyptic ending. The literal 
apocalypse is indicated by the “10 K ‘DEMO’ BOMB” (Gaddis, CG 259) detonated at the end, 
indicating the beginning of the African sectarian conflict both McCandless and Ude are 
complicit in aiding. An thematic apocalypse is also apparent by the novel’s close: Liz is dead, 
McCandless has sold out, the Revered Ude is on the run, and Paul seems to be snaring another 
naïve girl with the exact same pick-up line he used on Liz (“I’ve always been crazy about the 
back of your neck” [Gaddis, CG 262]). This definitive unwinding and tearing down of the 
played-with verities and clichés of fiction seems almost a decided linguistic “screw you” such as 
Joyce offered in the “nonsense” language of Finnegans Wake following the pristine modernist 
language of Ulysses. As Gregory Comnes notes, CG “resists those who would seek any 
emphatic, conventional affirmation of the theme present in Gaddis’s earlier novels: humans’ 




spirited world” (126). Yes, the fragmenting of Gaddis’s corpus comes down to an absence of 
“love,” or rather, if viewed through the constructive-affective lens Clough offers, some sort of 
binding or adhesive affective charge able to pull the fictionally constructed, poststructual 
language-beings together. Sexuality is no surrogate, rendered as the alignment of inanimate 
natural elements, and the broader bonds of the novel seem impossible. Nor is there a larger new 
media remove to progress beyond pseudo-digital, emptily constructed characters. In CG, 
Gaddis’s fictional divide of runaway language as capital is permanent; in the language of J R, the 
empire of words collapses as readily as a financial system run amok. 
 In true gothic tradition, the evolution from J R to CG marks the macabre expansion of 
postmodernism’s worst tendencies from bloated and diluted characterization to the level of 
cartoon, much as gothic novels often presented an exaggerated crystallization of a particular 
societal fear. Unlike the polymorphous perversity of Turkle’s MUD language games, the 
elemental bodybuilding of Stelarc, or even the automated, life-like systems of the chat bots, 
Gaddis’s fictional chat bots are poignant in their inevitable inability to connect with one another. 
Without the binding agent of affect, as Clough argues, ontology is shattered into a disparate 
cluster of characteristics. The result is a sort of word-scrambled Joyce—epitomized in 
lovemaking sequences that seem to describe an orgiastic word soup as much as human coupling. 
Though J R is perhaps more convincingly a participatory, second-order cybernetic system, this 
understanding seems only to widen its existing fissures and indeterminacies—language’s 
slippery uncertainty given full play. There is no retreat to the screen-penetrating ethics of 
transcendental or absurd video artists, nor a Burden with loaded rifle to the rescue. As Gaddis’s 
“conversation” novels are comprised entirely of rendered dialogue, perhaps the most exaggerated 




ascribes to expanding communication networks—wherein feeling requires diminishment due to 
its expansion of transmission range—here rendered in the formalist literary frame. Likewise, we 
see a slippery corporeality almost digital in its mercuriality as the process of reading J R 
obstructs our ability to distinguish distinct fictional entities or discern a plausible relationship 
from them to the reader. This absent recognition of autonomous persons or “connection” 
between characters is given parodic and apocalyptic charge under CG’s claustrophobic scale, 
yielding potentially human fragments in need of explication. And so the question becomes: how 
might one wrest back a formally operating system as organizational method, if such systems 
have been eroded by words as virally expansive as unchecked capital? The answer, in the 
methodical stabs of hyper-visceral pain framed by such systematic operation in “transgressive” 


































Grooves on the Feeling Knob: Systematic Transgression in William T. Vollmann’s The Rainbow 



















Organizers of the Orgy: An Introduction to Systematic Transgression 
And was Jerusalem builded here / Among these dark satanic mills? 
—William Blake 
 
 Michael Silverblatt, one of the first critics to label an alarming group of writers arriving 
around the turn of the 1980s as “transgressive,” 24 identified perhaps the most telling signifier of 
the group as an allegiance to the “hypothetical.” This was in homage to one of the cohort’s chief 
influences, the Marquis de Sade, and particularly Sade’s schizophrenic, visionary impulse of 
embellishing the gap between his sad state of imprisonment and the hyper-kinetic fantasies of his 
120 Days of Sodom written while interred.  (Sade’s deflation from profane God to abject prisoner 
was made all the more apparent, Silverblatt notes, by Maurice Lever’s biography Sade [1993] 
released around this time and describing such depressing anecdotes as Sade being too fat to fit 
into a self-pleasuring device snuck into prison by his wife.)  Silverblatt describes this fixation on 
unreachable satisfaction as an inherently aesthetic, and oddly optimistic, one: “The gap between 
Sade’s pathetic life and the intellectual fireworks that his writings inspire leads us to the true 
Sadean subject: the realm of the hypothetical.” The hypothetical is not a state relishing sadness 
or abjection, but rather a fixation on the immanent limitations of materials used as a transient 
step in the pursuit of higher and more distilled principles, like coal for the fire.  Contrary to other 
critical perceptions remaining fixated on the content of transgressive literature, both praising and 
condemning,25 Silverblatt reveals the underside to grotesquerie to be an emphasis on what is 
                                                
24 Silverblatt’s tentative roster includes: “Jeannette Winterson, David Foster Wallace, William T. 
Vollmann, Dennis Cooper, Kathy Acker, Lynne Tillman, Joel Rose, Catherine Texier, Bret 
Easton Ellis, A.M. Homes, Mary Gaitskill, Stephen Beachy, Steve Erickson, Karen Joy Fowler, 
Will Self” (2). Coterie building is of course an inexact science, and the total list of 
“transgressives” differs depending on critical account. 
25 Key pieces dismissing the movement include Jonathan Dee’s “Readymade Rebellion: the 
Empty Tropes of Transgressive Fiction,” James Gardner’s “Transgressive Fiction,” and Joe 




unseen, invisible, and utopian.  By penetrating and tattooing the text as a kind of mercurial skin 
covering unknowable meaning, transgressive authors “require… the defeat of the physical world, 
and the virtual obliteration of the body” (Silverblatt 2). Other critical perceptions regarding the 
perceived hostile nature of the fiction—the subtitle to Silverblatt’s article is in fact “Who Are 
These Writers, and Why Do They Want to Hurt Us?”—reveal a paranoia about being possibly 
implicated in this source of hostility, and hence explain the resulting tendency to explain away 
the genre by pinning it to a single cultural instance or attitude. 
 While resulting labels for the genre are legion I find Silverblatt’s “transgressive” fiction 
the most cogent, as it honors the authors’ structural, philosophical technique and retains an 
integral allegiance with Sade.  Other categories, however, have ranged from “Post-Punk,” 
“Downtown,” “New Narrative” (a separate, theory-based movement unto itself), and even (in “a 
ludicrous piece of literary recycling”) “Lost Generation” fiction (“Introduction” xiii). Enjoying 
probably the longest vogue, and a close second to “transgressive,” is “Blank Generation” fiction. 
The term, canonized by Elizabeth Young in Shopping in Space: Essays on American ‘Blank 
Generation’ Fiction (1992), aligns the movement primarily with the cool rebellion of punk, 
deriving its title from the Richard Hell song “Blank Generation.” The lyrics, “I belong to the 
____ generation, and I can take it or leave it each time,” the singer apparently too lazy or blasé to 
even fill in the title, indicate the sort of disaffection Young sees mirrored in the “flat, stunned” 
quality of much of the prose (“Introduction” xiii).26  The moniker of “blank fiction,” without 
Young’s qualification of belonging to a “generation,” was revived and reiterated in James 
Annesley’s Blank Fictions: Consumerism, Culture, and the Contemporary Novel (1998), 
                                                
26 Robert Siegle in Suburban Ambush: Downtown Writing and the Fiction of Insurgency (1989) 
understands this “punk” quality as a position closer approximating nihilism, stripping any 





drawing in the essential qualities of violence, the “darker” materials of drugs and sex, and 
perceived mutilations of or mutations in the human body. Annesley summarizes this ethic as an 
“emphasis on the extreme, the marginal, and the violent… a sense of indifference and 
indolence… the limits of the human body seem indistinct, blurred by cosmetics, narcotics, 
disease, and brutality” (1).  
 Other attempts to locate objective correlatives for “transgressive” literature reach for 
more disparate theoretical, or classical, forebears. M. Keith Booker’s Techniques of Subversion 
in Modern Literature: Transgression, Abjection, and the Carnivalesque (1991) describes any 
literature opting for techniques of “transgression” to the anarchic spirit of Bakhtin’s carnival.  
Robin Mookerjee’s Transgressive Fiction: The New Satiric Tradition (2013) addresses 
“transgressive” fiction as a defined genre, but suggests Menippean satire as its most fitting 
antecedent, both forms presenting discomfiting “subject matter…directly” rather “than through 
the optic of a system or theory,” mirroring strategies of “Petronius and the Menippean school” 
(2). This latter sense of otherwise intangible information nakedly presented, and reminiscent of 
transgressive forebear William S. Burroughs’s Naked Lunch (though here with the “system or 
theory”), begs the question, however, of how transgressive fiction fits within the lineage of 
postmodernism, or which strategies may be shared by both.  Indeed, considering the grotesque 
and cartoonish subject matter of such postmodern classics as Naked Lunch, how is one to 
separate these “offensive” methods (censored in their time) from the hyper-grotesque techniques 
of the transgressives?  And, similarly, might there not be other strategies shared between the two 
movements, much as transgressive literature in many respects presents an amplified, and 




 Lyotard’s definition of postmodern art is helpful in creating a link between these two 
forms.  According to Lyotard, postmodern art is “that which searches for new presentations not 
in order to enjoy them but in order to impact a stronger sense of the unpresentable” (Lyotard 81, 
my italics). Under this rubric, recalling also Sade’s aesthetic of the “hypothetical,” transgressive 
literature may only manifest a variety of horrific exterior symptoms in response to the 
inexpressible horrors or traumas in the society that birthed it. Indeed, like Fredric Jameson’s call 
for a literature that both reflected and critiqued the logic of capitalism in Postmodernism, 
transgressive literature merely literalizes societal problems in the starkest fashion possible.  
Mookerjee discusses how books like American Psycho are “monstrous” primarily in their 
literalization of postmodern principles like uninhibited virtual capital—Bateman’s Gucci-gloved 
hand slicing through vagrants’ throats is the repressed unconscious of Reagonomics, in Ellis’s 
conception.  I would argue that it has merely been by the sheer shock value of these transgressive 
artists’ imagery that the effectiveness of their methods, and alignment within broader literary—
and specifically postmodern—strategies has been overlooked.  Wholly ignorant of a possible 
exaggeratedly symbolic view of the profane, such as Bataille offers in his pornographic narrative 
Story of the Eye, which offers alignments of testicles, suns, and eyeballs in an abundant fertility 
of symbolic referentiality, critics of transgressive fiction have for the most part been stymied by 
subject matter alone.  Yet, I would argue, in looking at these often highly systematic, highly 
symbolic novels—in this study, William T. Vollmann and Bret Easton Ellis—an unseen 
alignment arises between a massive vein within late 20th century postmodernism in the “systems” 
novel and the presumed charged symbolism of the transgressives. 
 Harkening back to Silverblatt’s assessment of Sade as the forefather of American 




transgression in Sade’s elaborate erotic puzzles. Sade’s forever unsatisfied and manic desire in 
The 120 Days of Sodom leads not to a chaotic arrangement led by impulse, but rather an 
elaborate and orchestrated sequence of acts, mechanically arranged and bound by numerous 
pacts and contracts.  Roland Barthes in Sade/Fourier/Loyola even goes so far as to bestow Sade 
with an erotic grammar, a means of speaking the language of desire not only in his text, but also 
in the imagined, verbal patterns of bodies.  Curiously enough, this systematic impulse is likewise 
used to describe lengthy twentieth-century postmodern novels that Tom LeClair in his In the 
Loop: Don DeLillo and Systems Theory (1987) describes as “systems” novels, or present an 
attempt to mirror posthuman networks of information in complex and cataloguing fictional 
arrangements. These networks of information might also be rife with the circulation of emotional 
or erotic charge, as Jameson notes the distinguishing postmodern “waning of affect” alongside 
the form’s aesthetic incorporation of other forms of capital, be they financial, business, or 
scientific. Indeed, David Foster Wallace’s claim that William Gaddis’s J R in fact explores a 
corporate economy of lies exemplifies the sort of charged systems theory I wish to explore here 
(Wallace, Silverblatt “Heartbreaking”). 
 Before aligning systems theory with transgression, it is worthwhile to discuss the original 
concept of systems theory and its utility as a model for analyzing postmodern fiction. Tom 
LeClair, in his work In the Loop: Don DeLillo and Systems Theory, describes the most coherent 
organization of systems theory arises in biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s 1968 book General 
Systems Theory. The book demonstrates “how mathematical expressions and models could help 
scientists understand ‘problems of order, organization, wholeness, teleology,’ matters central to 
living systems but, he belied, ‘programmatically excluded in mechanistic science’” (LeClair, 




biological modes in fluid “ecosystem[s],” or living, organic environments in which information 
circulates (LeClair, Loop 3). By melding these circuits of living and non-living information into 
one unit, distinctions are lost between human, or even organic, components, and the inorganic 
constituents of their environment. As part of this blending, Bertalanffy’s paradigm borrows from 
cyberneticist Norbert Wiener’s concept of feedback, or how systems are able to expand their 
network of data-collection, by “concentrat[ing] on the reciprocal-looping-communications of 
ecological systems (including man)” (LeClair, Loop 4).  
 LeClair’s intervention is to apply this model to the massive and “encyclopedic” novels of 
late postmodernism (Edward Mendelson coined the “encyclopedic novel” in 1976), already 
concerned with “mass” circulatory systems of, for instance, engineering technology in Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow or the stock market in Gaddis’s J R. In a novelistic construct, this “give[s] the 
medium of the text the illusion of reciprocal simultaneity, growth to complexity, an ecosystemic 
plenitude” (LeClair, Loop 10). That is, if traditional realist novels offer mimetic replicas of 
traditional human time frames, marked by climaxes of action and matching resolutions, systems 
novels are instead concerned with the circulation of themes and characters on a more horizontal, 
and non-climactic, plane—development is more circular, character more static. This gives rise to 
what LeClair calls, in perhaps unintentional reflection of Dostoyevsky’s “underground man,” the 
“systems man,” who “is more a locus of communication and energy in a reciprocal relationship 
with his environment than an entity exerting force and dictating linear cause-effect sequences” 
(Loop 10). This “systems man” has been effaced sheerly by his “reciprocal relationship with his 
environment,” rendered ontologically flush with the environment in which he exists. The 
possibility for “trangression” or instability to enter into such a paradigm is perhaps raised by the 




originally envisioned by von Bertalanffy. Oddly mimicking homeostasis itself, Ilya Prigogine in 
Order Out of Chaos pairs entropy with an organism-wide equalization called a “dissipative 
structure,” claiming “entropy may lead to a new, more differentiated, higher, and ‘negentropic’ 
level of organization” (LeClair, Loop 6). This bending tension between entropy and its ordered 
manifestation, or of attempting to inject disturbing and traumatic events in a stabilized circuit, 
likewise bleeds into Roland Barthes’ concept of a textual body and its dismemberment for 
readerly pleasure. 
 Barthes’s most obvious and scandalous assertion in Sade/Fourier/Loyola (1976) is that, 
as one infers from the title, the infamous pervert, the utopian socialist, and the Jesuit priest all 
share similar qualities; primarily their “mania for cutting up” and “enumerative obsessions” 
(Sade/Fourier 3-4). Sade’s legendary capacity for endlessly arranged fornications is aligned with 
the meticulous ratios of Fourier’s utopic commodities, which are in turn aligned with Loyola’s 
endlessly catalogued sins. Sade is paramount here, who Barthes describes as designing in the 120 
Days of Sodom a self-regulating grammar, or unique language construct born out of the totalizing 
system of debasement and producing unique “linguistic units” of “postures, formations” 
(Sade/Fourier 30). The hierarchy and linguistic organization are rigid, as a “gesture” constitutes 
a building block for a “figure,” which then may constitute an “episode,” all marked by elaborate 
pacts and means of interacting between the arrangers and participants (Sade/Fourier 29). Barthes 
modifies this seemingly ironclad nature of Sade’s system in The Pleasure of the Text (1975), 
locating his own readerly “jouissance” in moments of rupture, tear, or mutilation. Writing is a 
“disfigurement” of the mother tongue (Barthes, Pleasure 5); writing is the “seam” between 
“culture” and “destruction” where “the death of language is glimpsed” (Barthes, Pleasure 6). In 




tears in the fabric—the most “erotic” part of the text “where the garment gapes” (Pleasure 9). In 
blending the “systems” novel with the transgressive notion of text requiring rupture and 
disfiguration, consideration of one final thinker—Bataille—imbues such ruptures with the 
affective charge of the transcendent. 
 As Barthes links readerly pleasure to a moment of impossibility, to where a libertine 
might be hanged and cut the rope “at the very moment of his orgasm” (Pleasure 7), Bataille 
paints the vision of how one might live beyond this hanging, or learn from one’s mortal 
expulsions. Proclaimed, derisively, an “excremental philosopher” by André Breton, who 
expelled Bataille from the Surrealists, Bataille is an analyzer of sacred eliminations (Stoekl xi). 
His own theory of “heterology” imbues waste with a valued and explicable content—the frenzied 
excesses of airtight systems, be they philosophical or religious, holding almost sentimental value. 
He claims that any excretory impulse, be it “ritual cannibalism, the sacrifice of animal-gods, 
omophagia, the laughter of exclusion, sobbing,” presents “a common character in that the object 
of the activity (excrement, shameful parts, cadavers, etc) is found each time as a foreign body” 
and hence is capable of “subjective” consideration (Bataille, “Sade” 94). Bataille is virulently 
opposed to what he sees as sterile philosophical camps prizing flat, stable qualities like 
“nothingness, infinite, the absolute,” ignoring the inevitably more sullied categories of 
“degradation” and “decomposition” (Bataille, “Sade” 96). He likewise seeks moments beyond 
comprehension, or altered states beyond the explanatory or derisive reach of organized bodies, 
such as “ecstatic trances,” “orgasms,” or “burst[s] of laughter” (Bataille, “Sade” 99). True to his 
unsettling reputation, however, these moments of self-forgetting and escape from stifling social 
systems rely also on dark and violent impulses: “natural forces such as violent death, gushing 




101). Such power is revolutionary in his estimation, holding the potential for a transformative 
freeing of libido in a fashion reminiscent of Marcuse’s ideal freeing of co-opted Eros in Eros and 
Civilization (1955). Patrick Bateman from Ellis’s American Psycho might be considered a social 
agent under such criteria. Inevitably, however, Bataille’s violent gashes and expulsions are 
moments of revelation, keys for locating the heart of transgressive feeling. 
 Under this model, “transgressive” literature is not simply a one-dimensional shock-
delivery-system, but rather a complex processing mechanism for emotional circulation and 
occasional spill. Indeed, I believe this model of “systematic transgression” offers the best lens for 
understanding the complex, formal capacities of these supposedly one-dimensional works, and 
better rendering their ecstatic excesses and conscious puncturings. To elucidate, I will address 
William T. Vollmann’s The Rainbow Stories (1989) and Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho 
(1991). Both novels offer a telling embodiment of the complex circuitry beneath the façade of 
sheer “transgression,” and likewise offer a commentary on the perceived affectless nature of 
postmodern characters. Similarly, both borrow from a media model of circulation and medium-
derived distance to plumb the depths of a systematically distributed character and ability to 
transgress such a system. First, Vollmann’s Rainbow Stories lends itself easily to this sort of 
analysis in its prescribed goal to analyze all the “miseries” of the rainbow through a color-
specified construct. Considered in the broader fashion of Vollmann’s “moral calculus” he later 
formulates with regard to his war reporting, I argue that The Rainbow Stories (1989) presents an 
“emotional calculus,” or tests empirically the various possibilities for feeling and transcendence 
even in the most stark economies of affection, such as prostitution. Turning to Bret Easton Ellis’s 
American Psycho (1991), I will reassess Ellis’s novel beyond the content of its usually discussed 




organizing its moments of violent schism among consumer detritus to evoke a unique affective 
construct of “dread.” I will also open the possibility for Patrick Bateman to be seen as a nascent 
three-dimensional human, or rather Ellis’ own variety of “systems man” attempting to escape his 















                                                
27 This tactic of re-opening questions of postmodern character may likewise be seen in Aleid 
Fokkema’s survey Postmodern Characters: A Study of Characterization in British and American 
Postmodern Fiction. Fokkema calls for a reassessment of the usually pejorative claim that 
postmodern characters are “flat,” derived from E.M Forster’s famous designation, vying that “the 
introduction of the distinction between ‘flat’ and ‘round’ characters has served evaluation rather 
than critical analysis, and that a strictly mimetic reading of character appears to exclude the study 
of conventions of characterization” (17). Critic Ian Gregson in Character and Satire in Postwar 
Fiction (2006) likewise imbues “flat” postmodern characterization with deeper resonance and 
purpose of caricature.  Both forms, according to Gregson, share “anti-humanist assumptions 




Sensory Movements: William T. Vollmann, The Rainbow Stories, and “Emotional 
Calculus” 
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, / Stains the white radiance of Eternity. 
–Percy Bysshe Shelley. 
 
VOLLMANN 
One of the things that I had to do occasionally while I was collecting information 
for that prostitute story, ‘Ladies and Red Lights’ from The Rainbow Stories, was 
sit in a corner and pull down my pants and masturbate. I would pretend to do this 
while I was asking the prostitutes questions. Because otherwise, they were utterly 
afraid of me and utterly miserable, thinking I was a cop. 
 
INTERVIEWER 




 William T. Vollmann is a white whale of modern American fiction. Occluded beneath the 
surface of institutional recognition—only reaching some degree of critical validation recently with a 
National Book Award for Europe Central in 2005 and a Strauss Living Award in 2008—Vollmann is 
often marked, when described, by his twin characteristics of prolific production and uncomfortable 
subject matter. As to the former, Vollmann has been working on a cycle of novels tracing contemporary 
American trauma back to seven historical encounters between colonists and Native Americans he calls 
the “Seven Dreams,” of which he is at the time of this writing seven-fifths finished with. His self-
described life’s work, however, is the seven-volume, 3,296 page Rising Up and Rising Down (2003) 28—
a spanning attempt to find a “moral calculus” (Vollmann’s term) for when violence is justified, 
buttressed by his extensive journalistic experience and ranging examination of famous historical leaders 
and dictators. Amidst both “cycles,” however, are additional novels, art books, drawings, epigrams, and 
                                                




the concurrent cycle of “prostitution” novels recently capped by his perhaps most critically regarded 
fiction, The Royal Family (2000). Taken as a sum they form one of the most prolific corpuses of modern 
American letters. Yet, likely due to his fascination with outré subject matter, crystallized most formally 
in his prostitution works, there has been essentially no sustained critical work on Vollmann. He is 
mentioned in part by Tom LeClair alongside other producers of “prodigious fictions” including David 
Foster Wallace and Richard Powers, yet his only book-length monographs are primarily volumes by 
Larry McCaffery29 and Michael Hemmingson published with the intent of spurring further critical 
consideration.30  However discomfiting the prostitution work and Vollmann’s embeddedness within it is, 
I believe his analysis of emotional intimacy and distance in its most formal and financially motivated 
form possible, mixed with the need for a holistic economy or “calculus” within it, is essential to 
understanding his larger, world-centered journalistic project and the ethic of his fiction. Likewise, in 
juxtaposing the technique of these mass, systematic novels with the fine-tuned erotic economy portrayed 
in Vollmann’s more transgressive work, one sees more accurately how a “systems novel” approach 
might interact with the flattened affective economy of fiction at the time. 
 Perhaps most overlooked among Vollmann’s fiction is his second major “novel” (or 
interconnected series of vignettes) The Rainbow Stories (1989).31  Written after his first novel 
                                                
29 An early champion of Vollmann’s work, McCaffery wrote on Vollmann early in “The Avant-
Pop Phenomenon” for ANQ (1992), included him in the “Avant-Pop” anthology After 
Yesterday’s Crash (1995), and co-edited the first Vollmann reader Expelled From Eden (2004) 
with Michael Hemmingson. 
30 Hemmingson’s work, alongside Larry McCaffery, has been to create a critical foundation to 
then build a future body of “Vollmann Studies” upon.  In the first book-length consideration of 
Vollmann’s work, William T. Vollmann: A Critical Study and Seven Interviews (2009), 
Hemmingson explicitly claims “it is my intention that this study will be the starting point for all 
Vollmann Studies” (1). His William T. Vollmann: An Annotated Bibliography (2012) is written 
to the same effect, yet the lack of dedicated critical work on Vollmann since both works’ release 
indicates it may still be longer yet until a full development of “Vollmann Studies.” 




You Bright and Risen Angels (1987),32 which was supposedly created while Vollmann was 
working as a computer programmer and sleeping under desks, living off candy bars, and writing 
the piece in 24-hour cycles (Vollmann, Bell “Art”), TRS marks the introduction of a suspiciously 
“embedded” journalistic voice Vollmann will return to throughout his career. The novel is 
notorious for its non-judgmental, affectless portrayal of skinheads, prostitutes, junkies, and 
desperate men and women of all stripes in San Francisco’s Tenderloin district. Due to this 
apparent championing of “underworld” behavior by tacit objectivity, TRS presents a conflicting 
ethical exercise and difficult object to critically validate.33  Vollmann’s odd, and to some 
distancing, regard for these historically oppressed or oppressive subcultures, is likewise extended 
to his general principle for moral issues as “calculus,” or transaction of value-neutral principles 
and desires. This sense of breaking down complex issues into highly philosophical “calculus”-
like strands is manifest in TRS’s very composition, attempting to trace the “manifold” “misery” 
of earth by dedicating chapters to subcultures and fables linked to specific colors. The idea of 
breaking down complex emotional-erotic issues, laid out in the starkest transaction of self for 
capital in prostitution, is what makes TRS an essential study in this period’s systematized and 
processed affect. To get a better sense of Vollmann’s “moral calculus,” since it founds the 
“emotional calculus” that will thread this essay, it bears looking at Vollmann’s most exhaustive 
exercise of the principle in RURD.  
                                                
32 Hereafter referred to as YBRA. 
33 For example, in a piece written against federal regulation of pornography, Vollmann writes of 
a similar dubious example testing the limits of libertarian freedom.  “A friend of mine who used 
to be a Nazi gave me his authentic swastika armband. I was touched that he would give me 
something with meaning to him, but embarrassed by my ownership of that particular object” 
(Vollmann, “What Porn Is” 217). Such is the sort of suspended, moral gamesmanship that often 




 In RURD, Vollmann arrives at his “moral calculus” by adopting the tactic of unwinding 
complex historical issues through sheer cataloguing, cross-referencing, and analytic 
maximalism.34  The neutrality and research-driven tactic implied in Vollmann’s stated mission 
for the project—to find when “the use of violence may be justified,” (Vollmann, Silverblatt 
“Rising”)—is part of such exhaustive documentation and scope. In order to work around the 
understood, de facto liberal-humanist principle of violence always being unjustified, Vollmann 
must stretch backward almost infinitely into history to cull examples and exhaustive comparative 
studies. The list of historical examples he does include, however, is telling. In a disseminated 
plea called “My Life’s Work,” written with the intent of finding a publisher for the weighty 
RURD, he lists a survey of monolithic, famous characters including “Robespierre, Lincoln, John 
Brown, Martin Luther King, Gandhi, Hitler” as well as more complex, prosaic figures like “the 
world’s largest distributor of heroin” and “Bo Gritz, the most decorated Vietnam veteran in 
America and also the head of an apocalyptic, anti-Semitic survival cult” (326). In Vollmann’s 
estimation, every example from history presents a point of moral condensation, all capable of 
expansion to elucidate more grey shades of moral nuance. Some examples are obviously 
paragons of goodness, like Martin Luther King, or evil, like Hitler, though figures presenting a 
more finely shaded mix of good and evil, such as the “heroic” anti-Semite Bo Gritz, seem to 
elucidate Vollmann’s point of moral violence becoming opaque when multiple ideologies 
converge in an imprecise fashion (such as, for Gritz, U.S. nationalism and racism). In an 
interview with Vollmann, Michael Silverblatt queried the troubling aspects of such a “neutral” 
analysis, raising Vollmann’s inclusion of a list detailing the perceived beauties of popularly used 
assault rifles. The aesthetic beauty of the weapons and empathetic tracing of pride in their 





ownership, Vollmann claimed, was essential to understanding the soldier’s motivation and 
attitude toward using them; a similar relationship to a samurai’s adoration for his sword 
(Vollmann, Silverblatt “Rising”). Such inclusions, lists, and finely-shaded moral examples in 
RURD, however, are essential to understanding Vollmann’s methodology, and his attempt to 
parse emotionally-charged moral issues into their individual, objective pieces.  
 No problem is too big to be tackled by the “calculus,” or to have some moral principle 
extracted from a mass collection of examples. Vollmann’s almost excruciatingly technical 
summation of these threads in RURD is presented at the end of the study in a section titled, 
clearly enough, “Moral Calculus.” The obsessively schematic layout of the section is highly 
illustrative of the supposed vast reach and general applicability of the “calculus;” it could be, in 
other words, a moral manual. One section for a particular brand of violence—self-defense—is 
titled “5.2 JUSTIFICATION: SELF-DEFENSE 5.2A WHEN IS VIOLENT DEFENSE OF 
HONOR JUSTIFIED?” Within this header are two separate sub-sections, as Vollmann claims 
definitively, “Every type of honor falls into one of the first two and one of the last two.” This 
scientifically diagnostic tone continues in the first sub-heading, defining one of two types of 
honor, “inner honor,” as “the degree of harmony between (a) an individuals aspirations, deeds, 
and experiences, and (b) his conscience. As such, it remains unknowable to others.” Proper 
exercise of violence in the case of “inner honor” is then further divided into two categories: “1. 
When honor is altruistic—that is, when honor demands the deliverance of a third party from 
imminent violence. 2. When defense of honor perfectly corresponds with other justified defense” 
(Vollmann, “Moral Calculus” 155-6). Such scaling offers a prescription for when such usually 
morally or emotionally shaded action is “justified” almost in the fashion of a glossary, or 




assumed umbrella-category for violence, distinguish the “type,” further distinguish “motive,” 
then discern whether one’s motives aligned with the justification. The idea of a God-like moral 
abacus gives a sense of Vollmann’s measured and scientific-philosophically-minded approach to 
usually knee-jerk issues, offering a near-perfect sensibility to test issues of affective deadness 
and their more arresting extremes. 
 Critically, Vollmann’s examination of abstract emotional issues through “calculus” as an 
extrapolation of his work with violence has been essentially unremarked on, even by McCaffery 
or Hemmingson. Yet, Vollmann’s description of these emotional dioramas as they relate to his 
earlier work indicates this is a prevalent theme throughout his corpus. Vollmann says of YBRA (a 
psychotropic tale of veiled political allegory depicting a war of insects) that the book regarded 
“experiments conducted in my ethical laboratory—experiments involving the most powerful 
reagent—cruelty” (“Biographical Statement” 4). Interesting here is Vollmann’s conception of the 
fictional frame as “laboratory,” replete with “cruelty” as a chemical reactant, to conduct 
“experiments” on moral principles—a metaphoric melding of the purely nonfictional schematic 
used in RURD. He likewise attributes the reactant of “suffering” as the base for his later 
experiments in Eros. He notes the shift to TRS as follows: “I saw that my characters were 
suffering so much because they had misdirected their feelings of love” and “to explore this 
further, I decided to write stories about prostitutes” (“Biographical Statement” 4). In this 
origination of “suffering” caused by “misdirected love,” and the employment of prostitution as 
an amplified chamber to view these reactions, we see the chrysalis of Vollmann’s sterile sexual 
gamesmanship. He claims the characters of TRS, significantly including an extended sequence on 
prostitutes that forms the kernel of his later “trilogy,” were about “lowlives” who did not know 




prostitution of its usual socio-political context, Vollmann’s sublimation, however suspect, of the 
economic inequalities immanent in prostitution is necessary to understand his sterile inquiry into 
emotional absence. 
 Prostitution, as noted before, is likely the prickliest obstacle to embracing Vollmann’s 
work. I want to side-step concerns over judging or attempting to locate damning evidence in 
Vollmann’s apparent admission to autobiographical enjoyment of prostitution through 
experiences attributed to his character, “William Vollmann,” who appears in his work. 
Alignment between Vollmann the author and Vollmann the character is primarily difficult 
because the Vollmann character is often employed rhetorically as a blundering everyman used 
for a wandering, “floating-eyeball” perspective, like Christian from Pilgrim’s Progress—a naive 
and well-intentioned dupe testing and travelling through various rings of temptation and 
tribulation to highlight particularities of vice in the process.35  His personal comments on the 
topic, however, reveal a predictably removed and theoretical concern for prostitution, lending 
credence to its more abstract use in his fiction. When pressed on his fascination, Vollmann 
inevitably describes how prostitutes seem to present a condensed sum of life experience obtained 
through the harsh conditions of their existence. This conception embodies a “holy whore” 
paradigm, identified as such by a journalist and confirmed by Vollmann. Such a paradigm’s 
more worshipful and exoticized view, however, is undermined and contrasted in the same 
interview by other at-times clashing opinions. He goes on to describe in detail how prostitutes 
may hold an unjust and disenfranchised position, as “people can be very mean to them,” and are 
inevitably tied to a customer who “gives you diseases and stabs you and burns you.” Yet, just a 
                                                
35 For those interested in hearing Vollmann discuss the alternate fictionalization and technical 
use of his pseudo-autobiographical interventions, see his 1992 Bookworm interview on “Fathers 




few lines later, he claims, “In America, I believe that 99 percent of us are responsible for our 
actions” (“Vollmann Shares” 127-128), and hence exonerates himself of any responsibility for 
action or imperative to understand any particular prostitute’s circumstances. Vollmann’s curious 
movement from sanctification, to pity, to a detached appraisal, reveals his overall understanding 
and employment of prostitution as merely a metaphor, a circuit for examining the transaction of 
emotions, not a portrait of real-life conditions. Prostitution presents to Vollmann the base 
foundation of acceptable needs being met in a relationship—desire in the john, finances in the 
prostitute—that will present the template for his emotional investigations in TRS, and a fictional 
surrogate in his later work. 
 As the methodical scalpel into these “forbidden” zones of subculture, Vollmann’s warped 
New Journalistic technique acts as a curious inversion of Tom Wolfe’s prescribed “cure” for 
postmodernism in his 1989 piece “Stalking the Billion-Footed Beast”: journalistic-minded 
realism. In the essay—a touchstone for critics marking moments of maximum disenchantment 
with postmodernism—Wolfe cites postmodernism’s over-enthusiasm for European critical 
theory and an abandonment of mimesis as reasons for its inherent state of decay. His solution is a 
novelistic realism based in fact, or, in other words, his own method employed in novels like The 
Bonfire of the Vanities (1987). He claims, “It is not merely that reporting is useful in gathering 
the petits faits vrais that create verisimilitude and make a novel gripping or absorbing[,] “my 
contention is that…they are essential” (Wolfe 55). Vollmann’s repeated immersion of self into 
typically objective subject matter to obtain deeper, evocative truth is legendary—from assisting 
the Mujahideen against the Soviets as he recounts in An Afghanistan Picture Show (1992) to 
smoking crack for research to his repeated work on the Thai sex trade—and has earned 




his book Hell’s Angels (1966). Vollmann distorts this, however, with his politically incorrect 
immersion into sex work in particular, claiming part of the reason he visits prostitutes is to flesh 
out their characterization in his fiction, or form kernels (again problematically) for female 
characters in his work (Vollmann, Bell “Art”). Vollmann further allies this with his own 
assessment of problems in American literature in a 1990 piece entitled “American Writing 
Today: Diagnosis of a Disease,” where he boils down missing elements to an essential maxim: 
“we should never write without feeling” (332).36 That Vollmann’s “feeling” is intrinsically tied 
to the sort of ribald brothel enjoyment that would make Tom Wolfe’s white suit blush is a 
curious muddling of Wolfe’s own puritanically offered immersive realism. Further, when this 
feeling is subjected to Vollmann’s “calculus”-derived equations of libido, we might be able to 
view works with ostensible filters or organizational principles, like TRS’s organization of 
chapters according to colors, as offering individual symbols and keys to their own interpretation. 
Namely, TRS presents itself as a logic-driven investigation of “feeling” by channeling affectively 
extreme subgroups like sex workers and down-and-outs into trackable filters, embodied in 
colors, and offering a neutral arbiter and assessing instrument in the form of Vollmann’s 
embedded persona. 
 In investigating TRS’s particular color theme as an analog for “feeling,” it is useful to 
consider Wittgenstein—an integral thinker for both Vollmann and David Foster Wallace37—and 
                                                
36 This sentiment pre-empts Wallace’s similar urging for a return to “single-entendre” principles 
and anti-ironism in his 1993 piece “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” published 
shortly after. 
37 McCaffery and Hemmingson note the influence of Wittgenstein on Vollmann after his reading 
Philosophical Investigations at Deep Springs College under Alan Paskow—Wittgenstein 
becomes the most cited writer in Vollmann’s first non-fiction book, An Afghanistan Picture 
Show (“Chronology” 411,420). Hemmingson goes on to cite Wittgenstein directly as the source 




particularly his work on the limits of comprehension and color. In Remarks on Colour (1977), 
Wittgenstein marries his notion of knowledge confined to the social constructs of language 
relationships, or “language games,” outlined in the Philosophical Investigations (1953), to the 
difficulty of understanding intrinsic qualities of color as expressed by language. Wittgenstein’s 
rendering of the ontological paradoxes in human perceptions of color are oddly moving, and 
resonate with Vollmann’s own pursuit of some central, but ineffable, artistic “feeling” beneath 
the tableaus of TRS. Wittgenstein remarks, “I see in a photograph (not a colour photograph) a 
man with dark hair and a boy with slicked-back blond hair standing in front of a kind of lathe… 
But do I really see the hair blond in the photograph?” (10e-11e). That Wittgenstein wishes to 
assume an intangible quality of “blondeness” in a photograph he knows is only black and white, 
and the capacity of “blondeness” to remain just slightly off the range of perceptibility in a black 
and white color palette, has a poignancy regarding the impossibility of knowing a subject’s true 
qualities through color. Wittgenstein’s comments in Remarks on Colour, composed when he was 
near-death, are primarily tinged with a sense of isolation from the world, of an unbridgeable gap 
between person and object, like the skin of Silverblatt’s “hypothetical” veneer. He notes that, 
“when we’re asked ‘What do the words ‘red’, ‘blue’, ‘black’, ‘white’, mean?’ We can of course 
immediately point to things which have these colours,—but our ability to explain the meanings 
of these words goes no further!” (Wittgenstein 11e). This sense of objects lacking true states, or 
of existence expressible only in relation to other objects, is reminiscent of Vollmann’s relational 
qualities of “misery” attributed to his spectrum of degenerates and outcasts in TRS. The 
emotional degree zero of his subjects offers a chess-like potential to then analyze the constitutive 
parts of numbness in their movement and rearrangement. 
                                                                                                                                                       
rigorously logical thinker (and disciple of Wittgenstein) who favors the syllogistic, let’s-break-




 In Vollmann’s own schema that begins TRS, he remarks on a similar untouchability, or 
lack of immanent being, in the colors of humanity he describes. The schema, entitled “The Vile 
Rainbow,” lays out a “spectrum” that offers the twin polarities of the visible color spectrum, 
marked by “Mechanical Terrors” on the high spectrum and “Mysteries and Monsters” on the 
low, the colors of consideration as the hues in between. Vollmann’s goal is to elucidate, with his 
journalistic electron microscope, the colors in this “rainbow” of “manifold” “misery,” as his 
epigram from Edgar Allen Poe’s “Berenice” describes. Yet, such a task is also, considering 
Wittgenstein’s color-oriented “language games” and the central unknowability of these visible 
qualities, impossible. Vollmann claims in his preface: “I do not understand colors in themselves. 
I have therefore based my ideology not on the innate qualities of certain hues, but on their 
extremes and their negation. Thus the spectrum of these Rainbow Stories is bordered by black 
and white, and it is in their progression from one to the other that their meaning lies.” 
In these comments, Vollmann remarks on the impossibility of exactly rendering, or lending 
descriptive detail to these actual states of being, or dispersed qualities of “misery.” His method 
of investigation is one marked by contrast, in which he must highlight the “extremes” of their 
qualities while attempting to elucidate some deeper, truer state in marking their “progression 
from one to the other.” Such is the introduction of an “emotional calculus,” through which 
emotion will be revealed by a contrasting movement between “colored” emotions in the 
spectrum and their resulting intersections. As each element in Vollmann’s scheme is further 
systematized and rendered traceable by allotting a realm of “misery” to a color, let us begin with 
the foundational element of prostitution and its allied color red. 
 As one of the most potent signifiers that will thread through most of Vollmann’s oeuvre, 




Vollmann through his trilogy dedicated to the subject, terminating with The Royal Family 
(2000). As such, our “calculus” should begin here. Vollmann’s exercise in the chapter is to set 
the foundation for the hollowed economy of desire and emotion he sees prostitution as 
embodying: a ground zero for the use of emotion and intimacy as currency. In plot contents the 
section is slim, bare, but marks firstly Vollmann’s mixture of his own journalistic method with 
that of the prostitutes, as well as the complex compensation scheme of emotion underwriting the 
prostitute’s transactions. Vollmann first sets the stakes of transfusing a sexual economy into a 
fictional one by continually raising his own “payment” for information to mirror the payment for 
actual intercourse. His repeating mantra, consigned to footnotes, is “This revelation cost me 
twenty dollars” (TRS 110), or “This information cost me four dollars” (TRS 133), marking 
Vollmann’s continual journalistic pumping for information with the sexualized cravenness of the 
“john.” This payment for fuel, or content, likewise opens the frame of the novel to circuits of 
literary prostitution, or sex acts used as an enactment of literary principles. Prostitution then 
occupies the extremes that allow Vollmann better to elucidate the emotional “color” of his 
spectrum that is otherwise invisible. These extremes, however, enact in Vollmann’s scheme the 
paradoxical inversion of the “john” from a position of power to abject desperation—a position 
implicitly lowered and at a loss due to his desperate pursuit of intimacy and emotional 
accommodation. Though they may be in the socio-economic position of control, Vollmann 
seems to posit, the john’s central, isolating desire is what bankrupts him before his selected call 
girl. One girl, Christina, claims that she pities her clients, as inevitably they are “lonely,” often 
married, and only seeking someone to “act appreciative” towards them (Vollmann, TRS 130). 
Vollmann also indicts himself in the scheme, anthropomorphizing his own desperate phallus 




100, 102). In the latter, he describes the detached quality of his individualized organ, stripped of 
more cohesive personhood and attachment to the larger human organism. Its desires are self-
servicing, and above all, isolating. The narrator describes the personalized genitalia’s journey 
and thoughts as follows: “the night is dark. He is so alone” and “What an emptiness Mr. Penis 
must look forward to!” (Vollmann, TRS 102). The hunt for a receiving organ is here correlated to 
a wider existential chasm desire forces the organ to face. Further, Vollmann reveals the 
incomplete overlap of sexual and emotional fulfillment, each not quite aligning with the other. 
 In progressing from sheer economically motivated sexuality to a more basic socially 
mandated sexuality, Vollmann then traces the transaction of emotional spark through a 
potentially ordinary young love between his character and a Korean girl Jenny in “Yellow Rose.” 
True to the title’s racialized overtimes, “Yellow Rose” describes the fetishization of externality, 
and “race” as a stand-in for the more internally invisible qualities of emotion, and a negating 
factor in their emotional consummation. Vollmann expresses his desperate love for Jenny, yet 
describes her repeated discussions of how their relation is ultimately doomed to fail as her 
parents desire a Korean partner, and Vollmann’s whiteness precludes his consideration. 
Vollmann reflects on this seemingly unsolvable racial impasse: “How to explain this revulsion 
that the colors of the rainbow feel for each other?” (TRS 322). He transcends the easy obstacle of 
sheer racial difference to return back to his schema of the “spectra” of misery, or the central 
inability for humans to relate suffering to one another and bond in the process. “Yellow Rose” 
culminates in a failed marriage proposal, yet evinces the sort of stark “emotional” calculus 
Vollmann proposes will leave nothing but anhedonia or absence in its wake. After Jenny turns 
down his request, claiming that he has made her “so unhappy” (Vollmann, TRS 231), she asks 




mean that I was ready to kill myself. I had already loaded my guns upstairs. ‘Seven,’ I said. ‘No, 
seven point five’” (TRS 232). Vollmann’s willingness to kill himself if shunned reveals the 
chasm beneath this fetishized racial externality. In his absolute paradigm of love or death, 
Vollmann’s willingness to topple into the latter should the former fail recalls the stark “black and 
white” outlining his own color spectrum. Earlier, after Jenny tells him their recent coupling is 
“the last time,” Vollmann similarly “sat imagining the cool barrel of the gun against my left eye” 
(TRS 214). The story is a paradigm of central incompatibility, with race as an external, red 
herring signifier for how this impossibility is manifest. Suicide is the given alternative, couched 
in a youthful proclamation of “love or death.”  
 Vollmann then eradicates his yellow signifier through a paired section on blue, called the 
“Blue Wallet,” hence systematically negating the possibility of earthly, relationship-driven love. 
The implied mixture (blue and yellow’s green also birthing the self-involved, narcissistic chapter 
“The Green Dress,” to be covered shortly) eradicates fully any possibility of overcoming racial 
difference in “Yellow Rose.” Racism as a negating factor arises again here, as Jenny loses the 
wallet in question at a skinhead party Vollmann has taken her to, and remains convinced the 
wallet will be used by the skinheads to burglarize her. Vollmann imagines the skins breaking in, 
“com[ing] charging up the stairs and Dagger would shatter the banister with one kick of his Nazi 
boots and Yama would smash in the curtained glass door” (TRS 321). The lost wallet takes on 
the characteristics of a magical object, a meta-fictional device used decisively for the slow 
unwinding of the relationship. Or, in terms of this study, such conceit might be a representation 
of mathematical inevitability or counter-polarity negating a prior emotional charge. Vollmann 
reiterates this self-consciously artificial interpretation of the wallet, claiming, “If this had been a 




proving by its determined refusal to be elsewhere that all suspicions had been reified to the point 
of logical and moral death” (TRS 323). In Vollmann’s typically hyperbolic prose, he describes 
the “suspicions” as already maintaining a reified symbolism of death before the relationship 
itself has been undone. He goes on to describe how the Wallet functions as an element of 
inevitable deterioration in the symbol of a “black waterfall,” “that everything goes down 
eventually” (Vollmann, TRS 323-324). With the blue wallet circulating as an introduced fictional 
solvent to the relationship, the processes resulting are inevitable.38  
 The nexus of these two poles of ideal love, manifest in the yellow and blue chapters, is 
fittingly found in a section entitled “The Green Dress: A Pornographic Tale.” Appropriate to the 
mixing of yellow’s promised love and blue’s revocation, green arises as a marker of what 
Vollmann describes as his “gangrened calculus” (TRS 210), or attempt to discern and investigate 
an emotional absence by himself. Contrary to the seeming implication of multiple partners raised 
by the subtitle of “A Pornographic Tale,” “The Green Dress” in fact describes displaced onanism 
as the only option left after the nullification of love, or more specifically the self-love expressed 
through a fetishistic obsession with an object: the dress. The section begins with the same 
mercurial pseudo-autobiographical narrator describing his fascination with a woman in a green 
dress he sees continually leaving his apartment building. The twist occurs when he becomes 
obsessed with the dress, not the woman. The first line of the section, “some women are so 
reclusive as to seem perfect,” banishes her to “reclusive[ity]” so as to obtain the “perfect” husk 
of the dress left behind (Vollmann, TRS 279). The narrator slips into the woman’s apartment to 
obtain the garment, then goes on to describe a surreal love story in which he courts, and 
eventually makes love to, this garment. He describes, almost farcically, that at dinner “someone 





turned the fan on, and she fluttered mischievously…” (Vollmann, TRS 290). Likewise, she 
entices him: “she billowed gently at me; I threw myself down at the foot of the chair and her hem 
caressed my forehead with indescribable gentleness” (Vollmann, TRS 288). Finally, the 
relationship is consummated in a ludicrous fashion: “the sleepy dress put her sleeves around me 
as I entered her, but she couldn’t feel me she was too big” (Vollmann, TRS 289). The similarity 
between these descriptions is the narrator’s attempt to fill his loneliness by means of emptied 
cipher, in this case the invisible, former signifier of companionship. The narrator cements this 
concept of desiring a blank vessel through his proclaimed disdain for actual humans: “It seemed 
unreasonable to have to put up with the day-to-dayness of glands, hairs, tissues, fluids, and 
moles, when all I wanted was a Companion to hug” (Vollmann, TRS 298). The statement’s 
antisocial nature synchronizes with the emotional vacancy of Vollmann’s desired prostitution 
system; the dress acts as signifier of the literally objectified rather than the traditional body-as-
object of the prostitution encounter. 
 This exaltation of a missing emotional center in Vollmann’s system is ensconced within a 
larger phenomenological debate in “Violet Hair,” a section that elevates the possibility for love 
to a final, divine level for ontological investigation. The section describes a missing, and 
presumably dead, “Saint Catherine” and situates Vollmann as her still-living biographer or 
guardian angel, raises and nullifies the potential of emotional connection beyond the earth or in a 
fantasized, celestial dimension. The woman in question, “Saint Catherine of San Diego,” or more 
properly, of “Solana Beach,” is a carry-over figure from YBRA, where Vollmann describes her 
with a mystical air of inhumanity, either hinting at her inaccessibility—like the voyeur object in 
“Green Dress”—or her literal inanimacy (Vollmann, TRS 483). Vollmann notes that she “would 




(Hemmingson, Critical Study 25), yet just as quickly says he may have been “fooling” himself, 
and that in true Beatrice fashion, she may be “in her grave” (YBRA 25). Regardless, Vollmann 
fictionally transmutes himself into an ethereal guardian angel, or “holy ghost,” who observes the 
potentially dead (or perhaps dead-in-life) Catherine. He claims, “I, William T. Vollmann, am the 
Holy Ghost, I am able to understand all tongues” (Vollmann, TRS 530). In one sense, the tale 
presents Vollmann as a penitent parishioner trying to summon the idea of Catherine through 
sheer faith, yet in another, related to Catherine’s supposed reading of Heidegger, Vollmann is 
tested in his relation to her more ontologically. We then have a religious narrative, about the 
possibility of love as a holy, faith-driven yet untouchable construct, as well as a practical 
philosophical investigation into how such love manifests the same problems of unprovability. 
 Vollmann’s description of his interaction with Catherine is always by proxy. Rather than 
the window shade of “Green Dress,” he gives himself a parting of the clouds to gain omnipotent 
insight into Catherine’s daily rituals and worries that become fixed by his gaze with the 
transcendent importance of divine communion. He describes matter-of-factly that “most of her 
life, Catherine had been reading, sometimes taking her book to visit me in Heaven where it is 
cold and foggy” (Vollmann, TRS 483). Vollmann’s voyeuristic obsession is “holy,” and he 
claims that by imagination alone can he bring Catherine up to his transcendent peak. His relation 
to her, however, is forever uncertain—there is never an absolute assertion that Vollmann-as-
Holy-Ghost actually exists, nor that Catherine believes in him. She sometimes has “a peculiar 
feeling that something in the air is trying to talk to me,” yet no absolute confirmation that 
Vollmann’s supervision is recognized (Vollmann, TRS 488). Catherine, as surrogate to 




relating to any certain knowledge of divine figures. Like Beatrice, he can only follow, but never 
fully embrace or know. 
 Vollmann’s querying of supreme love’s existence is likewise blended with Catherine’s 
own investigations into Heideggerian ontology and “being.” Catherine’s philosophical 
investigations raise an idealized end point for Vollmann’s investigations into absolute union that 
his calculus strives for but finally, crushingly, cannot obtain. The section is subtitled “A 
Heideggerian Tragedy,” and is marked by Catherine’s ontological crises as she pores over 
Heidegger’s Being and Time in an attempt to solve her problem of “being-in-the-world,” or 
Dasein. Vollmann creates an explicit link between his former fetishistic spectatorship and the 
relationality at core of much of Heideigger’s investigation of Dasein by describing his Holy 
Ghost stature as existing “in relation to Catherine” (TRS 494). Here we see Vollmann’s 
reiteration of his epigram’s notion that misery’s colors are only visibly by contrast, or by 
alignment with one another. Relationality’s integral function in Heideggarian thought is revealed 
by Vollmann’s glossary at the end of the section, defining “Relatedness” as “One of Dasein’s 
most integral characteristics” (TRS 533) and that “Dasein does not exist as an isolated quantity, 
but as an entity in relation to the constellation of ontic flotsam and jetsam in the world” (TRS 
533). By claiming an ontological status of “being” only in relation to the phantasmal construct of 
Catherine, Vollmann literally claims to be living for, or only existing as an adjunct to, the 
“being” of Catherine. He has an emotional status only by proxy to the gravitas of Catherine’s 
Dasein; like Wittgenstein’s color, he holds no stable immanent state or qualities in himself. 
Likewise, Catherine implicates herself in the dual potential of Dasein as either manifesting 
“being” in a free-standing, self-sustained capacity (“present-at-hand”) or as a function of use in 




even applicable to sunlight, such that “she seemed imprisoned in some summer reverie about 
whether sunlight is essentially present-at-hand because it is there in itself or whether it is ready-
to-hand because Catherine discovered it and felt it on her” (Vollmann, TRS 496). Her 
“Heideggarian panic” (Vollmann, TRS 496) is such that she seems incapable of acting, perhaps 
as a means of heading off any claims to “ready-at-hand” status, and the nonstop activity and 
utilization implied. She ruminates on the quote from Being and Time, “To be closed off and 
covered up belongs to Dasein’s facticity,” using this sentiment of reclusiveness as a reason to 
stay “lying on her bed day and night” and to covertly slip into a “factual,” present-at-hand status 
(Vollmann, TRS 514). Her panic over her own status, unsure of whether she is only a relational 
construct, or indeed has a priori existence, reflects Vollmann’s own regard for her as an aloof 
paramour, wandering spirit, or idealized construct. As the ultimate encapsulation of cosmic love, 
Catherine cannot exist, or can only exist as a shifting manipulation of the pieces of Heideggerian 
being. In Vollmann’s emotional calculus of only vacated emotional currencies, she simply 
cannot be known. 
 Having established his “holy” vision and his ability to see through the various hollow 
emotive charges of the rainbow’s colors, Vollmann closes TRS with a reflective epilogue called 
“X-Ray Visions,” a ruminative suggestion of the space beyond color. Similar to the synthesized 
colors in the book’s first formal chapter, “The Visible Colors,” which describes the sinister 
practice of hospitals assigning one’s severity of disease and required operations to colored lines 
on the floor, “X-Ray” presents a pan-novelistic perspective looking beyond them. The x-ray 
perspective sees through Eros, as I believe TRS outlines in its color-specific chapters, straight to 
the terminus of death. Vollmann is ostensibly interpreting the Rorschach-like x-rays marked by 




“ghosts of marrow,” “you are literally seeing death” (TRS 537-541). Like the inaccessibility of 
“holy love” that Vollmann manifests in the presumably dead “saint” Catherine, the underlying 
composite of these various colors the book encapsulates is the nullification of life, the common 
base against which the other colors may be judged. X-Rays, unlike the human eye, see “through 
the RED of our blood, the ORANGE and the YELLOW of our fatty tissues, the GREEN and 
BLUE of our intestines, the INDIGO of our dreams, the VIOLET of our preoccupations—and 
only the black and white remain” (Vollmann, TRS 541). That is, the sterile erotic interchanges of 
prostitutes, the unreachable coupling of earthly love, and the unattainability of cosmic love, all 
circulate around the central nexus of death, of bodily decay and the certainty of mortality. 
 In Vollmann’s erotic calculus, transgression is merely the silver lining that runs through 
various kinds of ephemeral social and erotic connection. The world of prostitutes, limned by 
concepts of “safety” and complacency, is kept in balance by a possibility of bodily harm to the 
prostitute and of emotional deficit to the john. In unobtainable social connection, epitomized in 
the unreachable ideal of Jenny, the fetishized external qualifier of race enters to nullify any 
possible understanding. Beneath this unreachable surface-level human connection, the 
mathematical certainty of suicide (the “10” of Vollmann’s 1 to 10 misery scale) lies 
unquestioned. Likewise, even self-love and solipsism are marred by the eventual transmutation 
of one’s desire into inanimate objects like the green dress, themselves incapable of loving back. 
Love is essentially ensconced in the hollowness of the green dress’s interior when Vollmann 
attempts to make love to it—empty, a joke, animated by self-delusion. This emotional incapacity 
reaches a level of ontological uncertainty in Catherine and the search for Dasein. Vollmann is 
never able to realize his existence in relation to her, nor her existence in relation to herself, due to 




evacuation of emotion in various capacities, and the ways in which one might be able to shift the 
remaining husks of personhood to analyze the lingering dregs of desire. (As Gaddis says in The 
Recognitions, “what’s any artist but the dregs of his work?”) The colors and chapters not 
mentioned here, mostly relating to skinheads, the murdering of homeless people, and 
performance artists mashing animals in threshers, likewise reveal the quantification and isolation 
of “transgression” next to the isolated experiments of the other colors. The transgression is 
merely an understood and exaggerated attempt for “feeling” set into relief by the flatness, and 
emotional numbing of the other chapters for the sake of the “calculus.” That such calculus 
inevitably equals “zero” doesn’t seem to strike Vollmann as the sole poignancy of the work. The 
push beyond the “zero,” however, and with a far greater fixation on these “isolated” 
transgressions wound to a high tension, is explored in Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho. 
Indeed, Ellis’s oscillating scheme of brutality and banality is so fevered as to make pain feel like 














Less Sad The Second Time Around: American Psycho and the Selfhood of Repetition 
 Bret Easton Ellis opens American Psycho with an excerpt from Dostoevsky’s preface to 
Notes from Underground that describes how the grizzled and outcast underground man isn’t an 
aberration, but rather a necessary byproduct of contemporary society. That, “considering the 
circumstances under which our society has generally been formed,” such persons not only exist, 
but “must exist” (Ellis, AP). If we update the underground man to Tom LeClair’s “systems man,” 
or to a similar crystallization of societal ills that is allowed greater circulation within society, the 
presence of this ostracized figure’s mania would be diffuse, abstract. Navigating through a 
postmodern architecture of abstract wealth, sex that mimes pornography, and an assemblage of 
brands that connote “identity,” American Psycho’s Patrick Bateman presents just such a figure 
permeating society as fluidly as the currency he spends with abandon. His passage through his 
environment, and the novel in general, is marked by stark outbursts of violence—cruel, 
calculated, and deployed with scientific precision. Yet this balance of deadened commercial 
circuitry and “incomprehensible” violence has dominated critical discussion with little comment 
on the structured and systematic aspect in which they operate, though this systematic nature 
forms the mantle of Patrick’s consciousness and the novel’s organization. Selfhood is suggested 
by the systematic repetition of banalities and extremes: a learning of emotion by rote. Violence is 
present throughout the story with the insistence and definition of a plot device, or recurrent 
minor character, and Bateman himself exhibits the revolving, centrifuge-like coming into 
consciousness by these bursts of violence, coupled with his own repeated attempts at self-
definition.  
 In the highly segregated and dread-saturated emotional centrifuge of American Psycho, 




TRS is separated by Ellis into categories of absolute numbness and absolute carnality. In Larry 
McCaffery’s interview with David Foster Wallace, McCaffery places Ellis in the same tactical 
camp of sensational material as Vollmann, though he claims Vollmann uses sensation to “depict 
those people not as flattened, dehumanized stereotypes,” as Ellis does, “but as human beings” 
(132). Yet he doesn’t comment on whether these flattened “stereotypes” might have a purpose, 
or greater ability for circulation within the particular construct Ellis has built. Similarly, in 
Vollmann’s imbuing of “humanity” to his down-and-out subjects and personalizing his 
relationships with them, there is a complication—Vollmann’s own embedding of self within the 
narrative coupled with empathy (and sometimes physical intimacy) with his subjects makes 
objective analysis difficult. Even Vollmann’s imposed schema of the scattered colors of 
“misery” only captures sensation in the movement from one to the other. Bateman’s quest for 
selfhood, however, is marked by twin trajectories of stark violence and banal consumerism, 
revealing how each category might alternate, repeat, and interplay to build sensation accretively. 
Ellis’s “flattened, dehumanized” characters, like Bateman, function more like algebraic symbols 
in a larger equation. As a numb placeholder, Bateman is an ideal test case for the conjuring of 
affect by repetition and recursion, intermittently jolted by jags of “feeling” that performatively 
mirror a novel being shocked to life. 
 While much has been made of the book’s twinned trajectories of banality and violence, 
these have been understood fairly simplistically as one only puncturing the other, or creating an 
ethics of “suspension”39 in one’s anticipation of the other. Yet, rather than presume the violence 
is a manifestation of some latent dissatisfaction with a superficial, consumer façade, both 
                                                






trajectories embody the same desire—of a coming-into-being of “feeling,” of composing 
moments of excess or elation from constitutive elements. And indeed, a closer appraisal of the 
novel’s careful construction—Ellis offers an alternative to critics’ claim of plotlessness by 
highlighting his unique structuring device of steadily increasing “dread” (Ellis, Goulian “Art”)—
reveals a more carefully constructed attempt to reach affective breakthrough by the dual threads 
of hyper-violence and bourgeois self-realization. The former is achieved by meticulously plotted 
inclusions of hyper-violence—Ellis often notes that the book presents less than twenty-five pages 
of the much discussed violence—included as quantitative entities, rather than the nuanced, 
“bravura” element that critics like Julian Murphet claim presents the “real” or “literary” writing 
of the novel. The latter, likewise, is marked as accretive gestures toward self-realization, with 
Patrick’s sense of self attempting to manifest through his two chosen mediums—jokes and music 
reviews— to no avail, and made moot by their systematic repetition. Indeed, the “banality,” 
repetition, and formlessness perceived by most critics—some redemptively with the aim of satire 
in mind—are rather a misperception of the emotional economies running beneath the novel’s 
seemingly disorganized construct. With an aim at systematic construction, and almost content-
negligible moments of rupture and overt transgression, Ellis’ novel attempts to offer a starker 
rendition of Vollmann’s emotional calculus by projecting it through the most abysmally flat 
character possible. And, in the process, Ellis generates a new type of two-dimensional character 
actively realizing the existential hell of his own two-dimensionality. 
 When discussing two-dimensionality of character, it is useful to reflect on the more 
damning critical assessments of Ellis’s work. Most suggestive are those understanding the 
emotional chasm beneath Ellis’s work as sheer vacuity, as these critical perspectives still point to 




and most apropos in this study—, let us look at commentary by one of Ellis’ most pointed 
detractors, David Foster Wallace. In Wallace’s 1988 piece “Fictional Futures and the 
Conspicuously Young,” he attributes one of three genres seen as symptomatic of the shallow 
writing of his generation to Ellis, called “Neiman-Marcus-Nihilism,” or alternately, “Gold-card-
fear-and-trembling” fiction (39, 67). The genre supposedly entails “six-figure Uppies and their 
salon-tanned, morally vacant offspring, none of whom seem to be able to make it from limo door 
to analyst’s couch without several grams of chemical encouragement” (“Futures” 39). Wallace’s 
main critique of Ellis’s school, as he elaborates on in his later interview with Larry McCaffery, 
was the “Mimesis-for-Mimesis’ sake” (“Futures” 67) mode of critiquing “shitty, insipid, 
materialistic” social problems by merely mirroring them without commentary or a way out, 
crystallized excesses in Ellis through the travails of a bored aristocracy (Wallace, McCaffery 26). 
Yet, in raising these reflections of Kierkegaard (“fear-and-trembling”) and nihilism, however 
facetiously, Wallace still allots weight to the philosophical project Ellis remains engaged in, 
however much he might disagree with the superficial gloss or surface action.  
 Wallace’s assessment of Ellis during the 1993 McCaffery interview actually arrives 
incidentally while dodging McCaffery’s original query about whether Ellis fulfilled Wallace’s 
dictum that writers must be willing to be “cruel,” or progress beyond a prostituting, entertaining 
relationship (23). McCaffery clarifies this cruelty as “‘cruel’ the way an army drill sergeant is 
when he decides to put a bunch of raw recruits through hell, knowing that the trauma you’re 
inflicting on these guys…[is] going to strengthen them in the end” (Wallace, McCaffery 24). 
Wallace’s unwillingness to ally literal “cruelty” to the emotional hardiness he feels essential to 
quality writing is further reinforced by his wholesale dismissal of the kind of “shock-tactics” 




avant-gardism” that, in its abandonment of a reader-enriching pact, lends to “bad language 
poetry and American Psycho’s nipple-shocks and Alice Cooper eating shit on stage” (Wallace, 
McCaffery 132). Wallace’s point of view is that “cruelty,” or confrontation of discomforting 
issues in discomforting manner, must still provide means to apply “CPR to those elements of 
what’s human and magical” (Wallace, McCaffery 28). Hence, Ellis and Wallace only differ in 
the final reaction of cruelty in provoking a more optimistic reaction in the reader; the line at 
which productive cruelty merges into mere “shock tactics” is uncertain.  
 Discussion of productive or unproductive cruelty leads us to the most fixated-upon aspect 
of American Psycho: the violence—the original, blinding element that caught the eye of critics 
trying to, as Roger Rosenblatt’s article was titled, “Snuff this Book.” The story of American 
Psycho’s publishing is legend, such that there is little point in recounting it in full here, other 
than remarking the initial, premature release of the hyper-explicit scenes (out of context, and 
without indication that this comprised a minority of the text), a boycott by NOW, withdrawal of 
Ellis’s publishing contract, a reinstatement of Ellis’s contract by Vintage Contemporaries, and 
eventual release of AP to much scandal and fanfare. The resulting premature critical assessments 
were locked into this hysteria, taking the bait of early titillating detail and using this as an excuse 
to slander and almost deliberately misread the book. (This reactionary groupthink response is 
wholly refuted in Elizabeth Young’s essential “The Beast in the Jungle, the Figure in the 
Carpet;” the foundation of most or all critical reappraisals of Ellis.) A telling review by John Leo 
in U.S. News & World Report is indicative of the broader consensus: “totally hateful… violent 
junk… no discernable plot, no believable characterizations, no sensibility at work that comes 
anywhere close to making art out of all the blood and torture… Ellis displays little feel for 




particular, of the novel’s construction and apparent shirking of “narrative” and “rhythm” are 
actually telling of a deeper organizational principle missing in these assessments.  
 Elizabeth Young’s “Beast in the Carpet” includes an ironic epigram by Ellis meant to jab 
at these myopic critics, in which Ellis is quoted as saying, “What I was really interested in was 
the language, the structure, the details” (85). Young goes on to describe the story of the novel’s 
difficult and controversial publication as a decoy for critics to avoid the structural complexities 
of the real narrative (“Beast” 85). Yet, the root of such critical indignation—Ellis’s celebrity and 
high profile—is also part of what makes the consideration of American Psycho so essential, as 
the dramatic release of the book led to Ellis being temporarily regarded as “America’s most 
notorious and ‘dangerous’ mainstream writer” (Young, “Beast” 85). Indeed, Young claims “it 
was the combination of overt sexual violence and Ellis’s status as a ‘serious’ novelist—young, 
relevant, living, mainstream—that determined all the hysteria” (“Beast” 92). Dennis Cooper’s far 
more explicit novel Frisk, whose kaleidoscopic sadism makes American Psycho look like Where 
the Sidewalk Ends by comparison, was released to essentially no critical protestations that same 
spring. One plausible reason? Frisk was a “homosexual-murder” novel rather than a 
heterosexual-murder novel, and hence was marginalized (Young, “Beast” 90). Such is to say, 
American Psycho, as an object of mainstream fear, offers a more telling example of how 
hegemonic tropes of emotional flattening and violence operate than other works. 
 Ellis’s fastidious approach to handling violent content is surprising when considering his 
somewhat misattributed reputation as shock-meister and gore-monger. In interviews he describes 
how he consciously, and with a degree of detachment, implemented the subject matter into the 
already-existing construct of the novel, indicating the quantitative and chronological function of 




“I didn’t really want to write them, but I knew they had to be there… there were four or five of 
them scattered throughout the book, that I left blank and didn’t work on until the book was 
completed, then I went back and filled those scenes in” (Ellis, Clark 75). Rather than 
fetishistically pore over the violent contents of these chapters, as perhaps some critics assumed, 
Ellis in fact created them with a degree of uneasy resolve and then coolly distributed them into 
the already-constructed frame of the novel—a method that reinforces his claim to use these 
sequences for their periodic irruption rather than actual substance. Even the content of the violent 
episodes were not explicitly drawn from Ellis’s presumed “dark” imagination, but rather from 
research and secondary material. He describes how he “read a lot of books about serial killers 
and picked up details from that and then I had a friend who introduced me to someone who could 
get me criminology textbooks from the FBI that really went into graphic detail about…what 
serial killers did to bodies” (Ellis, Clark 75). Further, intentional fallacies aside, the constitutive 
elements of the sections weren’t constructed ex nihilo, but were rather based on a real-life 
journalistic research and transplanted almost wholesale (with a “turned up… notch” from “being 
in Patrick Bateman’s mind-set for three years” [Ellis, Goulian, “Art”]). Ellis claims, “That’s why 
I did the research, because I couldn’t really have made this up” (Ellis, Clark 75), indicating 
perhaps another dark turn in Tom Wolfe’s journalistic realism prescription. As is evident in these 
highly constructed and meticulous inclusions of stark violence, such episodes were used as 
organizational punctuations to other components of narrative construction, much like Barthes’s 
understanding of Sade’s erotic grammar. 
 Considering Ellis’s attitude towards violence as a quantity structurally and prescriptively 
distributed, one should investigate also Ellis’s unremarked-on use of other book-level 




technique borrowed from Joan Didion, whose minimalist style already looms large as an 
influence on Ellis (she is named as one of only two influences, along with Hemingway, as Ellis 
claims “one is enough, two is enough” [Ellis, Clark 70]). He remarks specifically on the effect of 
“white space” in her novel Play It as It Lays (1970), claiming “the whiteness surrounding the 
words adds an extra dimension of emotionality to the book,” and “when you turned the page it 
was a page where white dominated and then there were two paragraphs that just floated there 
alone in this whiteness” (Ellis, Clark 69). This “float[ing]” textual chunk then “summed up what 
was going on in the book and the themes of the book as much as the action in the book” (Ellis, 
Clark 69). Significant here is Ellis’s perception of the text’s arrangement, and the exaggerated 
whiteness of margins in Didion’s text in particular, as mimetically rendering the bleakness and 
isolation reiterated in the textual content. Ellis first explicitly borrows this concept of whiteness 
in The Rules of Attraction (1987), as he describes in his 2012 The Paris Review interview where 
he details multiple arguments with his Simon and Schuster editor Robert Asahina over his 
exacting typographical expectations. Most stark was perhaps the “blank page after the [character 
Lauren’s] abortion” (Ellis, Goulian, “Art”). However, he also argued for “bigger” “spacing 
between characters’ monologues,” “about two and a quarter inches wide,” the gaps between text 
recalling Didion’s evocative floating paragraphs and imbuing each monologue with a distanced, 
solipsistic aura (Ellis, Goulian, “Art”). This same strategy of invoking the margin to reiterate 
narrative content reappears in American Psycho as well, namely in a moment reminiscent of the 
blank-page abortion from Rules, where Bateman describes a “scary drawing” drawn with a 
prostitute’s blood that “looks like this” (Ellis, AP 306), after which there is only a blank gap. 
Here Ellis gestures at the blankness of Bateman’s emotional state with the blankness of the page 




spacing, placement, and arrangement of certain sequences, and particularly those evoking 
visceral emotional reactions.  
 Half-understandings of this systematic construct have arisen in the attempt to locate the 
novel between twin polarities of banality and violence. A sense of both forces’ interplay is 
typically sensed—usually in an interpenetrating, binary alternation—but one side is usually 
illogically believed to represent the “actual” literary content. As part of this unbalanced 
understanding, critic Julian Murphet sees the violent sequences as cuing the entrance of literary 
“style” in the form of fevered, accumulative syntax. He claims that “in scenes of abomination,” 
“the oppressive paratactic narrative voice finally ‘lets rip’ and tips over from weightless 
indistinction into driven, compulsive syntactical construction (Murphet 45-46). My main critique 
of Murphet’s assessment, which Serpell reiterates, is in Murphet’s claim that if the violent 
portions are the only segments that are stylistically remarkable, the non-violent portions are 
negligible, or in his terms, “indistinct.” To appreciate only the violence is to ignore the acerbic, 
Jane Austen-like satire of the “banal” portions—the chapter-long argument about dinner 
reservations, for instance, resembling a Gaddis boardroom scene of balletic, interchanging puns 
and double entendres. Further, to claim that the violent sections are the only segments exhibiting 
“compulsive syntactical construction” is to ignore the minimalist repression of the non-violent 
prose. And whoever said parataxis was non-literary? Regardless, even Serpell, who contends that 
these interruptions of violence are not the only stylistic moments, still agrees with Murphet’s 
implication that the novel presents a binary pacing of starkly visceral action and boredom. 
Serpell’s thesis revolves around interpreting these intervals between violence as epitomizing an 
“ethics of suspension,” or a forced imperative to “read expectantly, to read in suspense of 




and the sense of dread created imbues the sections of mindless consumer catalogue jargon-speak 
with an emotional vitality by virtue of their proximity to sequences offering luridly described 
carnage. I wish to expand this notion of violent sequences seeping into banal ones by outlining a 
more central, tightening affective core driving the work: namely, an incrementally increasing 
sensation of dread. 
 “Dread” suffuses the novel—Bateman reflects on his consumption by a “nameless dread” 
on eight separate occasions in the work. Yet, “dread” also acts as a sub-textual undercurrent by 
which Ellis claims he subverts conventional plotting, or a typical linear organization beholden to 
“climaxes” and conclusions. As such, dread might function as an energy current of systematic 
function in the novel, or trace of environmental changes that don’t require overt expression. 
Interpreting systematic “dread” rather than “plot” is essential to understanding Ellis’s work yet is 
curiously missing in current criticism (excepting Serpell’s mingling of dread and suspension). 
One telling eschatological quality of American Psycho is that it holds no real conclusion, it gives 
no real act of shift or resolution—the last words in the novel are in fact “THIS IS NOT AN 
EXIT” (Ellis, AP 399).40  There is “progress,” however, if one looks at the sub-plot elements of 
increasing emotional charge. Ellis corrects critical misinterpretation of his “plotlessness” as 
actually misperceptions of a deeper system, noting, “The nonnarrative, or least plot-driven, 
books that I’ve written [a category he eventually extends to include all of them] were actually the 
most carefully structured” (Ellis, Goulian, “Art”). He elaborates on a potential reader’s location 
within the text by claiming, “What keeps the reader engaged is probably a gradually increasing 
sense of dread” (Ellis, Goulian, “Art”). This may seem incidental, but he goes on to elaborate the 
                                                
40 Indeed, in a moment of more naked, fourth-wall-breaking, despair, Patrick reflects that there is 
no reason for the book to exist: “There has been no reason for me to tell you any of this.  This 




function of “dread” as a carefully structured phenomena in American Psycho in particular: “The 
scenes had to be put in a certain order. There are subtle gradations of menace. There’s a faint 
hum of horror in the background at the beginning of the book, and as the book progresses the 
hum becomes, hopefully, deafening” (Ellis, Goulian, “Art”). Hence, rather than a shock-and-
retreat tactic emphasized by Serpell and Murphet, Ellis describes an abstract, slowly increasing 
sensation of hopelessness that mounts as one proceeds through the book, often unrelated to what 
is immediately being read.  
 The thematic through-line between the schematically arranged violent sequences and 
their counterpart in Bateman’s prosaic routines is an emotional one, and, in its constant shifts, 
one might even say presents maturation. Serpell notes: “despite critical protestations to the 
contrary, the scenes of violence do in fact change over the course of the novel in structure, in 
accumulative effect, and in tone” (Serpell, “Ethics”185). This change is reflected in the 
increasing elaborateness of torture and grisliness of violence: the famous “Rat” sequence as well 
as the murder of the child at the zoo (two of the most bleak moments) arrive relatively late in the 
novel. Bateman also becomes increasingly detached from the violent sequences; elisions and 
jump cuts indicate that an emotional essence in the scene has eluded him, or rather that the 
medium is incapable of keeping up with Bateman’s desired fulfillment. While critics like Marco 
Abel note the tempo of the novel disrupted by the incursions of violence—violence interrupting 
the “mundane” “slowness” of the consumer section (8-9)—Serpell hones in on the meta-textual 
elements, indicating that the violence is increasingly abbreviated, or short-handed. In particular, 
she notes Bateman’s narrative intrusions describing both his boredom with and elision of violent 
sequences, for example “As usual, in an attempt to understand these girls I’m filming their 




italics). What Serpall doesn’t remark on in describing Bateman’s increasing exasperation at his 
frustrated, violent confrontations is the widening chasm of emotional need it signifies and 
covers. Further, perhaps this deepening despondency may birth other concurrent epiphanic 
phenomena (the repetition of Bateman’s music reviews evidences a similar attempt at self-
realization addressed momentarily).  
 Through such systematic repetitions of dread-inducing violence that leave Bateman 
further unsatisfied, these systematically repeated attempts seem to prompt the urgency for other 
means of actualized selfhood. The question, then, is whether dread is capable of causing 
empathy, or the creation of a psychic chasm feeding into (even banal) attempts at artistic 
realization. In system theory terms, the question is whether entropy could lead to a “negentropy,” 
or high-order arrangement of these deviant and runaway impulses. This question of Bateman’s 
interiority was formerly stymied in scholarship by Ellis’s initial insistence that Bateman was a 
fabricated, satirical cartoon, used only for overtly critical purposes (likely to head off claims of 
his own misogyny in light of the resulting controversies).41 Yet, in recent interviews (around the 
time of his seventh novel, Imperial Bedrooms, being published), Ellis has modified his position, 
revealing to a far greater extent how Bateman was actually modeled on himself and his own 
experiences living as a well-to-do author in Manhattan, at that age, during the 1980s.42  Ellis’s 
alignment with his fictional avatar would inevitably call for critical reassessments of Bateman as 
something beyond a completely flat, unredeemable trope. Likewise, in LeClair’s notion of a 
                                                
 
42 In a 2013 interview with The Sabotage Times, Ellis claims, “Patrick Bateman was me. I was 
Patrick Bateman. He clarifies that “my father wasn’t in New York the same age as Patrick 
Bateman, living in the same building, going to the same places that Patrick Bateman was going 
to—I was.” He further describes how “the impetus to write that book came out of my lifestyle 
and how unhappy it made me, and how the idea of becoming an adult seemed frustrating, absurd, 




“systems man,” Bateman might be the depersonalized node in the circuit of Ellis’s satire, or a 
“flat” figure able to accrete typically human characteristics by integration with his environment. 
Recent critical work, such as Alex E. Blazer’s essay “American Psycho, Hamlet, and Existential 
Psychosis,” indicates this new kind of scholarship that treats Ellis’s characters as “fictional 
personalities with emotional complexity,” by “put[ting] Patrick in the company of that paradigm 
of humanism, Hamlet” (Mandel 17). This may indicate a new wave of consideration for the 
novel, and Bateman in particular as a more “accurate” prism of the times. If we understand the 
conception of Patrick as a thickened cipher, or numeric digit with personality, we might begin to 
align Ellis’s structural vision with this nascent psychological perception of Bateman.   
 The sensitivity, if one can even use that term with regard to Patrick Bateman, is perhaps 
also set into relief by Ellis’s updating of the character in 2012 during a Twitter session 
brainstorming a potential American Psycho sequel. With updated cultural references and 
markers, it becomes easier to see Bateman’s psyche as something vibrating in frequency with a 
pop ideology, or rather taking the ethics of pop culture to a psychotic degree of literalism. One of 
Ellis’s tweets describes how “Patrick would talk about Adele and Kanye and KATY PERRY 
because ‘Firework’ [a somewhat trite song about individuality] is his favorite song… and then he 
kills Katy Perry’s trainer” (Ellis “Patrick would talk”). Another claims “Patrick would complain 
about spotify and the cloud and tumbler [sic]… but he would find victims via Blendr while 
listening to Beyonce and O.A.R.” (Ellis “Patrick would complain”). Another: “Patrick would 
post pics of murdered girls on Facebook and either no one would notice or post ‘Fuck yeah’” 
(Ellis “Patrick would post”). Interesting firstly is Patrick’s empathizing with the saccharine 
emotional formulations of pop music—it is not that he doesn’t have emotions, it is just that his 




supposed pictures of dead women on Facebook would be received with mild adulation or 
neutrality indicates Bateman’s “morality” as just above that of an underdeveloped teenager. His 
attitude is present, but disengaged. His interests in gadgetry and cutting-edge smart phone 
applications for ‘deviant’ purposes even present a typical tableau of teen-age online exploration. 
Seen in 2012, Bateman isn’t so much a psychotic singularity as a mixture of teen-age tastes and 
hyper-masculine id. 
 Bateman’s interest in “pop” is so pervasive and all-encompassing that it becomes a major 
destabilizing factor in his attempts to render personhood beyond his interests. Indeed, an early 
comment by Ellis reveals that Bateman’s consciousness is essentially a weave of secondhand 
consumer reference, his makeup “made from magazines,” “A mixture of GQ and Stereo Review 
and Fangoria… and Vanity Fair” (Ellis, Love). Patrick’s consciousness as “catalogue speak” 
often irks critics, who believe they have been duped into reading crushingly dry, Sky Mall-like 
advertorial prose as a joke, yet this ad-copy mentality also presents the central paradox in 
Bateman’s attempt to find consciousness within a postmodern selfhood constructed only of 
recycled quotation. Some have even noted how Bateman receives constant praise in the novel for 
his ability to quote popular adages and odd bits of GQ arcana precisely because this second-hand 
quotation is what passes for “creation” in a referential, postmodern semiotic system. The 
pressure caused by forced submersion of the “new” for sake of regurgitating the “old” forms part 
of James Brusseau’s theory of Patrick’s murderousness—his hunger for the visceral is driven by 
a desire to resist or transcend capital-driven Baudrillardian hyperreality. Brusseau frames 
Bateman’s psychosis as follows: “what he’s losing is his defense against the intrusion of 




something still unfound, something stubbornly ineffable” (43-44).43  Without even considering 
the murders (literal or imagined as they may be), Bateman’s battle for his own interiority is 
ultimately fought on the commercial plane of his pop-soaked consciousness. Glitches in this 
commercial fabric then might be reappraised as evidence of nascent and independent thought 
strands arising within the flow of the novel. Young cites this manipulation of affectless 
advertising-speak that often seems perilously closes to insinuating interiority as one of the 
primary revolutionary aspects of the novel, that “by situating this mall-speak within a serious 
novel, Ellis destabilizes genres and suggests that, in general, a close study of our cultural debris 
might reveal clues” (“Beast” 101). These “clues,” in fact, might be fledgling pieces of Patrick’s 
consciousness. We must then look to the rules and conventions of the “mall-speak” that drives 
much of the novel, seeking out the exemptions and intrusions that give us a sense of Patrick’s 
slowly creeping deterioration and organic breakthroughs.  
 The nearest integration between the novel’s systematic nature and this “mall-speak” are 
the epigrammatic section headings that divide the book. Often separated by a perforated line 
seeming to indicate that one could detach and rearrange the sections entirely, these headings can 
range from the utterly prosaic (“Dinner with Secretary” [Ellis, AP 256], “Dry Cleaners” [Ellis, 
AP 81]) to the deranged (“Tries to Cook and Eat Girl” [Ellis, AP 343], “Taking an Uzi to the 
Gym” [Ellis, AP 346]). The catalogue feel gives one the impression that just as we are flipping 
through a pop archive of recorded anhedonic episodes, so might Bateman too be viewing his own 
                                                
43 Critic Ruth Heyler replaces this central ineffability, or elusive truth, that Bateman strives 
towards as the primal urge lying beneath social prohibition typically expressed in Gothic novels, 
putting American Psycho in the lineage of the form.  She borrows Fred Botting’s formulation of 
Gothic novels as “warning of dangers of social and moral transgression by presenting them in 
their darkest and most threatening form” (726). Bateman’s “submission to bestial urges” then 
indicates that he “succumbed to these urges, not invented them,” making “the unpleasant 




detached life like a secondhand peruser. The intrusion of Patrick’s derangement into the 
construction of the chapters—his blank “scary drawing,” his bile-spewing, stream-of-
consciousness monologue in “A Glimpse of a Thursday Afternoon” (Ellis, AP 148), his action-
movie murder montage in “Chase, Manhattan” (Ellis, AP 347)—is amplified by their proximity 
to chapters describing an unexplained return to Patrick’s banal lifestyle. Likewise, any apparent 
causality, or chronological progression, is constantly undermined. Young notes that even though 
some headings seem to gesture at linear sequence, with passages like “Morning” followed by 
“Afternoon,” Bateman’s different attire in both scenes indicates that they in fact occur 
separately, that an unseen jump cut has taken place (“Beast” 101). The unwinding and fraying of 
organizational markers also seeps into and appears within Patrick’s mutating consumer object 
obsessions. As Patrick usually describes characters in a deluge of labels, e.g. “she’s wearing a 
Krizia cream silk blouse, a Krizia rust tweed skirt, and silk-satin d’Orsay pumps from Manolo 
Blahnik” (AP 8), Young notes how over the length of the novel this apparent hyper-perception 
devolves. “Shoes by ‘Susan Warren Bennis Edwards’ becomes shoes by ‘Warren Susan Allen 
Edmonds’ becomes shoes by ‘Edward Susan Bennis Allen’” (Young, “Beast” 102). In other 
words, the stability required in Bateman’s catalogued imagination shows signs of wear, 
instability, and unfurling in minor, patterned ways. Bateman likewise often misattributes songs, 
despite the fact that his obsession with music is evidenced in his exhaustive reviews of Whitney 
Houston, Phil Collins, and Huey Lewis and the News. The minor misattributions indicate the 
degradation also of smaller-scale and pop cultural elements. These “glitches” in the mall-speak 
of Bateman’s brain indicate fissures—not only those leading to a desired violent eruption, but 




 In the search for positive fissures within Bateman’s catalogue-construct, Serpell isolates 
one element of seemingly unique and creative construction that troubles further the Ellis-
Bateman line: humor,44 and particularly Bateman’s constant inclusion of puns. This trait 
becomes almost a running joke as regards Bateman’s true ontology and persona—whether he is 
as Evelyn, his supposed girlfriend, claims, the “boy next door” with an “ador[able]” “sense of 
humor,” or how Bateman imagines himself, “a fucking evil psychopath” (Ellis, AP 11, 220, 20). 
His puns and the schisms opened by them include a comment about his interest in “murders and 
executions” in lieu of “mergers and acquisitions,” his ordering of a “decapitated coffee” rather 
than a “decaffeinated” coffee and assurance (in Ellis’s later novel Glamorama) that he has (we 
assume a literal) “coat of arms” (Ellis, AP 44) all expressed without surprise from present 
characters. Serpell sees these schisms opening a linguistic “void,” similar to the “existential 
chasm” always before Bateman (Ellis, AP 179), tearing open the authorial construct, or rather 
querying how far removed Bateman’s consciousness is from the text we are now receiving. 
(Certain abrupt narrative modifications, such as the switch into third-person during the frenzied 
action sequence in “Chase, Manhattan,” and phrases indicating certain scenes as being literally 
filmed—e.g. “a slow dissolve,” “smash cut and I’m back in the kitchen” [Ellis, AP 8, 11] amplify 
this character detachment.)  She notes the paradoxical, koan-like nature of most of the puns’ 
homophonic operation, only registering as humorous when read by an outside source. The 
trauma done to language, and the collapse of Bateman’s consciousness with the mediated prose 
of Ellis, are revealed in these puns, as Serpell claims, 
                                                
44 Helyer also comments on the presence of comedy as holding a society-critiquing element 
endemic to the Gothic, as well as an embellishment of frightening qualities to such a degree that 




[The] use of puns complicates matters for two reasons: first, because his puns are 
often linguistically inventive and thus they are intentionally rather than 
accidentally amusing;  and second, because they are both Ellis’s and his narrator’s, 
which is to say the narratological gap infuses into the puns a knowingness that 
would seem to gainsay any accusation of thoughtlessness (“Ethics” 173).  
That is, due to the blasé, self-involved, and generally clueless nature of many of the characters, 
the duty of filling in the “ah-ha” moment of the pun’s punch line lies with the reader as outside 
party. The reader’s role in delivering the charge of humor to the clueless diegetic situation both 
merges us with the removed novelization of events as told by Ellis while also operating within 
Bateman’s potentially humorous-on-purpose demeanor. This notion of humor acting as a wedge, 
or self-divulging element, in Patrick’s characterization is elemental, I think, to finding some 
sense of artistic, and hence emotionally three-dimensional, drive in his persona. 
 Humor for Bateman is where these dual narratives of violence and self-actualization 
collide. Inevitably, setting aside the (as I’ve mentioned) grisly scenes of sheer violence, the novel 
operates mostly as a social satire, many sections hinging on Bateman’s own (perhaps 
unintentional) wit and mental removal from the situation at hand. These moments of self-
forgetting, or rather, cathartic divulgences of inner truths in the form of “wit” are perhaps his 
most socially healthy means of catharsis, set off from his other hobbies of self-punishing and 
onanistic exercise and Olympian sexual marathons.  
 As a means of understanding Bateman’s particular treasuring of his at times macabre wit, 
Freud’s theories on jokes as psychic release in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious offer 
a useful schema for humor as a subconscious ameliorative, as well as an adept means of 




Bateman’s cathartic regimens of sex, exercise, and violence. Freud notes that jokes in general 
“will evade restrictions and open sources of pleasure that have become inaccessible” (123). In 
aesthetic terms, jokes offer Barthes’s punctures in the text that give one a glimpse at a deeper 
fictional psychology beneath Bateman’s façade. Similarly, under this Freudian aegis, jokes might 
instead be a redirected medium to channel potential anti-social, and perhaps even eventually 
homicidal, tendencies caused by repression. The form unconsciously given to these jokes, like 
natural geological formations, will likewise bear the marks of their repression and give birth, 
potentially, to a refined and potentially “stylistic” artifact.  
 Given this discussion of emissions, let us recall Georges Bataille’s previously mentioned 
system of “heterology,” or rather, the analysis of usually discarded and abject materials expelled 
from an organic body or philosophical system. (Bateman’s fascination with fluids, from those 
voluntarily or involuntarily evoked, gives credence to the former and invites consideration of the 
latter.)  Bataille describes “the notion of the (heterogeneous) foreign body permits one to note the 
elementary subjective identity between types of excrement (sperm, menstrual blood, urine, fecal 
matter) and everything that can be seen as sacred, divine, or marvelous” (“Use Value” 94). Just 
as Bateman remains fascinated with what is seeped out of or emitted from the human body under 
duress, or by the sharpened edge of a torture instrument, one might also assume Bateman would 
be fascinated by his own involuntary vocal emissions in the forms of jokes. Mixing Bataille and 
Freud, one can assume that such artifacts, consciously or unconsciously emitted, might then be a 
course of condensed revelation or personal turmoil for Bateman, allowing him better to 
appreciate the value of his own submerged sense of self. 
 Humor becomes the knee-jerk sign of Bateman’s vulnerability, or a deflation from the 




Bateman’s jokes may sometimes be wielded with a witty and acerbic edge, humor also springs 
forth in moments of insecurity. During a ruse in which Bateman attempts to sneak his way into 
the impregnable restaurant Dorsia, we see him break into a deranged series of actions and jokes. 
He claims, “I find myself saying things, without listening to Jean, like ‘Protecting the ozone 
layer is a really cool idea’ and telling knock-knock jokes” (Ellis, AP 260). Likewise, after being 
thrown out of the restaurant when his ploy is discovered, his secretary, Jean, is still attuned to his 
perceived sense of humor, potentially indicating that this jocularity might be a more true and 
permanent state. Rather than degrade him, or raise attention to the scorching embarrassment he 
feels for himself, Jean says, “’That was so funny,’ and then, squeezing my clenched first, she lets 
me know ‘Your sense of humor is so spontaneous’” (Ellis, AP 262). As Jean is one of the few 
characters who genuinely seems to find redeemable elements in Patrick’s character, and perhaps, 
as Elizabeth Young suggests, presents one of his only hopes for returning to operable human 
society (“Beast” 113), we might countenance Jean’s perception as more than just the self-saving 
logic of a jilted lover. Bateman’s perceived “humor” erupting as a defusing element also occurs 
during a meeting with his brother Sean, an equally sociopathic, if slightly more restrained, figure 
who recurrently appears in Ellis’s novels. When Sean is able to get him painlessly into Dorsia, 
where he had been formerly evicted with Jean, Sean asks, “So you like this place?” to which 
Patrick responds, “’My favorite,’ I joke through clenched teeth’” (Ellis, AP 227). The defense 
mechanism of the joke, however tensely emitted, allows one to map Patrick’s actual moments of 
pain, or acute emotional injury, throughout the novel. (The most weighty, resounding instance is 
perhaps Patrick’s final misunderstood admission of “thirty, forty, a hundred murders” [Ellis, AP 
352] to an acquaintance, Harold Carnes, over the phone, only to be congratulated on what is 




and “Donaldson,” claims the joke and its plausibility was only ruined by Bateman’s actual status 
as a “goody-goody” [Ellis, AP 386-389].) The recurrence of humor, however, has the linguistic 
splitting effect Serpell notes, yet in the division of Bateman’s perceived icy façade and actual 
vulnerability, and the accretive effect of these instances, a glow of affective stability becomes 
visible. 
 Repetition is also aligned, not simply with an accumulation of dread, but also the 
operation of humor. The constant presence of The Patty Winters Show with its occasionally 
surreal themes, including “Real-Life Rambos” (Ellis, AP 87), “UFOs That Kill” (Ellis, AP 115), 
and “Has Patrick Swayze Become Cynical or Not” (Ellis, AP 231), becomes a prime example of 
an eccentric tableau made increasingly humorous by its recurrence. One more Bateman-centric 
example, however, made famous particularly by Mary Harron’s film adaptation of American 
Psycho in 2000, is Bateman’s continual and flustered reason for leaving situations: “I have to 
return some video tapes.” The phrase acts as a prime example of the sort of author-character 
schism Serpell describes, only this phrase is unique in its systematic, and improbable, recurrence 
within the novel as a sort of personality-structuring device.45  Personality is then given the same 
logic as a recurrent joke, increasing in strength by its improbably jumping-forth in increasingly 
out-of-context situations. Like the aforementioned example of Patrick’s attempt to soften ridicule 
with absurd “jokes” or knee-jerk humorous responses, the phrase is repeated with increasing loss 
of context as both an indication of Patrick’s social isolation as well as unintentionally developing 
sense of humor. After a failed romantic encounter with “despicable twit” Luis Carruthers, which 
                                                
45 Humor seems such an ingrained part of Patrick’s character that it is one of the few traits that 
survives his transformations and shifts into his serial killer persona, or at least is marked in both 
sides of his personality.  For instance, his describing, “a cheerful black bum motions for me, 
explaining that he’s Bob Hope’s younger brother, No Hope… I think this is funny, so I give him 




may plausibly suggest a potential source of romantic comfort to Bateman, which he denies,46 his 
means of exiting the increasingly comic situation is allotted through this “motto.” Standing in 
public, facing the amorously distressed Carruthers, he claims, “‘I’ve gotta return some 
videotapes,’… jabbing at the elevator button” (Ellis, AP 162). The scene also invokes the 
Bataillian and Freudian resonances of the “joke” described before—perhaps Bateman’s nascent 
homoerotic feeling have been expelled, in the form of the joke, which again gives him a 
comfortable reassurance in his having turned such repression into humor. The line is described 
again later, to the bafflement of the recipient—Jean in this case—yet passes as recognizable to 
the reader. Bateman again indicates an attempt to remove himself of an unwanted feeling, in this 
case the unadorned intimacy offered by Jean, by again retreating into a humor only made 
humorous by its repetition. When Jean invites Patrick up to her apartment, he denies her, again 
invoking the infamous videotapes: “’I have to return some videotapes,’ I explain in a rush. She 
pauses. ‘Now? It’s’—she checks her watch—‘almost midnight’” (Ellis, AP 265). The 
“videotapes” mantra becomes both a humorous one-liner as it repeats throughout the novel, yet 
also acts as Patrick’s self-isolating means of severing any possible means to be embraced, or 
confronted in his developing selfhood. Both in this case are intertwined and, most importantly, in 
a fashion reminiscent of the “deafening” dread, both are systematically linked. 
 A linked channel of possible “artistic” creation for Bateman, and achieved through 
similarly pained repetition, is the included review sections for the (often banal) pop music of his 
time. Ellis explains the inclusion of these often boiler-plate reappraisals of musician’s complete 
discographies as “the reason Patrick Bateman loves this music, and wants to tell us about it in 
                                                
46 Young reiterates this potential, but thwarted, linkage of Patrick and Luis, claiming, “Despite 
the comic aspects of Patrick’s discomfiture, this and later scenes with Luis where Luis expresses 




excruciating detail, is because he wants to fit in” (Ellis, Goulian “Art”) Indeed, while most critics 
comment on the deadness, and reductive, paint-by-numbers approach of the reviews (often 
considered as a particularly audience-hostile move by Ellis), I see these reviews as evidencing 
Bateman’s attempted conjuring of emotional response from formulaic compositions of pop 
music, which he intuitively understands (reminiscent of the projected American Psycho sequel). 
Ellis also touches on this sense of Bateman attempting, like Kafka, to stab at the “frozen sea” 
inside himself by the stilted artistic creations of record reviews. Ellis justifies the three reviews, 
which he claims his Vintage editor Gary Fisketjon heavily advised cutting to two, as: “The 
reason they work is precisely because three is overkill. One is not psychotic. Three is psychotic” 
(Ellis, Goulian “Art”). While Ellis chooses to categorize the overkill of three reviews as 
“psychotic,” it could just as easily be read as desperate, or flailing—an attempt for an 
emotionally frozen man to learn, by rote, the appreciation of art, however banal. 
 As a piece of “art,” rather than a performative evincing of a desperate need to appreciate 
art, the reviews also stand as a nascent attempt to create. Similar to Murphet’s argument about 
the violent sections presenting the only “bravura” and writerly elements of the novel, Elizabeth 
Young conversely locates this quality within the otherwise critically lamented review sections.47  
She finds “sophisticated and emotional” language in the reviews (Young, “Beast” 112), a telling 
example in Bateman’s description of the Genesis album Invisible Touch: “It’s an epic meditation 
on intangibility, at the same time it deepens and enriches the meaning of the preceding three 
albums” (Ellis, AP 77). Similar language can be found in his rendition of the Huey Lewis love 
ballad “If This Is It,” which presents “a plea for a lover to tell another lover if they want to carry 
on with the relationship, and the way Huey sings it… it becomes instilled with hope” (Ellis, AP 
                                                
47 Perhaps part of Naomi Wolf’s commonly shared impression of American Psycho as “the single 




356), or how a Whitney Houston song provokes the realization that “since it’s impossible in the 
world we live in to empathize with others, we can always empathize with ourselves” (Ellis, AP 
254). It is difficult indeed to think of the same person who supposedly can eat a woman’s brain 
with Grey Poupon being moved by a love ballad or self-reliance mantra. Yet these reviews, and 
the evocative language employed by Bateman in them, should be sharply paid attention to, 
particularly as they seem to violate Ellis’s own prescriptions for the “construct” of Bateman’s 
consciousness. Ellis describes the prescription in his outline for the novel (Ellis’s outlines are 
extensive, and often exceed the length of the works themselves) that due to Bateman’s fixation 
on surfaces he must “omit metaphors, similes, anything where Bateman can see something as 
something else because everything is too surface-oriented for that to occur” (Ellis, Clark 77). The 
transcendent language, however trivial the subject matter, then grossly violates this prescription, 
indicating that something animate is rising from the components of the pop formula, and 
conjured by Bateman in his repeated attempts to describe it. Rather than reveal Ellis’s supposed 
anhedonic detachment, the repeated reviews indicate an artistic coming into consciousness by 
means of criticisms, or attempt to render an artwork’s abstract qualities in language. 
 Similarly, just as each “review” encapsulates a beginning-to-end career diagnostic of the 
reviewed artist, they also unveil in microcosmic form a narrative of artistic self-actualization. 
Young was the first to realize that “each of the chapters but particularly the one on Huey Lewis, 
concerns the maturation of a creative artist” (“Beast” 112). These micro-narratives of self-
actualization and “maturation,” reflecting broader concerns about Bateman’s growth and 
development throughout the book, present a postmodern incarnation of Stephen Dedalus in 
Ulysses. Dedalus, sworn to artistic creation in Portrait of the Artist, is seen shortly after in 




the Parable of the Plums related in the novel. The parable about two old women spitting plum 
seeds from atop a tower, which ends abruptly before a proper conclusion can be affixed, is 
supposed to present an extra-textual joke about Dedalus’s driven steps towards an artistic 
masterwork; he has arrived a step closer towards realizing his vision, yet now only has a bare-
bones vignette rather than the wider scope and emotional vision required of genuine (Joycean) 
art. This embedding of artistic maturation within a broader narrative frame, broken erratically in 
Psycho into magazine cut-out sections, acts to raise this degree of artistic parable to an even 
more aloof level. Bateman does not have the comfort of “parables”—he must find manifestos in 
advertisements and Whitney Houston songs. The perceived affectlessness of the rest of the book 
likewise raises this Joycean gamble to an almost impossible dimension, or presents the question 
of whether one can make genuine art from sheer referentiality and consumer dross. Ellis’s 
attempted redemption and granting of interiority to an otherwise exaggeratedly “flat” character 
also gestures forward into a nascent mission of what will fumblingly be called “post-
postmodernism,” or an attempt to find a heart, or empathetic core, within postmodern tropes and 
techniques. Ellis’s contribution is finding the artistic struggle and evolutionary line within the 
most supposedly unredeemable quarters. He is working with what is available, and as he claimed 
in a 1990 New York Times editorial shortly after American Psycho, “If there are icons for this 
generation, they’re in pop music” (Ellis, “Twentysomethings” H37). 
 I believe, rather than a carte blanche purveyor of violence, Ellis might actually be closer 
to the supposed “moralist” label he shrouded himself in during American Psycho’s backlash in 
the early 90s. Yet, Ellis’s moralism is an unusual one, in that it moves a degree beyond satire to 
potentially imbue life or artistic transformation into the most irredeemable acts and vessels. 




to conjure “feeling” through a systematic repetition of both twisted consumer ideologies and jabs 
of gore. Some semblance of individuality, like the illusion of film’s persistence of vision, begins 
to be conjured by Ellis in the process (Bateman himself tries to self-curate the narrative with 
flash cuts and dissolves). Ellis’s deeper contribution, however, is perhaps the feinting of 
transgression as the solution to Patrick’s “dread.” Unlike fellow transgressives that arose before, 
Ellis’s conjuring of a blanket-wave dread is primarily to conjure the urgency, or stimulant to 
consciousness, apparent in Bateman’s cracking self-organization and narrative. Jokes emerge and 
splutter as if attempting to bring a meta-textual irony to the programmed and robotic nature of 
Patrick’s daily activities. Patterns of unwanted mutation arise in the text as if the catalogue of 
Patrick’s mind has been haunted, or is awakened by something competing with this dread. 
Patrick is far better understood, I would argue, as a cipher, as an experiment, much as 
Vollmann’s characters in The Rainbow Stories are experiments, in a laboratory of empathy and 
shock. Bateman’s famous soliloquy that “there is an idea of a Patrick Bateman, some kind of 
abstraction, but there is no real me” (Ellis, AP 377) is perhaps literal—he is most usefully 
employed as a marker, an isotope within the body of an anhedonic, “transgressive” frame, 
highlighting affective resonances by his circulation within it. Yet even this attempt to provide the 
veneer of personability through humorous and painful repetitions is part of Ellis’s symbolic 
position as a transition into a period more directly infusing feeling into purportedly two-
dimensional characters. Young notes that Ellis maintains “a belief in a ‘reality’ or morality 
somewhere beyond the spectacular blandishments of the hyperreal consumer circus,” and such is 
integral to “the slow emergence of an American renaissance that attempts to transcend these 
fictional games and re-establish from deep within consumer culture other ways of writing 














A poor jest, but I will not scratch it out. I wrote it thinking it would sound very 
witty; but now that I have seen myself that I only wanted to show off in a 
despicable way, I will not scratch it out on purpose! 
























Unforeseen Ruptures: David Foster Wallace’s Big Break, or, The Legacy of 
Experimentalism 
 In the last section, we saw seemingly inanimate postmodern tropes come to life through 
the aid of extra-textual, machine-like apparatuses of “systematic transgression.” These 
systematic operations included principles of recursion, diffraction, and repetition to stimulate 
banal or superficial emotions until they reached, like Patrick Bateman’s whirring mind, a 
deafening spell of amplified emotion—even if this emotion was simple dread or misery. 
However, this summoning of affective potential that is only possible when narrative fragments, 
or fragments of persona, are circulated through cybernetic systems, indicates inherent limitations. 
How then does a “systems man,” tied to transgressive ruptures and logarithmic iteration, act as 
segue to a more stable aesthetic category? How can one create subjectivity out of shock and by 
definition exceptional activity alone?  
 While previously seeming to arise out of a vacuum, or in naïve opposition to felt 
American consumerism, transgressive tactics actually hold far more alignment with arguments 
about postmodernism’s return to sentiment in the nineties, and how the form might evolve 
beyond the massive, “encyclopedic” tomes that dominated the sixties, seventies, and eighties (of 
which Gaddis’s conversation novels limned the dying edge). Chiefly, the transgressives call 
attention to two predominant narrative threads critics employ to make sense of postmodernism’s 
demise and provide a path back through its aftermath to authentic “feeling.” One thread is that of 
classically postmodern maximalism overloaded to the point of implosion, conjuring an intangible 
essence in the process, while another posits a “new” realism, marked by a lost innocence with 
regard to language’s mimeticism. Stephen J. Burn, in his work on Jonathan Franzen and the 




the “same origin” (grouping Franzen, David Foster Wallace, and Richard Powers together) and 
hence argues for their consideration under the big tent of the “post-postmodern” (Franzen 16). I, 
however, wish to cavil with Burn by interpreting the “post-“ in “post-postmodernism” as 
implying a needed advancement in method rather than just chronology,4849 and hence focusing 
on the work of Wallace alone as the most engaging, mercurial, and potentially successful of the 
movement. Wallace will serve as the test case for this practice in his development from Infinite 
Jest (1996) to Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999), though I would argue he still borrows 
tropes from the realist tradition—namely, the epiphany—with the intent of integrating them 
within maximalist system and overloading them to the point of yielding an abstract distillate. In 
this practice, Wallace embodies Robert McLaughlin’s conception of post-postmodern writers 
attempting to “acknowledge but penetrate through the [postmodern] layers, aiming, perhaps 
quixotically, to reconnect with something beyond representation, something extralinguistic, 
something real” (“Post-Postmodernism” 213, 216). Tactically, then, Wallace’s mode and mantle 
of post-postmodernism hold a resonance more with the “systematic” transgressive novelists as 
we have previously discussed them than modified realists. “Hypothetically,” à la Sade, the post-
postmodern and transgressive writers both circulate around a central absent “feeling” through 
                                                
48 Burn’s periodization of the term also likewise indicates the ambiguous, and non-formal, nature 
he wishes to address in description of “post-postmodernism.” Previous occurrences taken into 
consideration range from Alan Wilde’s 1976 consideration of Donald Barthelme’s later work as 
signaling a “possibly, post-postmodern?” sensibility to W.M. Verhoeven’s 1995 classification of 
Raymond Carver’s work as “post-postmodern moral realism” (Burn, Franzen 18). 
49 This also aligns with McLaughlin’s original designation of “post-postmodernism” in his 2004 
essay “Post-Postmodern Discontent,” rather than the slightly more general definition he gives in 
his contribution to The Routledge Companion to Experimental Literature (the latter’s 
comprehensiveness may also be likely due to its encyclopedia function). In the former work, 
McLaughlin analyzes the twin test cases of Wallace and Franzen as pushing beyond 
postmodernism, though cites Wallace as distinctly pushing beyond exhausted postmodern 





baroque and circuitous formal structures; both identify the absent “middle” of genuinely felt 
sentiment as the core pursuit of their structural games. Yet, where the transgressives merely 
problematize, Wallace seeks to embody—both in a newly revised three-dimensional character 
psychology, as well as an aporetic structure not inevitably framed only on viscera and violence. 
 The kinship between Wallace and the transgressives is more than coincidental. Wallace, 
early in his career, expressed a fascination with the deadened voice of Bret Easton Ellis’s Less 
Than Zero (1985), and expressed curiosity on how it might be overloaded to the point of 
grotesquery and collapse (Max 73). (He would later famously deny any alliance with Ellis, and 
paint him as a chief oppositional figure in early aesthetic manifestos, as mentioned in Section 
Two.) Likewise, Wallace’s aforementioned “epiphanic” moments are usually so grotesque, and 
tied to moments of violent, cathartic expulsion, as to represent greater affinity with transgressive 
writers than the more heart-string-plucking moments of a Franzen novel. Indeed, the shifting, 
uncertain valence between mindless catharsis and a more carefully considered willingness for 
pained self-sacrifice is what undergirds the philosophical struggle of Infinite Jest (itself largely 
concerned with addiction). Further, considering Wallace’s repeated mentioning of Vollmann as a 
worthy peer, and The Rainbow Stories in particular as able to “raise hair on parts of your body 
that don’t have hair” (McCaffery, Wallace 108) through levels of autobiographical immersion 
beyond what Wallace was comfortable with,50 the sexually “hideous” through-lines of Brief 
Interviews seem to indicate a Vollmann-like sexual philosophy enacted through exaggerated 
“worst case scenarios.” In stories like “Adult World,” where a climaxing epiphany is provided in 
                                                
50 The incompatibility of Wallace and Vollmann, particularly due to the latter’s brashness with 
regard to outré subject matter, is evident in a letter describing Wallace’s impressions of 
Vollmann after eating dinner as “more than a bubble off plump—prefers bloody venison and 
chocolate cake washed down with Stout for supper, speaks easily of blow-jobs and cooze while 




story-outline form, resolution comes through the main character, Jeni Roberts, recognizing self-
love in masturbation and perceiving her husband’s “Secret Compulsive Masturbat[ing]” as 
symptomatic loneliness (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 184). In the extroverted, blank space of epiphany, 
“understanding” is framed on either side by devolution, temptation, and extreme sexual behavior. 
Likewise, in “Octet,” metafictional structures are meant to not only encourage direct access to 
the author (Konstantinou, “No Bull”), but to encourage a mutual commingling, or exchange of 
agency that might be closest to a libidinal interchange.  
 It is odd that the link between Wallace and the transgressives has not been discussed, 
given their shared interest in both extreme subject matter and elaborate means of framing and 
exposing this extremity, Indeed, in the recently published Routledge Companion to Experimental 
Literature (2012), containing McLaughlin’s entry on post-postmodernism amongst other 1980s 
and 1990s experimental movements (such as “Avant Pop”), there is no mention of transgressive 
literature at all, let alone as a bridging genre to a further iteration of postmodernism. (Due to a 
general critical neglect for the form, this absence is not altogether surprising.) However, in 
further elucidating the demise of postmodernism, Wallace’s alignment with transgressive authors 
in responding similarly to this lapsed historical era in tactic and method—as opposed to 
traditionally paralleled “contemporaries”—becomes clearer. 
 Postmodernism’s exact time of death is uncertain, though critical guesses have been 
forthcoming. Neil Brooks and Josh Toth in The Mourning After: Attending the Wake of 
Postmodernism argue for the death of Beckett in 1989 as a marker for when “the first symptoms 
of some terminal epistemological illness” become “irrefutable” (“Introduction” 2). Brooks and 
Toth also include as supplement the fall of the Berlin wall as proof of the irrepressible “triumph 




answer, citing the “IPO of Netscape” and the explosion of the “World Wide Web” allowing more 
universal “experiences of virtuality” beyond “high-tech research laboratories funded by military 
grants” for the nullification of postmodernism, now made obsolete by consumer access (Hayles, 
Gannon 99). This saturated consumerist angle is also supplemented in intellectual historian 
Minsoo Kang’s citation of the Arnold Schwarzenegger vehicle The Last Action Hero as the 
terminus of postmodernism, due to its final co-option of postmodern tropes for successful, mass-
commercial pleasure (Hoberek 233). A conference in 1991 explicitly called “The End of 
Postmodernism: New Directions,” attended by postmodernism luminaries like William Gass and 
John Barth, indicates a more overt and academic periodization of the form’s demise, or least self-
acknowledgment by postmodern authors of their own genre’s imminent expiration (Brooks, 
Toth, “Introduction” 3). However varied, and culturally supported, a far more concise and 
stylistic reason for postmodernism’s end is a fatigue with the seemingly insular and self-
conversing nature of the form itself. 
 Explanations generally converge, beyond historical obsolescence, in aligning 
postmodernism’s end with distaste for the form’s apparent fascination with linguistic games and 
sheer, masturbatory solipsism. Robert L. McLaughlin, in his comprehensive explanatory piece 
on post-postmodernism, highlights a tipping point of exasperation toward postmodernism 
arriving with John Leonard’s New York Times review of John Barth’s career-capping LETTERS 
in 1979. Leonard, who McLaughlin takes time to note was not averse to difficult postmodern 
works, and even “went to the mat with the Pulitzer committee over Gravity’s Rainbow,” 
described LETTERS in frustration as “written for graduate students and other masochists” (“Post-
Postmodernism” 212). McLaughlin notes the review as emblematic of increasing impatience 




any responsibility in real-world connection. As McLaughlin sums up this felt disenchantment: 
“why can’t these authors put aside their postmodern games, their annoying stylistic tricks, and 
give us characters we can care about and a plot in which we can lose ourselves?” (“Post-
Postmodernism” 212). A similar note was rung in Tom Wolfe’s anti-postmodernism manifesto 
“Stalking the Billion-Footed Beast” in 1989, ruing the so-called “Puppet-Masters” who were “in 
love with the theory that the novel was, first and foremost, a literary game, words on a page 
being manipulated by an author” (49). Wolfe claimed that journalism was threatening literature 
in terms of representing the vitality of human experience. The fact that his solution of a 
journalism-inflected social realism is encapsulated by his own novel, The Bonfire of the Vanities 
(1987), indicates the essay as perhaps more of self-apologia than clinical diagnostic. 
 Yet, McLaughlin describes this supposedly “urgent” need to overcome and push through 
postmodernism’s terminal narcissisms as perhaps arising from a central misunderstanding of the 
form’s function and intent. In McLaughlin’s earlier piece, “Post-Postmodern Discontent” (2004), 
tentatively articulating the phenomena of post-postmodernism and its relation to high 
postmodernism, he cites an elemental misinterpretation of Barth’s “The Literature of 
Exhaustion.” “Exhaustion” is popularly understood as a paean to theory and advocacy for a full 
severance from reality, inexorable proof that Barth had “cut the cord between the text and the 
world, smashed the mirror art traditionally held up to nature, [and] turned the referential function 
of literature in on itself” (“Discontent” 56). McLaughlin returns to Barth’s original text to refute 
this conception, reemphasizing Barth’s original, far more modest, call for an updating of 
structural forms while maintaining an essential link to real feeling and sentiment. In particular, 
McLaughlin calls attention to Barth’s favored category of the “technically up-to-date artist,” 




artist,” as a subset containing the exceptional few whose “artistic thinking is as hip as any French 
new-novelists, but who manage nonetheless to speak eloquently and memorably to our still-
human hearts and conditions, as the great artists have always done” (“Discontent” 56). Rather 
than complete abdication from concerns of the “real” world, and the threads of emotional 
urgency found in the most self-described realist texts, Barth argues for an advancement of style 
in tandem, rather than in lieu of, matters of the heart. Considered with this, it is far easier to see 
Wallace as advancing a postmodernism agenda, rather than inventing one out of whole cloth. 
 A divergent thread from this central advancement of the means and techniques of 
postmodernism arises in a parallel thread to “post-postmodernism:” the so-called “new realism” 
marked by a declaration to shun postmodernism’s tactics altogether. This had perhaps been most 
vocally defended by novelist Jonathan Franzen, a contemporary and close friend of Wallace’s, in 
his designation of “Contract” writing, as described in Section One. This style, recall, favored “a 
soul-to-soul contract between reader and writer” enabled by “substantial characters” 
transparently rendered to aid this bond, and was rendered in opposition to “Status” writing, 
favoring “difficulty” and avant-garde stylistics (Franzen, “Difficult” 241). Yet this realism is not 
so pure and removed from the concerns of postmodernism as Franzen claims. Beyond Franzen’s 
first, highly Pynchonian novel The Twenty-Seventh City (1988), Stephen J. Burn notes in 
Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism (2008) that Franzen’s alleged new realism was 
profoundly affected by a suspicion of mimeticism that had been raised by postmodern 
innovations (ix).51 Further, critic Robert Rebein encapsulates this new style of postmodernism-
tinged realism, often referred to generally as “new realism,” as having “absorbed 
                                                
51 For further discussion the complexities of seemingly new realist novels, see the essays in 
Brooks and Toth’s The Mourning After: Attending the Wake of Postmodernism, and in particular 




postmodernism’s most lasting contributions and gone on to forge a new realism that is more or 
less traditional in its handling of character, reportorial in its depiction of milieu and time, but is 
at the same time self-conscious about language and the limits of mimesis” (Hicks 20). This new 
realism is more of a mirage of realism, undergirded by deep skepticism, and banking its 
traditional threads on denial of certain larger theoretical trends signaled by poststructuralism and 
postmodernism. 
 This augmented realism is further marked, due to this thin mediation and compromise, 
for its instability, shakiness, or exhaustion, of formerly airtight, hermetic mechanics and 
naturalistic depiction. This amplified realist style (supposedly extending to include Wallace) has 
been most aptly designated by critic James Wood as “Hysterical Realism” in an essay called 
“Human, All Too Inhuman” (ostensibly a review of Zadie Smith’s White Teeth). The 
“hysterical” aspect, meant pejoratively, arose from “the conventions of realism…not being 
abolished but, on the contrary, exhausted and overworked” (Wood). Plotted happenings and 
coincidences that were essential for realism’s operation instead became exaggerated to the point 
of improbability. This is a sentiment expressed also by Melvin Jules Bukiet’s “crackpot” realism, 
which lumps Franzen and Powers in with the likes of Pynchon to reveal how paranoiac belief in 
international networks of conspiracy lends a stylistic penchant for heightened coincidence. As 
Wood relates over-coincidence to Smith’s book, however, certain coincidences are less 
conspiratorially charged but still implausible on a “realist” level: twins that are countries apart 
break their noses at the same time, a terrorist cell goes by the prosaic name of “kevin,” and so on 
(Wood); in other words, the writers go just beyond the pale of what is acceptably realist into 
something not yet fabulism. The tropes are improbably expanded rather than destroyed, tainted 




 Wallace then extracts the potential for teetering and unstable epiphanic transition, 
salvaged from altered or “hysterical” realism, and tempers it with a postmodern frame (a mixture 
of affect and contemporary technique not thrown away with Barth’s bathwater, as McLaughlin 
re-emphasized) to fragment it into unrecognizability. Indeed, the ruptured epiphanies Wallace 
imparts to his characters are often so staggering, and direct in their foisting choices upon the 
reader, that these divergences from “representation” have been touched on under a variety of 
titles—from “belief” to “sincerity” to philanthropic “gifting”—by various Wallace critics 
(McLaughlin, Scott, Konstantinou, Kelly, Smith). Yet, this break seems less delicate and one-
dimensional than sheer philanthropy. As Wallace claimed in response to an earlier, later 
disavowed novella called “Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way,” he desired “the 
Armageddon-explosion, the goal metafiction’s always been about… then out of the rubble 
reaffirm the idea of art being a living transaction between humans” (Wallace, McCaffery 41). In 
this “explosion,” Wallace reaches the extra-linguistic dimension McLaughlin notes as the true 
goal of the post-postmodern agenda, enclosed within a still postmodern-leaning frame. 
 A final red herring in categorizations of Wallace arises in a critical misunderstanding of 
this visually absent “extra” quality wrought from metafiction’s rubble as simply “sincerity” or 
saccharine naïveté. This perception is drawn from Wallace’s own nonfiction work, and centrally 
the essay “E Unibus Pluram” already mentioned in Section One that issued a clarion call for the 
end of irony and return to “single-entendre principles,” spawning a unique sub-section of 
Wallace criticism in the process (Kelly, “Death of an Author”). How this quality became shoe-
horned into an allied aesthetic movement called “New Sincerity” is largely through this division 
in Wallace scholarship, as well as a mistaken inclusion of Wallace in earlier descriptions of neo-




influential Wallace essay in this former regard is Lee Konstantinou’s “No Bull: David Foster 
Wallace and Postironic Belief,” which argues that Wallace’s fourth-wall tampering mechanisms, 
most evident in his short story “Octet,” were present to reveal the “‘total, genuine honesty, the 
100% candor’ (148) of the author—not the narrator, but the author” (94, italics Konstantinou’s). 
Konstantinou posits that Wallace’s direct address of the reader, and metafictional gimmicks, are 
to open a more clear channel directly to the author himself, who in order to function must instill 
“belief” in the reader of his essential “goodness” (“No Bull” 97, 106). “Sincerity” further 
undergirds ruptures in the fictional wall, as, according to Wallace scholar Adam Kelly, “sincerity 
is…the kind of secret that must always break with representation” (“New Sincerity” 142). 
However, the exact complexity of this “break[ing],” and the baroque means by which Wallace 
reaches his “100%” candor, is undoubtedly different than other New Sincerity authors who have 
been aligned with Wallace. Consider for instance Dave Eggers, who Konstantinou notes was 
heavily inspired by Wallace, and moved towards the “optimistic ethos that mixes an offbeat 
aesthetic with a laudable urge toward philanthropy and the active construction of alternative 
institutional structures [referencing Egger’s nonprofit 826 National] (a publishing house, tutoring 
centers, a charitable foundation)” (“No Bull” 106). The perceived “twee”-ness, or sweetly well-
intentioned affect of Egger’s work, coupled with his implemented real-world good will, reveals 
that Wallace is a separate entity entirely. 
 One might then say Wallace’s separateness is found in a triad between his willingness to 
engage dark and inevitably more existential subject matters, the complexity of his method, and 
the self-conscious navigation and interpenetration of emotional and formal subject matter. In the 
first matter, as discussed, Wallace is often interested in the epiphanic charge of visceral 




rats, or IJ protagonist Don Gately attempting to discern true malice in his “empathetic” murder 
of two assailants to protect addicts in his charge. These violent acts aren’t one-dimensional, 
however, as their murkiness of intention is often ensconced in religious terms of choice (in the 
William Jamesian, pragmatic sense) and often places the reader in the position of making key 
decisions, leaving the frame of the text open to do so. This tactic alone could not be more distant 
from so-called contemporaries in New Sincerity writing. Wallace is also able to extend these 
moments of moral uncertainty through his complex and multi-layered method, using what Raoul 
Eshelman calls an alternation of “inner” and “outer” narrative frames. Lee Konstantinou employs 
Eshelman’s methodology to explain the complex mirrors-within-mirrors quality of Wallace’s 
nested series of “Pop Quizzes” in the short story “Octet”—irresolution and seeming impossibility 
of “solving” the quizzes is ameliorated by the larger, total, nesting frame. Wallace’s desire to at-
times “punish” the reader—a common critical complaint, and one epitomized in “Octet”—
likewise bleeds into his willingness to punish his characters, and the receivers of his characters 
alike, devising complicated moral gauntlets around binding traps of addiction, compulsion, and 
sadism. Yet, in both these moral and structural punishments, Wallace’s character psychology is 
advanced in a means not quite realist, not quite postmodern, not quite transgressive.52  
 Wallace’s mid-to-late 1990s work then reveals the dawning of a new type of technique 
that acts on the fringe of, and incorporates materials from, parallel yet colliding fictional forms. 
Wallace’s style is a post-postmodernism yet defined, though for the sake of critical context, is 
closest to the “maximalist” tradition, borrowing and pilfering odd devices from realist and 
                                                
52 Stephen Burn describes in general a post-postmodern reaction against structural fragmentation 
with a renewed emphasis on character psychology. In Wallace’s case, this balances the 
“strategically deployed analepses” of Infinite Jest’s fractal-like organization by giving an 
exhaustive background of its central character, Hal, in a fashion unusual for such stylistically 




transgressive fiction. Drawing from these forms, the following two chapters will focus on the 
emblematic concept of “the epiphany:” tritely old in a realist sense, transgressive in its potential 
for a dubiously shaded moment of revelatory violence, and implying moments of aporia while 
granting characters subjectivity to choose. In Infinite Jest epiphanies alter between “real” and 
“fake,” set off by a particular character’s will either to salve themself through cathartically 
violent action or repair what William James calls the “sick soul” or “divided self” by more 
empathetic means. These “ill” characters, unlike Vollmann or Ellis’s protagonists, are rendered 
life-like by their illness, wrestling with the decisions it foists on them. Their struggle, however, is 
allied with a readerly one. The final epiphany and supposed closure at the novel’s end is 
enigmatically removed, creating an absent space where the reader imagines what character 
transformations have taken placed, or what learned. This method is expanded drastically in Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men, where the reader is bludgeoned with metatextual addresses and 
explicit precautions of transformation that act, perversely, to mystify the overtly described 
epiphany rather than deaden and over-explain, as metafiction had done previously. In both 
works, the epiphany serves as an ambiguous no-man’s-land, wherein both character psychology 
and reader orientation are constantly in a process of self-determination. In this regard, Wallace is 










“Sudden Awakening to the Fact That the Mischief Is Irretrievably Done”: Epiphanic 
Structure in Infinite Jest 
Breaking the Circle: Introduction to Epiphany 
 The epiphany is a trope present throughout David Foster Wallace’s oeuvre, flowering in 
his mid-to-late nineties work, yet little discussed in criticism. Understood in the terms of sexual 
metaphor Wallace often employed to discuss the mechanics of fiction,53 these epiphanies are 
near-orgasmic in their impact: marked by emotional abstraction, drastic structural alteration, and 
a lingering lucidity left in their wake. This model is delivered most overtly in Wallace’s 
previously mentioned story “Adult World” (1999), wherein a neurotic housewife undergoes a 
“sddn blndng realization” (described explicitly as an “epiphany”) that her husband’s sexual 
dissatisfaction is due to his “Secret Compulsive Masturbat[ion]” rather than her perceived poor 
lovemaking (Wallace, “Adult (I)-(II),” 161, 183)—a realization likewise marking a shift in the 
story’s structure to unfinished and more truthful-seeming author’s notes. Yet, the use of 
moments of choice, transformation, and structural rearrangement are employed most 
programmatically, though in perhaps duplicitous form, in Infinite Jest (1996)54— symmetrical 
epiphanies and the use of at-times invisible epiphanic shift are intentionally made unclear, as 
revealed in their progressive obscuring during the advancement of IJ’s drafts. IJ’s epiphanies, 
and the dark powers of release that arise as alternatives to them, offer information elemental to 
the understanding of IJ’s character interiority, and by extension, the exact sort of “new realism” 
Wallace co-opts and integrates with his maximalist postmodern strategies. As these ruptures are 
also framed in the orgasmic-epiphanic mode of structural defamiliarization, these “holes” in the 
                                                
53 Indeed, Wallace described the evasion and reflexivity in his earlier work as evidencing a 
relationship with the reader that was “sexual,” rather than the platonic straightforwardness of his 
current tactic resembling “a late-night conversation with really good friends” (Donahue).   




text also become enjoinments for reader interaction and cooperation—a form discussed by critics 
as bafflingly “unrepresentable,” yet usually linked to milder qualities of “belief” (Konstantinou) 
and “sincerity” (Kelly) rather than formal operation. Understanding these epiphanies, then, lends 
both a richer understanding of IJ’s exact organization and aesthetic, just now emerging from the 
pall of reviews dubbing it a “psychedelic jumble” or product of a nonstop “word machine” 
(Kakutani, “A Country”), 5556 as well as Wallace’s use of these tropes to navigate and advance 
beyond existing literary styles.  
 As intrinsically important as the epiphanies themselves is their conspicuous occlusion 
and elision—namely the two primary epiphanies swallowed by the infamously “missing” year-
long gap57 at the book’s finish—the reason for which becomes clear when considering Wallace’s 
early drafts. Yet, this draft-driven elucidation has not thus far been recognized, likely due to the 
lacking, though urgently required, genetic consideration of Wallace’s works.58 The largest 
epiphanic gap, anchoring the novel and dictating its structure, is the final year-long interruption 
that marks the novel’s linear end and catapults one back to the first chapter where the final 
chronological section exists. In this fashion, IJ is a cyclic novel like Finnegans Wake (1939), 
                                                
55 Other reviews, still discussing the prose’s seemingly overgrown and haphazard structure, 
touch also on a perceived “cybernetic” arrangement. As Sven Birkerts wrote in the Atlantic, “the 
book is not about electronic culture, but it has internalized some of the decentering energies that 
computer technologies have released into our midst” (“Alchemist’s Retort”). 
56 IJ’s structure as a Sierpinski Gasket—or a type of fractal organization—was only mentioned in 
critical literature by Greg Carlisle in 2007 (Elegant Complexity) after being mentioned by 
Wallace in a Bookworm interview in 1996. 
57 Stretching, approximately, from late November in the Year of the Depend Adult 
Undergarment to late November in the Year of Glad (Carlisle, Elegant 496). 
58 D.T. Max’s biography Every Love Story is a Ghost Story (2012) is essentially the main and 
principal work touching on Wallace’s developing ideas through drafts. Steven Moore was also 
able to view an early version of IJ, and offered his thoughts on the changes between this and the 
final version in “The First Draft Version of Infinite Jest.” Stephen J. Burn also mentions minor 





where the poignancy of the book’s ostensible finish enhances one’s immediate return to the 
book’s beginning, now enriched by a space of suspension.59 The culminating epiphanic moment 
of Gately—spurred by the former addict attempting to “save” a former partner in a drug-addled 
vision while potentially being injected in real-time with his favorite drug, Demerol—hangs off 
the margin into this gap, influencing invisibly the novel’s first chapter. Hal, the “catatonic hero” 
marked by “non-action” (Wallace, IJ 142), similarly reveals a coming-to-life, either paralyzing 
or revitalizing, shortly before the same abrupt interruption and is revealed at the novel’s 
beginning as inarticulate but emotionally awakened. So, what is one to make of these obscured 
happenings and secreted occurrences that seem to so inflect and cast shadows upon the 
remaining bulk of text we do have access to? And why has there been so little made of these jolts 
of transformative energy, much as they inform the realistic interior life of characters supposedly 
harkening a return back to a new, yet warped, form of character relatability? 
 First, one must consider the function and content of the novel’s “absent center,”60 
structurally, as the capstone of delicately maturing and thoughtfully entwined psychic narratives. 
The gap is highly intentional, and not offered as a dead-end or blockage to interpretation. 
Wallace envisioned the end functioning like a parabola, where “certain kind [sic] of parallel 
                                                
59 Christopher Hager’s undergraduate thesis, “On Speculation: Infinite Jest and American Fiction 
After Postmodernism,” offered the earliest defense and careful explication of IJ’s ending amidst 
a generally unreceptive and hostile critical reaction. Wallace himself claimed Hager’s analysis 
was “very, very close” and at the time made him “feel good, real good.” Hager’s primary 
revelation (Max 321) was that the resolution critics often complained was missing in fact exists, 
but “sits chronologically & spatially in front of the novel proper, which, as a satellite dish, serves 
to focus myriad rays of light, or voices, or information, on that central resolution without actually 
touching it.” Hager also takes a parabolic, symmetrical view of the novel, remarking on its 
“centering” energies—pivoted around a “vertex,” or a “crucial point” “different from a 
climax”—rather than the “decentering energies” posited then-contemporarily by critic Sven 
Birkerts. The peak of observable action is the discernable rim of a parabola, or as Hager borrows 
from Pynchon, a rainbow-like arc, capped by the pseudo-epiphanic death of Lucien Antitoi. 
60 This phrase is employed by Boswell, describing the cartridge Infinite Jest as the invisible yet 




lines… converg[e] in such a way that an ‘end’ can be projected by the reader somewhere beyond 
the right frame” (Wallace, “Live Online”). He expands on the exact breakdown and 
quantification of what manner of character resolution he believes occurs by the last page of IJ in 
a defense of the ending to his editor Michael Pietsch: “we know exactly what’s happening to 
Gately by end [sic], about 50% of what’s happened to Hal, and little but hints about Orin [Hal’s 
brother]” (Max 199). Further, solidifying the necessity of the end and beginning of the novel, 
Wallace thought “it was OK to make a reader read the book twice” (Max 199). Bracketing more 
pessimistic interpretations that the space beyond the final page presents, as Marshall Boswell 
claims, a “void” in which “all the novel’s unanswered questions fall endlessly” (174),61 and 
keeping in mind a Wake-like structure of narrative metempsychosis,62 one comes to understand 
this structural aberration at the end as an intrinsic trope and emblematic symbol of Wallace’s 
method. 
                                                
61 For other interpretations favoring arrest or irresolution, see Carlisle’s assumption that the 
ending offers a paralytic freeze, or means of creating, in IJ’s words, a “chaotic stasis” mirroring 
the “anxiety we feel in a culture that gives us a ‘confusion of choices’” (“Consider” 17). Burn’s 
interpretation is closer to my own, conceiving of the “end” as more of a protracted middle by 
calling attention to the seemingly metafictional comment, on page 981, that the book is moving 
“toward what’s either a climax or the end of the disk,” with this “end” then requiring the disk to 
be presumably reset (29). Other critical strategies include Frank Louis Cioffi’s reader-response 
notion that the book’s structure reiterates a cycle of addictiveness proffered in the book, N. 
Katherine Hayles’s conception of the novel’s end undercutting subjective autonomy, and Samuel 
Cohen positing that the end represents an arrested Künstlerroman of Wallace’s own artistic crisis 
having arrived in a paralyzing “middle of history,” historically and literarily, with the path 
forward uncertain (“To Wish” 68, 76-7). The end of IJ, to Cohen, presents “the young writer-
figure on the verge of maturity, incoherent but full of things to say” (“To Wish” 73). 
62 It is perhaps useful to draw attention to Burn’s perception of Infinite Jest star Joelle van 
Dyne’s alter ego “Madame Psychosis” (also an alternate name for DMZ [Wallace, IJ 215]) 
sounding “temptingly close” to metempsychosis (61) and indicating Wallace’s interest in 




 Considering this warped circular structure,63 it is essential to understand the figurative 
import of Wallace’s concept of “annulation,” a cyclic process creating seemingly unending 
energy through a closed, self-sustaining system. Annulation is described in the book by Michael 
Pemulis as “a type of fusion that can produce waste that’s fuel for a process whose waste is fuel 
for the fusion” (Wallace, IJ 572); 64 Boswell also notes that “‘annulation’ refers to a ringlike 
anatomical structure” (162). The self-involved, narcissistic import of the process is hinted at in 
the text through a “spontaneous reminiscence” of James O. Incandenza regarding the 
“awakening of [his] interest in annular systems,” wherein he recalls fleeing the incapacitated 
form of his drunk and possibly cirrhotic father to observe a sheered doorknob’s rolling pattern on 
his bedroom floor (Wallace, IJ 1034, 501-3). As Boswell claims, this moment is essential in 
unveiling James Incandenza as a “cold, closed figure” who “hide[s] his emotions behind cold 
logic and surface objectivity” (Boswell 162). Wallace’s co-option of the stylistic aesthetic of 
annulation has been noted at the sentence level—the “‘annular’ self-consciousness” of Wallace’s 
prose (Boswell 164)—yet a more macrocosmic structural dimension is gestured at by his 
inclusion of annular rings as larger-scale punctuations between narrative chunks in the novel.65 
                                                
63 Critics like Boswell touch lightly on IJ’s total circular nature (119, 121), yet a far more 
dominant critical perspective is one of a fractal organization, paying attention to immanent 
narrative threads rather than the looping structure of the beginning and end (See Burn’s DFW’s 
IJ, Carlisle’s Elegant Complexity, and David Hering’s discussion of geometric shapes in “Infinite 
Jest: Triangles, Cycles, Choices, and Chases”). 
64 Hayles exhaustively explicates the technical configuration of annular fusion as explained by 
Pemulis (whom Hayles misidentifies as Thorp) in “The Illusion of Autonomy,” pages 688-9. 
Hayles also embeds this notion of annulation within broader loops of recursive independence 
that she argues structurally undercut the idea of autonomy in the text. Bradley J. Fest also 
employs annular fusion as emblematic of Wallace’s “anti-eschatological vision” (129) due to its 
driving force in the cyclically poisoned and fertile Great Concavity, which uses “massive 
amounts of toxic material to produce energy, the by-product being more toxic material, which 
annular fusion then recursively uses to begin the cycle over again” (133-4). 
65 Carlisle merely notes the typographical circles’ existence and their function in opening the 




Wallace explains these typographical markers in a clarifying letter to Pietsch: “They’re just 
supposed to be circles. Decoration. Maybe suggesting tennis balls, heads, annular defloration 
cycles, etc. Maybe just me amusing myself” (Wallace, Letter to Pietsch, italics mine).66 Due to 
the circles’ lacking any identification marks as heads, or tennis balls, and given the evidence to 
follow, I believe the most accurate and charged interpretation is of “annular defloration cycles”67 
and the implied process of annulation. Wallace was obsessive about the circles, modifying them 
when they appeared too bouncing and comic, restricting their number from several to one, and 
settling on the half-shaded, hangnail-moon-looking glyph that appears in the book (Wallace 
Infinite Jest Typescript, Copyedited). Wallace meticulously stipulated the final annular cycle that 
appears semi-eclipsed on the last page of the main narrative, yet to be fully analyzed by Wallace 
critics.68 The partially occluded circle, lying just beyond Gately’s final breakdown, is essential to 
understanding the forward motion, and means of breaking the self-enclosed annular rings that we 
might understand the novel’s arrangement prompts. Wallace was fastidious about this 
terminating symbol; he corrects a typesetter at Little, Brown in late proofs on a circle incorrectly 
placed in the middle of the page—whited out and X’d with pen—and another mildly obscured on 
the middle-right margin, jutting more bulbously (Wallace Infinite Jest Typescript, Copyedited). 
                                                
66 In the same letter, Wallace mentions that he employed similar “decoration[s]” in the form of 
“jagged lines” distributed throughout his novella “Little Expressionless Animals,” left in by his 
prior editor Gerald Howard (Wallace, Letter to Pietsch). The novella describes a Jeopardy! 
champion dethroned by her severely autistic brother through producer calculation. As both 
siblings have become data savants while being locked up as children with an obscure 
encyclopedia and occasionally “a straightedge and a pencil” (Wallace, “Expressionless” 10), the 
straightedge-derived, “jagged” drawings serve a thematic purpose in recalling their damaged 
innocence. Such use of typographical markers as necessary narrative addendums should validate 
closer and deep scrutiny to those likewise present in IJ. 
67 The shadow limning the circle might also vaguely support an interpretation of “heads,” though 
the sort of empty, blank-faced heads that would reiterate an annular hypothesis of self-sustained 
narcissism. 
68 Carlisle also recognizes the “incomplete circle escaping from the bottom right corner of p. 




On a near-final proof with the circle in the proper lower-right position, marking the circle’s full, 
arc-like passage, he instructs further: “No—you have only 1/3 of circle protruding from bottom 
right, as if rest of circle has been cut off by margin” (Wallace IJ Proof Set 6-22). Wallace 
includes with the note his own marking of his intended eclipsed circle, far more off-page, and of 
a more unique shape, than the typesetter’s mark (Wallace IJ Proof Set 6-22). Like Joyce’s 
intended “large” period at the end of Ulysses’s “Ithaca” chapter—missing since the original 
edition and restored in the critical edition (Gifford, Seidman 12)—meant to perhaps insinuate a 
“womb”-like return to unity or precipitous point before a “plunge into…nowhere” (Briggs 136-
7), Wallace’s annular eclipse indicates the breaking of personal bonds, the rupture of the waste-
eating-waste circuit of paralytic thought that occurs just out of frame. 
 Radiating both forward and backward from this central absence and rupturing of the 
annular ring, Wallace also includes smaller elisions and micro-epiphanies in near-concentric 
circles. Moments of “real” and “faked” insight occur in tandem, one category precipitating the 
other, with two central scenes of “faked” insight for Hal and Gately respectively bearing heavy 
and obvious modifications in language meant to outline clearly the stakes of choice and empathy 
required for their later, truer insight.69 These modifications also introduce and delineate 
overriding structures of addiction and determinism opposing a potential conscious choice, further 
eroded by the allied compulsion of addiction. In Hal’s case, this alteration relates to his sudden 
                                                
69 For other smaller and minor precipitations of Hal’s final epiphanic moment, less bearing the 
mark of Wallace’s revisions, see Hal’s faked empathy with his “hypophalangial Grief-
Therapist,” in which he needed to “empathize with the grief-therapist” and “prepare from the 
grief-pro’s own perspective” to achieve a pantomimed breakthrough yielding supposed 
“absolution” (Wallace, IJ 16, 254-6), as well as Hal’s attempted absolution in admitting his 
marijuana addiction and fear of losing tennis ability to Mario (Wallace, IJ 782-5). For Gately, 
dreams often serve this anticipatory purpose, the more relevant of which are described later in 
the article. However, a more strictly AA-related “epiphanic” vision not discussed here is related 
on pages 358-9 of IJ, as well a visitation of James Incandenza’s wraith that Gately 




realization during a blizzard of forward-projected and accumulated banal activities, explained 
clinically in intermediary drafts as a reversed déjà vu syndrome called “jamais vu,” which makes 
one freshly aware of old sensations as if they were newly experienced—insight entwined with a 
“glittered feeling” of neurological tic (Wallace, IJ Typescript Draft (Continued)). For Gately, 
this modification relates to deterministic language painting his supposedly selfless defense of 
Randy Lenz as an addict-minded enactment of violent impulse—martyrdom turned inside out. 
These two “false” epiphanic moments then more narrowly align and explicate the two occluded 
insights occurring beyond the novel’s end: Hal’s mysterious, final interior implosion, and 
Gately’s missing, post-Demerol epiphany (the latter clarified by another missing episode 
utilizing imagery similar to Gately’s last, telling hallucination). Seeing these dual conflicts, and 
where they have been tempered by battles of the will, we are able to align further the 
transformative journeys of Hal and Gately. Further, in paying attention to the structural flow of 
the total work affected and stimulated by these missing fragments, analyzing also where and how 
these supposed absences arose, and what import these might have on the cyclic nature of the 
work, a new model of character interiority becomes evident. Indeed, from a character-oriented 
point of view, these excisions inflect far more aporetic consequences in line with spiritual 
malaise, transgression, and personal will that dovetail with previously discussed fascinations of 
Wallace with various kinds of addictions and compulsions.  
 The closest critical work to this potentiality of rupture and transcendence among pain and 
paralytic thinking is David Evans’s article “Chains of Not Choosing,” which discusses the 
influence of William James’s pragmatic philosophy on Wallace. Evans focuses particularly on 
pragmatism’s result- and choice-based faith model as an anodyne for spiritual paralysis. 




misappropriation,” namely Lenz using James’s expanded Gifford Lectures as a deceptive vessel 
for cocaine storage (171), indicates the joking resonance he believes James holds for IJ’s most 
damaged characters. However, in looking at Wallace’s increasing emphasis on James in his 
developing drafts, one sees an emphasis on the deeper spiritual “sickness” Lenz exhibits, as well 
as how Lenz’s seemingly irredeemable violence actually manifests a deeper attempted 
realignment of a “divided self”—to say nothing of Lenz’s forthright declaration that the content 
of the James text “mean[s] a great deal to [him]” (Wallace, IJ 1037). (Tellingly, Wallace alluded 
explicitly to the “Sick Soul” and “Divided Self” chapters of James’s Varieties of Religious 
Experiences [also known as the Gifford Lectures] in earlier drafts of IJ, which were later deleted 
[Wallace, IJ Typescript Draft (Continued)].) As such, in the next section I will focus on pseudo-
epiphanic moments of choice that highlight the “sickly” nature of Wallace’s maligned characters, 
in which genuine epiphanic transformation and search for “unification” uncertainly verges into 
nonreligious, violent “catharsis,” using Lenz as a base model. 
 Analyzing Wallace’s articulations of choice to potentially exorcise sickness through less 
spiritual means elucidates themes of change through violent expulsion that a focus on Wallace’s 
saintly, noble, or Wittgensteinian community-building aspects70 often neglects. IJ indeed 
presents a gallery of grotesque, “rock bottom” moments coupled with curious instances of 
                                                
70 Much has been made of Wallace’s employment of Wittgenstein, and particularly 
Wittgenstein’s evolution from the solipsism of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) to the 
community-through-language ethic of Philosophical Investigations (1953). This influence—
described by Wallace himself in his famous 1993 interview with Larry McCaffery—was 
unpacked exhaustively by Boswell, who claimed, “In a very real sense, reading a David Foster 
Wallace novel, short story, or essay is tantamount to learning the ‘rules’ of his game, yet once 
the reader learns those rules his texts succeed in creating a special, surprisingly intimate zone of 
communication, of subjective interaction, that is unlike anything else in contemporary literature” 
(19). Jon Baskin expands on this ameliorative quality, claiming Wallace pursued a “literature 
that was simultaneously challenging and therapeutic in the Wittgensteinian sense… what 
Wallace wanted to ‘share’ most was a way out” of “the maze of contemporary thinking”—for 




transfiguration. Wallace describes the “bottom” tellingly as the “jumping-off place”—a leap into 
self-renewal or oblivion, where an addict, low on choices, must either enter recovery or die 
(Wallace, IJ 347-8). Such ruptures and moments of distilled abjection are frequent in IJ. Recall 
Lenz’s increasingly carnivalesque animal murders, Lucien Antitoi’s human-skewering on a 
sharpened broom (Wallace, IJ 488-489), a crack addict carrying her ossified and still umbilically 
attached infant through the streets of South Boston (Wallace, IJ 376-379), a “paralyzed,” 
“invertebrate” daughter ritually abused by her father who yells the name of Raquel Welch “in 
moments of incestuous extremity” (Wallace, IJ 370-1). These instances are integral to Wallace’s 
grand plan of forming a novel around the concept of Alcoholics Anonymous and AA’s sine qua 
non of repentance: the “bottom.” Diseased as Wallace’s characters are, the “epiphany” often 
becomes inextricably tied with the bottom, inflected with either the self-immolating logic of total 
consumption or transfiguration by pain.71 
 It is necessary to contextualize Wallace’s employment of the epiphany, linked with 
violent transfiguration, in a broader history of the “epiphany.” Particularly of interest is how a 
trope cast by Joyce as a psychologically inflected and mercurial “radiance” inflecting “realis[t]” 
“structure[s]” (Langbaum 343)—becoming by Wallace’s time a predictable trope of painfully 
obvious MFA fiction (“Fictional” 343)—might be reintegrated with a realism tempered by the 
                                                
71 Transformation through trauma is related explicitly in IJ as a reason for the deformed Mario’s 
sanctification. Hal thinks that “People who’re somehow burned at birth, withered or ablated way 
past anything like what might be fair, they either curl up in their fire, or else they rise. Withered 
saurian homodontic Mario floats” (Wallace, IJ 316). Similarly, Max notes that in The Pale King 
(2011), the character of the supernaturally adept IRS investigator Shane Drinion was conceived 
by Wallace as potentially the same scalded child from the short story “Incarnations of Burned 
Children” collected in Oblivion (2004). In a potential side narrative to The Pale King about a 
“video porn operation” run by “rich businessmen,” Drinion “double[s]” as a male lead for the 
films, as his scalded penis and pale complexion allow him to be photographed better and more 




revelations of postmodernism. The epiphany as a wracking realignment of perspective72 
canonized in Dubliners (1914)73 originated through Joyce’s own recording of his own particular 
style of “epiphanies:” scenes of prosaic occurrence evidencing a deeper “spiritual” significance. 
Joyce famously described the occurrences in his early fragmentary manuscript, Stephen Hero, as 
“a sudden spiritual manifestation…in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable 
phase of the mind itself” (Ellmann 83). However, the idealistic certitude and truthful evocation 
of the epiphany has since been called into question, the seeds for potential irony and excess in 
the epiphany revealed in Stephen Dedalus’s own egotistical reflection in Ulysses (1922)—
mimicking Joyce’s own earlier practice—that he wished to have his scribbled epiphanies sent to 
“all the great libraries of the world” upon his death (Maltby 13). In “Joyce and the Epiphany 
Concept,” Zack Bowen, after recounting fierce epiphany debates among Joyceans (particularly in 
the pages of PMLA), posits that the ironic reversal and uncertainty of the Dubliners epiphany 
may actually be a “self-delusion” experienced by “less gifted characters” (106). Hence, it is 
important to note that while epiphanies would go on to become, as Richard Ellmann claimed, “a 
commonplace of modern fiction” by the late fifties (84), they are also marked by their uncertain 
potential actually to transform, much as they emanate from characters’ faulty consciousnesses. 
Similarly, as Paul Maltby describes, they are likewise drawn from the perverted religious 
impulse, traced back to Joyce’s recasting of a “Christian concept” for “conspicuously, not to say 
provocatively, secular ends” (13).  
                                                
72 A traditional definition of the Joycean epiphany is provided by Garry Leonard in the 
Cambridge Companion to James Joyce (2004) as follows: “not so much a moment of insight as a 
point where hitherto disparate observations, thoughts, and desires rearrange themselves into an 
unsuspected pattern that shatters often long held ideas about one’s self and one’s surroundings” 
(91). 
73 Paul Maltby notes how the popularization of the epiphany was effected through “general 
education courses, whose literature anthologies typically include a story from Dubliners in 




 I would argue that genuine epiphanic transformation, invested with a new skepticism 
after postmodernism, becomes to writers attempting forays into an altered realism a freshly 
ambiguous and potentially adaptable phenomenon. This is partly due to various critical “state of 
the field” declarations of a broader “new realism,” generally regarded as a realism, as stated 
previously, seeming superficially “traditional” and “reportorial," but still “self-conscious about 
language and the limits of mimesis” (Rebein, Hicks 20). This skepticism often finds its way into 
new sub-niches of post-postmodern writing. As also stated previously, James Wood coined the 
genre of “hysterical realism” in an essay ostensibly reviewing Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, 
claiming that the identified cohort (including Wallace under the shaky premise of IJ’s lethal 
cartridge and wheelchair assassins) are marked by their employment of realist tropes exaggerated 
to the point of hysterical frenzy. Wood notes that characters within these works are, like E.M. 
Forster said of Dickens’s, “flat but vibrating very fast;” their animacy is not interiorly felt but 
“hangs off them like jewelry” (Wood). This degree of character legitimacy and depth is also 
integral to Jonathan Franzen’s aforementioned formulation for “Contract” writing, favoring lucid 
prose and empathetic characters facilitating connection and “community,” wholly distinct from 
the thorny ostracism of avant-garde “Status” writing (Franzen, “Difficult” 239-41). While 
Franzen inevitably favors the “Contract” model, other writers of Franzen’s generation conceive 
of the potential synthesis of these two camps, or integration of realist emotional nuance with 
“difficult” postmodern stylistics, as the holy grail of a truly new type of writing. Wood quotes 
Zadie Smith describing this ideal genre as potentially marrying postmodern structural tropes, like 
“macro-microeconomics…math, philosophy,” with local, visceral components, such as “love, 
sex, whatever” (Wood). Crafting characters with human traits that do not hang artificially like 




postmodernism, perhaps by means of tropes vitalizing realist depiction like the “epiphany,” is 
posited as the next urgent step.  
 One might see also in Wallace’s rejection of the “twee” or saccharine qualities present in 
allied categories of “post-ironic” (Konstantinou) or “New Sincerity” (Kelly) writing, marked by 
a certain precociousness and projected good will, a willingness to co-opt darker and more 
spiritually nihilistic states in order to find absent character interiority. His portrayal, for instance, 
of the emphatically damned Lenz attempting to “resolv[e]” his issues of “rage” and “fear” by the 
escalating murder of animals reveals this path to subjectivity in highly tortured, evocative 
fashion (Wallace, IJ 541). Also relevant is how Lenz’s struggle leads to the conflict that initiates 
Gately’s defense, wounding, and resultant struggle with Demerol. Blended with the crafting of 
fleshed-out character psychologies—the “Contract” side of Wallace’s writing, in Franzen’s 
terms—Wallace is able to implement jarring, epiphanic plumbs into the damaged structure of his 
characters’ consciousnesses, usually departing from representation into undivulged absences, to 
present a new sort of three-dimensional postmodern figure capable of weighing the use and 
morality of these transgressive acts. Holes surrounding these characters’ epiphanies likewise call 
for a new degree of reader interaction absent also from Wallace’s contemporaries. The blending 
of formal eccentricity and mimetic rendering of thought process, much remarked on in Wallace 
criticism,74 is then just as reliant on these departures and gaps from this cognitive imprint, where 
blinding trauma, or emotional exultation, break from Wallace’s wall-of-thought to reveal 
something else.  
                                                
74 This is an essential cognitive quality discussed in critical attempts to diagnose Wallace’s 
method of exhausting maximalist postmodern prose. As A.O. Scott stated succinctly in his mid-
career diagnosis of Wallace: “Wallace, then, is less anti-ironic than (forgive me) meta-ironic. 
That is, his gambit is to turn irony back on itself, to make his fiction relentlessly conscious of its 
own self-consciousness, and thus to produce work that will be at once unassailably sophisticated 





Cambridge Psycho: Transgression, Catharsis, and Choice 
 Wallace was familiar with the genre of transgressive fiction presented in the popular form 
of “Brat Pack” writing. As discussed in Section Two, the Brat Pack encapsulated a model of 
“young writing” preceding him—of which he was seen as arising out of yet from which he often 
sought to distance himself—that seemed to epitomize a cool, affectless detachment. Wallace 
decried the movement most exhaustively in his early essay “Fictional Futures and the 
Conspicuously Young” (1988). Among three maligned categories of suspicious fiction, Wallace 
drew explicit attention to a category lampooning a Brat Pack style and specifically that of Bret 
Easton Ellis: “Neiman-Marcus Nihilism,” marked by depictions of “six-figure Uppies and their 
salon-tanned, morally vacant offspring…[un]able to make it from limo door to analyst’s couch 
without several grams of chemical encouragement” (Wallace, “Fictional” 39-40). What was so 
apparently irksome, as Wallace expanded upon in a much discussed interview with Larry 
McCaffery, was the mimetic rendering of a culture that was “hopelessly shitty, insipid, 
materialistic, emotionally retarded, sadomasochistic and stupid” back at itself without any 
attempted redemptive or soulful undercurrent (McCaffery, Wallace 26). In terms of stylistics, 
following a flood of avant-garde tactics originally opened and rightfully hard-won by a coterie 
from “Mallarmé to Coover,” Wallace found anathematic the purposeless avant-gardism 
encapsulated by Ellis’s single-minded aesthetic of cruelty, lacking the underlying “human” 
elements Wallace so prized (McCaffery, Wallace 26-7). Wallace saw Ellis’s cruelty rather as the 




stage” (Wallace, McCaffery 28)—in other words, shock for shock’s sake.75 This carte-blanche 
hatred for “cruelty” is interesting and seemingly contradictory, given that Wallace advocates an 
authorial cruelty of his own in the novella “Westward,” describing an “architect who could hate 
enough to feel enough to love enough to perpetrate the kind of special cruelty only real lovers 
can inflict” (Wallace, McCaffery 23).76 McCaffery raises this, and restates it allegorically as like 
the instructive brashness of a drill instructor prepping his recruits for war. Wallace curiously 
demurs, caviling over the “pretty Aristotelian” assumption of McCaffery’s restatement, reflects 
further on American Psycho’s tactic as the illusory rug-pulling of seemingly offering instructive 
pain behind which is only self-serving sadism (Wallace, McCaffery 24-5). 
 Despite this caviling over “cruelty,” or perhaps due to it, Wallace’s stylistic debt or 
similarity to Ellis is often overlooked. Indeed, in D.T. Max’s biography, Max describes Wallace 
denying having read Ellis’s novel Less Than Zero (73) when queried about a story of his, “Girl 
With Curious Hair,” which drew from the affectless, brand-name-exalting aura of Ellis’s work. 
The story describes a former Ivy Leaguer now called Sick Puppy who is finally allowed to enact 
his sexual fetish for burning women who “fellate” him by joining a group of punk miscreants 
(Max 73).77 While Max orients this debt as more stylistic appropriation, admiring “the strong 
voice Ellis had found” while exaggerating it into “the gothic or repulsive” (73), a borrowed logic 
                                                
75 A similar point regarding empty mimesis is made by Wallace in his essay on porn, “Big Red 
Son.” He defuses a potential counterargument against the cathartic value of an unnecessarily 
sadistic sub-genre in porn called “Bizarro-Sleaze,” claiming, “whether Bizarro-Sleaze might 
conceivably help armchair misogynists ‘work out’ some of their anger at females is irrelevant” 
(“Big Red Son” 27). 
76 Also related, by Wallace, to a former teacher’s edict that “good fiction’s job was to comfort 
the disturbed and disturb the comfortable” (Wallace, McCaffery 21). 
77 Lines like “I have the English Leather Cologne commercial taped on my new Toshiba VCR 
and I enjoy reclining in my horsehair recliner and masturbating while the commercial plays” 
(Wallace, “Girl” 55) are perfect mimicries of the hyper-sexualized consumerism and deadened 




of materialistic-catharsis by sadism is apparent as well. Sick Puppy notes that after an unpleasant 
interaction with a punk, “Gimlet let me burn one of Big’s nipples with my gold lighter at a rest 
stop, so I became happy and felt that Big was a fine individual once more” (Wallace, “Curious” 
58), indicating cruelty as a means to attain temporary, though shallow, relief. 78 Lenz, in IJ, 
presents a marked embodiment and evolution of this earlier attitude—his moral contamination 
not a simple farce like Sick Puppy’s, but a genuine spiritual affliction granting the potential for 
moral evolution from Ellis’s template. Namely, as becomes apparent in Wallace’s drafts, we are 
meant to elevate Lenz’s trouble, both his addiction and seemingly sociopathic compulsion to 
harm, to the angst of a more cosmically beleaguered “sick soul.” Struggle for a feeling of relief 
either through Ellisian hyper-violence or a more soul-aligning Jamesian “unification,” sets an 
important template of choice revisited in Hal’s and Gately’s own respective philosophical 
quandaries potentially leading to epiphany.79  
 Chiefly of interest in setting up this model of spiritual sickness is a deleted footnote 
wherein Lenz reads excerpts from William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience, 
specifically “The Sick Soul” and “The Divided Self” sections (Wallace, IJ Typescript Draft 
(Continued)). The most relevant excerpt, from “The Divided Self” (extending prior discussion of 
the “sick soul”), is reproduced here in the marked condition Lenz finds it in (the product of an 
                                                
78 See also Wallace’s desire in writing, as expressed to Larry McCaffery, for “living 
transaction[s] between humans, whether the transaction was erotic or altruistic or sadistic” 
(Wallace, McCaffery 41).  
79 A similar instance of Wallace foregrounding choice as integral to religious affirmation is 
Wallace’s initial inclusion, then deletion, of the saintly Mario as a sort of genitally ambiguous 
eunuch. The early version of IJ sent to Moore contains the line “since Mario was born without 
testicles, it’s kind of a shame that he can’t sing” (Wallace IJ ‘First Two Sections’ – Moore 
Collect.). Wallace also argued against Pietsch deleting Mario’s erotic run-in with the 
indomitable, warship-physiqued Enfield Tennis Academy (E.T.A.) player the U.S.S. Millicent 
Kent as he “need[ed] Mario to be quite a bit more a character than a kind of maguffinish schtick 




anal-retentive reader, annotated meta-textually in a fashion reminiscent of Hal correcting 
Pemulis’s dictated grammar in the Eschaton section): 
 Some persons are born with an inner constitution which is harmonious and well 
 balanced from the outset… Others are oppositely constituted; (sic) and are so in 
 degrees which  may vary from something so slight as to result in a merely odd or 
 whimsical inconsistency, to a discordancy of which the consequences may be 
 inconvenient in the extreme. (Wallace, IJ Typescript Draft (Continued)) 
These “oppositely constituted” individuals, who are more prone to melancholy and a deeper 
feeling of woe (including, according to James, Bunyan and Tolstoy), are ironically, however, 
those whom James elects as experiencing a truer texture of reality. This is due to their plumbing 
of a greater psychic depth through melancholy, as “the evil facts which [melancholy] refuses 
positively to account for are a genuine portion of reality” and potentially opens for them “the 
deepest levels of truth” (James, Varieties 136). One’s conflict with evil, and darker impulses, can 
then cultivate potentially positive characteristics—a notion that certainly must have appealed to 
Wallace. The “sick soul” takes on the function of a leprous holy man, or rather a damned 
individual who has been to the deepest recesses of hell, unlike those of “harmonious” 
constitutions, and can so account for a more total image of life’s possibilities. Similarly, the “sick 
soul,” torn by its darker impulses into a “divided self,” is also the key to a life-transforming 
conversion experience, requiring a seismic return to unification in order to settle the pestilence of 
a divided mind—they must be “twice-born” (James, Varieties 139) to achieve any sort of 
equilibrium. 
 This conversion and unification, James explicitly states, doesn’t necessarily have to be 




remedying inner incompleteness and reducing inner discord is a general psychological process, 
which may take place with any sort of mental material, and need not necessarily assume the 
religious form” (James, Varieties 146). Additionally, this rebirth, and resulting consolidation of 
self, may be achieved explicitly through a unity of evil, vice, or even neutral ideology. James 
notes this potential liberation in secularism or even vice as follows: “the new birth may be away 
from religion into incredulity; or it may be from moral scrupulosity into freedom and license; or 
it may be produced by the irruption into the individual’s life of some new stimulus or passion, 
such as love, ambition, cupidity, revenge, or patriotic devotion” (James, Varieties 146). 
Particularly relevant is this second-to-last designation, “revenge,” indicating a possible relief 
from “division,” or irksome philosophical uncertainty, through violence or retribution. Indeed, 
James claims that this process of conversion can feel like the “opposite of ‘falling in love’” 
(James, Varieties 149), or a stark removal from a sense of connection and affective affinity. 
 Yet, there is a choice available that forms the crux of James’s pragmatic system. Locked 
historically within a context of competing models of dogmatic determinism, James vied for the 
choice to believe in free will (Letters 147-48). Further, in pragmatism belief is rendered true by 
its results, and one is encouraged to choose the fateful track that would yield the most 
advantageous outcome—whatever “idea…will carry [one] prosperously from any one part of our 
experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily” (James, Pragmatism 34). 80 Yet, as 
relates to the “sick soul,” this choice broadens to the affective field shared by those directly 
                                                
80 Evans aligns this notion of choice with Wallace’s ideology expressed in his now-famous 
Kenyon College commencement speech, later published as This is Water (2009). As Wallace 
writes in the speech, “if you’ve really learned how to think, how to pay attention [i.e. 
‘choose’]… it will actually be within your power to experience a crowded, hot, slow, consumer-
hell type situation as not only meaningful, but sacred” (Evans 181). Evans also notes Hal and 
Gately’s movement out of their spiritual “Purgator[ies]” hinges on “choice,” yet doesn’t 
incorporate the taint of addiction into this choice nor other avenues for less advantageous choices 




influenced by one’s actions: choosing a unification operating in more harmonious relation with 
one’s fellow man would be starkly different than one operating out of malice, violent expulsion, 
or baseness. This choice, and Wallace’s implicit belief in the former option, is reiterated time and 
again in Wallace’s comments about the purpose of fiction. Fiction is, as Wallace is oft-quoted 
saying, about “what it is to be a fucking human being;” about ameliorating “loneliness” for the 
reader “marooned in her own skull” by giving her “access to other selves” (Wallace, McCaffery 
26, 16, 22). The function of the “sick soul” is to face this potential option of unification in the 
condensed form of conversion, or coalescence. Whether this is toward a transgressive excising of 
impulse or a religious empathy is left ambiguously unclear. 
 The conscious alignment of Lenz and James is obvious from Wallace’s evolution of 
thinking. In his first hand-written manuscripts, Lenz originally hides his cocaine in the Gould 
Medical Dictionary, which by later transcripts has been modified, explicitly, to James’s The 
Principles of Psychology and The Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion. The transition suggests 
a shift from biological explanations for actions—present in the Medical Dictionary—to 
psychological and religious explanations—present in the Principles and Lectures on Natural 
Religion.81 Also significant is the coupling of the two James texts in a compendium edition, “The 
Principles of Psychology and The Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion,” which doesn’t actually 
exist in reality (in the novel, it is cited, somewhat farcically, as “available in EZC large-font print 
from Microsoft/NAL-Random House-Ticknor, Fields, Little, Brown and Co.” published in the 
fictitious “Y.T.M.P [or Year of the Tucks Medicated Pad]” [Wallace, IJ 1037]). The Principles 
of Psychology presents the groundwork for understanding sensations and instinctual drives 
                                                
81 In his published paraphrased notes on his early-received draft of IJ, Moore describes this 





undergirding consciousness, and The Gifford Lectures (or Varieties) interprets religious 
phenomena in psychological terms—both combined in this fantasy edition to frame the 
competing forces of religion and physical perception. Similarly, by the time of an early 
typescript Wallace sent to Steven Moore, he had included in the Lenz section a hand-written note 
relaying the notion of sick soul being “oppositely constituted” to the “harmonious” souls (IJ 
‘First Two Sections’ – Moore Collect.), and by a later typescript had included the relevant 
chapters of Varieties explicitly (IJ Typescript Draft (Continued)), though these were all struck 
from the final version. 
 Similarly, in looking at Wallace’s early drafts, one sees a missing jargon of therapeutic 
resolution that exists in the published version. One salient example arises in Lenz’s killing of 
animals and need to utter his abreactive keyword “There.” Simple expression of relief in his 
earliest draft—“Lenz liked to look down at the former animal and go ‘There’” (Wallace, IJ 
Handwritten Drafts)—becomes amplified by the published version with an added allusion to a 
psychological process of “issue-resolution” allowed by the “There” (Wallace, IJ 541, italics 
Wallace’s). Yet, most expressive of this creation of Lenz as a psychologically tormented test 
case for reunification is Wallace’s inclusion of a made-up James phrase: “Catharsis of 
resolving.” In the published text, missing from the earliest draft, we are told that killing animals 
in their owner’s yards gave Lenz “what Bill James one time called a Catharsis of resolving, 
which Lenz felt he could agree” (Wallace, IJ 544). No such “catharsis of resolving” exists in 
William James’s extended works, and this fabricated conception of visceral release lends a 
particularly rich sample of what Lenz seeks to do throughout his nightly punishments and 




 Lenz’s process of self-described cathartic resolution increases in slowly ratcheting 
amplifications in the near mid-novel section that describes it; similarly, the process is marked by 
the attempt to achieve neat, defined moments of “resolution” through punctuated acts of 
orchestrated violence. The nature of this accreted sense of tension, which bursts forth in micro-
epiphanies, is actually described in an excerpt from Varieties in the published version, which 
Lenz reads from the compendium edition and “snap[s] [him] to what he was up to” (Wallace, IJ 
1037). The relevant passage, also present in an earlier version (Wallace, IJ ‘First Two Sections’ –
Wallace Papers), describes the “latent process of unconscious preparation often preceding a 
sudden awakening to the fact that the mischief is irretrievably done” (Wallace, IJ 1037). Here we 
see an “awakening” precipitated by a series of actions linked to his addicted state that he is aware 
of only retrospectively. Lenz’s process of escalating preparation pre-“awakening,” however, is 
telling. He begins by “demapping,” or killing, rats, in a rather straightforward fashion by 
dropping chunks of concrete on them—the sound “some aural combination of a tomato thrown at 
a wall and a pocketwatch getting clocked with a hammer” (Wallace, IJ 540-1). He escalates to 
suffocating cats in garbage bags, which “assume all manners of wickedly abstract twisting 
shapes… until finally the cat runs out of gas and resolves itself and Lenz’s issues into one 
nightly shape” (Wallace, IJ 542). Relevant here particularly is the notion of the clawed bags’ 
shifting and “abstract” shapes, perhaps a stand-in for Lenz’s nebulous feelings of unease, 
becoming “resolve[d]” only when collapsing into a fixed pinpoint of death. Lenz’s alternate 
mode of killing the cats, “swing[ing] a twisting ten-kilo burden hard against a pole and go[ing]: 
‘There,’” reinforces this notion of condensing resolution into a single act and focal point mixed 
with the abreactive properties of his keyword, “There” (Wallace, IJ 544). This feeling of 




normalized, and Lenz, an addict at heart, must escalate again to get the same high (Wallace, IJ 
541). His killing of dogs with a “Browning X444 Serrated” knife, slitting throats from behind 
(Wallace, IJ 545-6), is what inevitably leads him into the confrontation with the terrorist “Nucks 
[or Canadians]” that test Gately’s epiphanic potential (Wallace, IJ 610), yet it is relevant to 
notice Lenz’s craven compulsion, if not to consume drugs, then to feel “resolution” through 
violence. His “catharsis of resolving” is marked by his choice, in a perverted Jamesian fashion, 
to resolve himself by means of pain or sadism. 
 Lenz’s cathartic expunging is important in that it sets the stakes for what Wallace means 
to outline in his fantasy concept of “catharsis of resolving.” One can, as Lenz does, relieve 
oneself in a primal loosing of psychic pressures, or choose a loftier religious or altruistic 
principle through which to achieve consolidation and ameliorate sickness. “Sickness” is 
explicitly aligned with darker compulsions and fear, much as Lenz realizes in reading a recovery 
book at Ennet House (the halfway house that much of IJ is set in) that “the more basically 
Powerless an individual feels, the more the likelihood for the propensity for violent acting-out” 
(Wallace, IJ 546). The struggle becomes a greater one against one’s primal spiritual “sickness,” 
and intention, rather than the more empirical and Machiavellian understanding of pragmatism as 
a choice dictated by maximum pleasure. Wallace’s inclusion of this spiritual-afflicting language 
makes his foregrounding of this struggle clear. Such a concept also becomes useful in analyzing 
the twinned tracks of potential epiphany in both Gately and Hal, which, as is again evident from 
Wallace’s drafts, forms part of the elemental core to IJ. 
 




 The concept of concatenating epiphanies and pseudo-epiphanies is highly evident even in 
Wallace’s first total set of handwritten drafts (Wallace, IJ Handwritten Drafts). If we take 
Wallace’s former comment about the precisely calibrated closure of the two main endings 
(Gately at 100% certainty, Hal at 50%—Orin’s near-totally uncertain), we see this convergence 
accelerating, with Gately’s at a higher degree of salience, toward the end of the novel. As Pietsch 
wrote to Wallace by means of self-clarification, “there are two centers to the story, Hal and 
Gately, which seem to work like two poles of a magnet, with the bottom-hitting scene of each at 
opposite ends of the novel, moving sort of backward from Hal’s bottom and forward to Gately’s” 
(Pietsch, Letter). The structure of one “pole” and its preceding anticipations, containing Gately 
and Hal’s initial pseudo-epiphanic moments as well as Gately’s final flashback, were present 
even in the earliest complete set of handwritten drafts (Wallace IJ Handwritten Drafts). The last 
loop-completion of Hal’s finalizing “pole,” continuing the resonances left open with Gately’s, 
was added with the opening section appended in early 1994, prompting Wallace to affix the final 
“Artaud-ish blackout-type ending” replete with “tide…out” line to cement the “aclimactic” 
structure (Max 190-3). Considering this total scheme, anticipated skeletally in Wallace’s earliest 
total outline, the psychological reverberations of these polarized bottoms pulling across the final 
absent chasm require further investigations into Wallace’s nuanced articulations of key moments 
limning empathy and choice.  
 Recall the dubiousness of the “sick soul’s” transformation upon hitting bottom as 
evidenced by Lenz. Lenz’s own illness is tied to Gately beyond their shared addiction. Lenz also, 
as a perverse sacrificial lamb, initiates the means by which Gately can fulfill his Christ-like 
fantasy of self-sacrifice by incurring the wrath of separatist Canadians. As Wallace adds in a 




fantasies of saving somebody from harm, some innocent party, and getting killed in the process 
and getting eulogized at great length in bold-faced Globe print” (Wallace, IJ 611).82 Likewise, 
where Gately is shot, Wallace adds a section by the published version describing Gately’s 
conception of his own (sober) murder as a publically lauding news headline: “SHOT IN 
SOBRIETY in bold headline caps goes across his mind’s eye” (Wallace, IJ 613). While Lenz is 
pronounced in his selfishness, and dedicated in his choice of violence as a means of “issue-
resolution,” Gately’s fantasies about self-sacrifice are lodged in an indeterminate position 
between potential selflessness and a more primal drive for Lenz-like “resolving” violence or ego-
gratification. However, in the end, an animalistic, deterministic drive overrides any 
individualistic, Jamesian empathetic choice, as becomes highlighted by Wallace’s inclusion of 
unstoppable cosmic machinations seemingly forcing Gately’s hand and the pleasure Gately 
attains from the violent exercise. This then becomes Gately’s moment of “false” epiphany, much 
as it masks a deeper baseness in the clothes of insight, like the boy at the end of “Araby,” whose 
realization of “vanity” vacillates uncertainly between cosmic insight and childish self-pity 
(Bowen 107). 
 The ambiguity of the potential epiphany is largely structured around empathy, the 
dubiousness of which Gately marks in his craven desire to be seen as martyr-like in the public 
forum of the Globe. In opposition to this complicated affinity, while also granting greater 
philosophical nuance, is a near-irreversible sense of impulsive action that, when set into action, 
obviates choice and finer emotional identification. Deterministic description is integrated in later 
drafts, with empathy seeming the result of a more overriding force shunting Gately into his 
                                                
82 Where appropriate, intermediary additions are represented by their final, polished form from 
the published text, as these represent the fullest articulations of the included thought. As 




course of action, as shown in the following added passage: “Everything now slightly slows 
down; at the sight of an Item held on his residents there’s almost a kind of mechanistic click as 
Gately’s mind shifts into a different kind of drive” (Wallace, IJ 608). Further, the loss of fine 
distinctions between thought processes and the rising of innate habit is enhanced by Wallace’s 
addition of Gately’s almost robotic assessment of the situation: “All this appraisal’s taking only 
seconds; it only takes time to list it” (Wallace, IJ 609). The narrator also notes that actions seem 
predestined, which Wallace adds through the phrase “it’s not so much that things slow as break 
into frames,” creating a forwardly projected visual storyboard for the choreographed beating 
Gately is about to enact (Wallace, IJ 608). This beating is so seamless and Matrix-like it entails 
one Canadian getting his skull crushed “with a sort of liquid crunch” and another flattened like a 
“cockroach” through Gately’s balletic fighting grace—the plan orchestrated for maximum 
effectiveness due to his being outnumbered (Wallace, IJ 614-5). He realizes he should “hit his 
knees right here on the headlit blacktop and ask for guidance on this from a Higher Power,” yet, 
importantly, defers to his personal (perhaps flawed) judgment and “stop[s] thinking in any sort of 
spiritual terms at all”—Wallace emphasizes this latter point by adding that he “forgets to pray” 
(Wallace, IJ 612-3). Importantly, Gately is aligned with Lenz in a symbol dubiously either of 
protector or fellow outcast: “He stands there, Lenz chattering in his shadow” (Wallace, IJ 612). 
The alliance with Lenz further posits a secular religion relating to the religion of revenge, or 
violent, cathartic release. Indeed, this spiritualism of the damaged flesh is suggested by the new 
passage, “his subdural hardware clicks deeper into a worn familiar long-past track… Gately’s 
just one part of something bigger he can’t control” (Wallace, IJ 612)—a sentiment much 
amplified from an original declaration that “the situation becomes routine” (Wallace, IJ 




automated, almost cosmically set “track,” isn’t understood as the relapse of will so warned 
against in AA (the question of will and intent becoming paramount in his later decision to resist 
narcotics). More uncertainly, it represents a shift, a transition into a channel sought by his “sick 
soul” for unification through an available and makeshift mode of simple catharsis.  
 The indulgence and joy of such a cathartic release are at odds with the clinical and pained 
nature of Gately’s choice at the end of the novel to accept or deny Demerol. The notion of a 
perverted “pleasure” in the fight sequence marks the surrendering of will by giving over to his 
age-old groove of proficiently executed violence. Indeed, Wallace incorporates the language of 
the “divided” self in his added notion that “Gately has just division enough to almost wish he 
didn’t feel such a glow of familiar warmth” (Wallace, IJ 612, italics mine) in his violent 
enactment (expanded from the simple “wishes” [Wallace IJ Handwritten Drafts]). In other 
words, he is compromised by pleasure. Similarly, Wallace incorporates Gately’s guilt over this 
potentially enjoyable violence, adding a passage describing how “Gately stands quietly, wishing 
he felt different about potential trouble, less almost jolly” (Wallace, IJ 611). Once giving over to 
impulse, however, Wallace describes Gately’s smile as “broad but impersonal,” positing his joy 
as devolving him into a non-individuated, “impersonal” id (Wallace, IJ 613). Additions also 
delineate Gately’s long-submerged pleasure in revisiting and releasing his repressed nature. A 
section previously stating, “Gately is all business. He exudes a kind of weary expertise” 
(Wallace, IJ Handwritten Drafts), becomes “He’s projected a sort of white-collar attitude of 
cheery competence and sangfroid” (Wallace, IJ 614), downtrodden obligation becoming 
sprightly expertise. With the relating of violence to “white-collar” work, Wallace indicates 
Gately’s automated readiness and competence in his task, an unthinking kind of mental clocking-




 As a twinned example of epiphany highlighting the component of choice, Gately’s heroic 
struggle to deny Demerol for his wounds reveals a marked difference to the automated glee of 
the Canadian battle sequence. It is imperative to note that Gately’s two choices—to save his 
partner Gene Fackelmann in his hallucinated flashback, and to deny Demerol in his physical 
state—are essentially lapsed into one merged, hallucinogenic sequence at the novel’s end. His 
remembrance in the flashback of being administered a hit of “pharm[aceutical]-grade Sunshine 
[or heroin-like opiate]” by Fackelman’s tormentors and awakening almost immediately and 
inexplicably on a “freezing” beach indicate the mixed, drug-infused imagery of rebirth, raising 
questions as to what psychic or physical stimulus is prompting these visions (Wallace, IJ 979, 
981). (The physical-dream connection is solidified by Gately’s pained transference to a gurney—
“he felt an upward movement deep inside that was so personal and horrible he woke up” 
[Wallace, IJ 974]—that triggers his final bottom sequence). In the text, the answer to whether 
Gately is able to save Fackelmann is given explicitly: a resounding “no,” as Gately watches 
Fackelmann have his eyes stitched open as he lapses into a waking-coma-like trance. Yet, the 
answer to the Demerol question is suggestively withheld. Further, this latter question is also 
hinged essentially on intent; it has less to do with whether the physical drug has been 
administered, but more of whether it would be considered a “relapse” “according to [his] heart” 
(Wallace, IJ 819). Critics have pondered this relapse question, parsing the dream-imagery given 
at the close of the novel as Gately strives to deny drugs. Does the initiation of the final sequence 
and climactic blackout reveal Gately’s relapse to an inner, addictive sickness and signal a 
euphoric flood of Demerol? Or is his increasingly hallucinogenic delusion merely caused by his 
acute, unmedicated pain and an unfulfilled desire for substances? 83  Evidenced by Wallace’s 
                                                




annotations, this “did he or didn’t he” question becomes essentially null. In an intermediary 
typescript, next to a description of Gately desiring Demerol—“Memories of good old Demerol 
rose up, clamoring to be Entertained” (890)—Wallace writes “Processing of Demerol in body?” 
(Wallace, IJ Typescript Draft Fragments), indicating that a Demerol previously injected is now 
becoming acutely perceivable,84 explaining the elaborate moral exercises he passes through to 
test and tease his true intention for relief or addictive fulfillment (or at least this is an endorsed 
and hence highly convincing “strong” hypothesis). Indeed, the annotation arrives shortly after a 
hallucinated interaction (caused by “either fever or [addictive] Disease”) with an imagined 
Pakistani doctor who delivers an almost point-by-point argument for painkillers’ good-faith 
merit (the doctor himself is even an understanding, “abstain[ing]” “Moslem”) while Gately’s 
mouth floods with spittle in reaction to the memory of the “sick-sweet antiseptic taste” that 
accompanies an “injection of Demerol” (foreshadowed by an earlier suppressed impression of 
what “Demerol’s warm rush of utter well-being felt like”); this scene then prefaces Gately’s 
recollection of first falling in love with Demerol (Wallace, IJ 890, 887, 840, 891). All these 
instances seem to indicate that the drug in his bloodstream is calling up these Demerol-specific 
reflections. Foreclosing the question of “what if?”, Wallace’s annotational clarification gives us 
further reason to align the physiological changes Gately is undergoing in the hospital to broader 
                                                                                                                                                       
because of delirium brought on by his intense pain; it is also possible that he ‘reexperiences’ this 
episode because he has been given the painkillers after all” (177-8). Further, Boswell outlines the 
additionally Janus-faced possibilities suggested by the final, potentially lethal dose of Sunshine 
as either the “kill[ing] off [of] his addictive self” in the dream or the “present-tense” injection 
with Demerol (which Boswell accidentally lists as “Dilaudid”—Fackelmann’s drug of choice) 
(178).  
84 The original point of entry is perhaps the “I.V.-Demerol” he was offered “immediately on 
admission to the E.R.,” or the general Demerol proposed “twice” after by “shift-Drs.” (Wallace, 
IJ 814), though with the hallucinogenic nature of Gately’s hospital recollections, discerning such 





questions of psychological intent, and the subconscious self Gately is battling in the hospital 
room. Further, such psychological warring with self also draws from a similar dream-imagery 
representing intent set against more immovable cosmic forces. 
 Indeed, I wish to posit, at Gately’s final bottom, the replacement of choice with intent as 
a soul truly sick might be prohibited from any logical consideration of choice. Given the 
likelihood of his consumption of Demerol, with or without his consent, one should then turn to 
the Christ-complex resuscitated in his final interaction with Fackelmann. The Demerol and 
Fackelmann are merged together in the final cryptic yet lyrical line that closes the novel: “And 
when he came back to, he was flat on his back on the beach in the freezing sand, and it was 
raining out of a low sky, and the tide was way out” (Wallace, IJ 981), either indicating a rebirth, 
a lonely detachment into isolation,  or a number of cryptic possibilities which suggests Joyce-like 
critical pondering for years to come. Yet, this final image, of a freezing beach inundated with 
cold rain, is reminiscent of similar imagery present earlier in Gately’s dreams, one deleted from 
later drafts, exploring the regenerative yet sometimes higher-willed potential of water and tidal 
movement.85 
 Tides and oceanic shift often represent for Gately inevitable forces against which he must 
struggle. Earlier in the published version, during one of Gately’s several hospital fever dreams, 
he imagines a “dark writhing storm,” during which he is trapped in a crib though uncertainly an 
adult or child, calling for his mother who is being “beaten….by a man with a shepherd’s crook in 
                                                
85 Boswell notes that in any case, the final line signals a “rebirth,” with the “ocean as…womb,” 
indicating “Gately either at the remembered beginning of his sobriety, or at the beginning of his 
recovery from his wounds” (178-9). Carlisle sees this ending somewhat more pessimistically, as 
from the “bottom” itself, “his recovery is delayed… He will soon enter prison, and when he gets 
out he will go back to drugs and burglary, only getting clean… over six years later” (Elegant 
471). Further, his waking perception that the “tide was way out” indicates that he is “still caged,” 





the kitchen” [likely his mother’s Military Police partner] (Wallace, IJ 816)—an image reflecting 
a smiley-faced but vengeful and crook-wielding God in an earlier, AA-specific dream (Wallace, 
IJ 358-359) and representing unstoppable dark forces. Gately then breaks free to cut himself 
through a beach’s “crazed breakers” and “submerg[e] himself” in “deep warm water” from 
which he impotently “trie[s] to call for her to come into the deep water with him, but even he 
couldn’t hear his calls against the scream of the storm” (Wallace, IJ 816). While Gately’s 
primary impulse is to save himself by fleeing into the ocean’s waves, the “deep warm water” he 
submerges himself in is then a place from which he attempts to still call for his mother; in his 
physical restriction, his empathy is highlighted. Another dream, deleted by the published version, 
taps into similar imagery: Gately is mysteriously in the company of two “brothers,” “one’s stand-
up and one’s a fucking moron,” with the “stand-up” brother magically transporting the three 
between disparate, unattached lakes. Gately recalls to Ennet House members, “I tell the strong 
brother it must have almost fucking killed him to transform all three of us from lake to lake like 
that,” and asks “how the fuck’d he do it;” the guy “looks down in this hypnotizing fashion” and 
says how “he just had to do it” (Wallace, IJ Typescript Draft, With Corrections). While 
seemingly cryptic, here we see again a Christ-like sacrifice of personal wellness for duty, the 
imagery of water presenting against primal forces of ebb and flow while one man attempts a 
seemingly impossible task of sacrifice for others’ sake. Considering these respective dreams 
from Gately’s unconscious, one sees the apparent ambiguity of the final sentence slightly more 
clearly. In the image of Gately quite literally washed up, post-swim, we see his failure to battle 
oceanic forces in his attempted empathetic act. Similarly, this reiteration of heart-felt intent 




otherwise avoid his Sunshine-enabled bottom that couples with and abets his failure to aid his 
partner. 
 The final bottom sequence is carefully calibrated to test notions of empathy and intention 
amongst a paralyzed ability to function. From the moment when Bobby C, the vengeful 
henchman of Whitey Sorkin, a bookie Fackelmann has scammed, becomes visible in the window 
of a furniture-less luxury apartment in which Gately and Fackelmann lie incapacitated in their 
own filth, operations are performed on Gately as to render him fully impotent in all physical 
capacities (much like the prohibitive ocean tides of his dream states). He is “brodied,” or struck 
in the testicles, by Bobby C. upon the moment of arrival, which, as Gately reflects, is “S.O.P. to 
keep your man down” (Wallace, IJ 975-7). Gately attempts twice, futilely, to aid Fackelmann, or 
otherwise extricate him from the situation. In Bobby C’s absence, following Gately’s groin-shot, 
he “urged Fackelmann to go for the window as rickety-tick as he could” (Wallace, IJ 975). He 
then solicits “C quietly if he and Fackelmann couldn’t get cleaned up real quick and they could 
all go see Sorkin together and Whitey and Gene [Fackelmann] could reason together and work 
out an accord” (Wallace, IJ 978). Yet, Gately is unable to actually act, paralyzed by the drug 
binge that has preceded this sequence (where he was also unable to “go to Fackelmann’s side 
during [a] seizure, to help and just be there” [Wallace, IJ 937]). Earlier in the novel, Gately 
reflected on whether “God is really the cruel and vengeful figurant Boston AA swears up and 
down He isn’t, and He gets you straight just so you can feel all the more keenly every bevel and 
edge of the special punishments He’s got lined up for you” (Wallace, IJ 895). As if in physical 
mimesis of this concept of God sharpening one’s senses only to enact a more “keenly” felt trial, 
and reiterating Gately’s immobility, Fackelmann is injected with an “anti-narc[otic]” so that 




of precisely calibrated and agonizingly sensitive testing. Gately’s impotent fumbling to aid his 
friend, paralyzed by drugs both self and other-administered, still leads to a moment of 
identification that the novel directs. Gately’s final moment, before supposedly waking on the 
beach, is of staring into his own image in a held mirror, a “reflection of his own big square pale 
head” (Wallace, IJ 981). The symbol of reflective recognition marks the unification of Gately’s 
“divided self” by empathy and identification, however futile, with his fellow-addict Fackelmann. 
Such a unification along principles of identification spreads across the gap of the novel’s end, 
much as Finnegans Wake ends on a notion of river-emptying-into-sea and the beginning of a 
regenerative river cycle, and swings one satellite-like back to the beginning, much as Gately will 
inevitably then begin his recovery shortly thereafter. The whole novel is then, in Jamesian terms, 
a divided self struggling for reunification across the final break.86 
 Progressing along a similar axis of sharply felt testing, and another test case for 
Wallace’s evolving thought across successive renditions, is Hal’s main pseudo-epiphanic panic 
at the conceivably endless repetitions his current lifestyle will be comprised of—a 
comprehension potentially brought about by sobriety. Part of this panic is an acting out of 
Wallace’s conception of the novel extending narrative lines beyond the edge of the novel’s right 
frame, as well as the determinism Gately felt in his violent defense—chiefly that Hal projects, 
lucidly, into his own future, detailing the amount of “food [he] was going to have to consume 
over the rest of [his] life,” the “excrement [he’]d produce,” and so on (Wallace, IJ 897). In an 
inverse turn of phrase linking Hal to Gately, he sees life speeding up and coming “at too many 
frames per second” (Wallace, IJ 896)—a phrase added later by Wallace, echoing and inverting 
                                                
86 Carlisle interprets this ending, and mirror symbol, more negatively: “Gately’s final look into 
the mirror was one of self-absorption rather than one of self-reflection. He ‘wrecks’ instead of 
stopping, like the drivers duped by the mirrors of the Canadian terrorists [who infamously spread 




Gately’s conception of “things” grinding so slow as to “break into frames,” with Hal instead 
seeing into his infinitely repetitive future (Wallace, IJ 608). Hal is made mentally and physically 
aware of the taxing accumulation of total actions required by his mechanic existence, the cosmic 
total of his life of single-minded athleticism—the acute perception of this physical determinism 
paralyzing. His lucidity is enforced by the fact that this same sequence gives birth to his 
revelation that his mother Avril has been cheating on James Incandenza for ages with “graduate 
students, grammatical colleagues, Japanese fight-choreographers,” and so on (Wallace, IJ 957). 
He also sees it as a “black miracle” that “people could actually care deeply about a subject or 
pursuit, and could go on caring this way for years on end” (Wallace, IJ 900). He has become 
densely anchored, all-body, “impossible to knock down” (Wallace, IJ 902). Yet, Wallace’s 
earlier drafts reveal even this awareness of bodily repetition and acknowledgement of a willed, 
conscious intent required to believe in a “subject or pursuit,” was only pronounced in later 
versions. 
 Indeed, in Wallace’s earlier renditions, this sense of acutely perceived body panic was 
eclipsed and explained under a running thread of Hal’s “jamais vu,”87 the inverse of “déjà vu,” 
which Hal was initially struck by in lieu of simple panic. Explained in clinical, psychological 
terms in an intermediary typescript, jamais vu is a “comparatively mild temporal-lobe thing 
achieved through the ritualistic repetition of an action or experience until you all of a sudden get 
the uncannily glittered feeling that you’ve never done or experienced this actually overfamiliar 
thing ever before in your life” (Wallace, IJ Typescript Draft (Continued)). The newness of reality 
                                                
87 In earlier drafts, this is referred to as “jeda-vu” (likely an anagrammatic rearrangement of the 
more familiar déjà vu). Moore notes “jeda-vu,” and the later integrated “jamais vu,” going on to 
explain that “Jamais is French for ‘never,’” hence explaining “jamais vu” as a phenomenon that 
makes a familiar scenario seem unfamiliar—“never seen”—rather than an unfamiliar scenario 




that Hal experiences in brutal sobriety in the published version was before, essentially, a delusion 
of the brain, or explainable psychological sensation. Wallace wrote to Pietsch, who 
recommended cutting the entire jamais vu thread: “you’re right: it’s unclear and too heavy to be 
a good toss-off or herring” (Wallace, Letter—Feb 19). The result of excising jamais vu is that 
Hal becomes painfully aware of his problems (namely, how or whether to continue to abstain 
from marijuana, the withdrawal from which may potentially compromise his performance at the 
career-defining WhataBurger tournament), as if he, like Fackelmann, had been injected with the 
“anti-narc” (Wallace, IJ 784-980). In a new line by the published version, Wallace makes 
evident how Hal must now contend with a heightened consciousness previously potentially 
crippling, but manageable, on the court: “Lyle’s counsel had been to turn the perception and 
attention on the fear itself, but he’d shown us how to do this only on-court” (Wallace, IJ 896). 
Further, the deletion of “jamais vu” also acts to center Hal within the spectrum of his own 
available choices, rather than within the twin poles of addiction and painful sobriety—his 
“horizontal” denseness is the point from which his potential empathy might arise (902). 
 The glaring white space at the end of the novel, interrupting our final view of Hal in the 
first chapter, is made all the more poignant by its supposed contents of a resolution for Hal, his 
epiphany held beyond the margin—an annular ring apart—rather than half-eclipsed on the 
novel’s frame like Gately. What occurs between Gately’s bottom and the erratically acting, 
potentially lobotomized, yet potentially awakened Hal that opens the novel is cast largely in 
Wallace scholarship as an issue of plot—for instance, plot-wise, whether the AFR obtains the 
deadly cartridge, whether a “Continental Emergency” has arisen (Wallace, IJ 934), what has 
happened at E.T.A. during the fundraising gala, and so on. Likewise, considerations over Hal 




whether he has been forced to watch Infinite Jest, whether he has been dosed with the 
hallucinogenic DMZ, or is perhaps experiencing acute withdrawal (Burn, DFW’s IJ 44).88 But, as 
the novel just as singularly hinges on whether Hal is eventually able to “reverse thrust” out of 
himself, as was the cartridge’s original intent (Wallace, IJ 839), it seems relevant to remark on 
the potential epiphanic changes that have likewise occurred off the page on an emotional, 
subjective level. Further, a critical view that the novel refuses to resolve itself (Boswell) is a 
perspective perhaps wrought from fixation on explicitly plot elements, rather than character-
transformative components elemental also to situating Wallace within post-postmodernism. My 
interest, rather than conclusively resolving these issues (Hal is only expected to offer 50% 
resolution, in Wallace’s equation), is in the intuitional, anti-physical space beyond the page. Just 
as Wallace perhaps wills us to look beyond mere tallying plot-hypothesizing, I wish to focus on 
how Hal is forced to move beyond body-centered consciousness into an affective and sensory 
space contingent on empathetic identification and emotional intuition. 
 The qualities of empathy learned, by whatever process, and manifest in Hal at the novel’s 
opening are of central importance and little discussed.89 The balance of Hal’s awakened feeling, 
evident in his statements like “I am in here” and “I’m not a machine. I feel and believe” 
                                                
88 Creative mixtures of these theories abound. One has Hal organically synthesizing DMZ as a 
result of acute marijuana withdrawal, earlier exposure to mold, and a concentrated intake of 
sugar on Interdependence Day (Schmidt). Another has Hal as the only person in the U.S. who 
hasn’t been exposed to a “mass distribution” of the Infinite Jest cartridge, and, as the “one person 
who resisted the temptation to watch it or who could transcend its effects,” is viewed as “some 
kind of freak” (Hager). 
89 Burn floats a possible, more delicate and contrarian perspective, caviling with assumptions 
that Hal has in fact changed, or evidences a “strangeness entirely as a result of some cataclysmic 
event that took place in the novel’s missing year,” as Hal himself described the easiness of 




(Wallace, IJ 3,12), with his seemingly paralyzed or possessed exterior, has been marked,90 yet 
there has been little explanation of this undistinguished “feel[ing].” If one marks Hal’s relation to 
those around him, one sees an affective affinity; an empathy recalling Gately’s own in trying, in 
his own body-locked fashion, to aid Fackelmann. The laughable headmaster C.T., a constant butt 
of jokes and poor-spirited imitations to the E.T.A. students, is here to Hal “Uncle Charles” 
(Wallace, IJ 3), the familiar sobriquet indicating Hal’s new sense of acceptance for his family 
members that, despite their close proximity to him, Hal never truly considered before.91 
Likewise, he recognizes how “the same Aubrey deLint I’d dismissed for years as a 2-D martinet 
knelt gurneyside to squeeze my restrained hand and say ‘Just hang in there, Buckaroo’” 
(Wallace, IJ 15). Rather than the cartoon Hal had painted, empathy transfuses deLint into an 
almost paternal figure. In his trailing thoughts of other parties from his past, he likewise touches 
on an explicitly defined epiphany falsely produced for his “hypophalangial Grief-Therapist” 
(Wallace, IJ 16, 252-6), now realized for its shallowness and contrivance. Most compelling, 
however, is the critically ignored inclusion of Hal’s true opponent: not the catatonically efficient 
John Wayne, whom Hal began to resemble toward the end of the novel and who has since been 
mysteriously dispatched, but the blind tennis player Dymphna, who is described somewhat 
unrealistically (given his later tennis mastery) at one point to have “several eyes in various stages 
                                                
90 For instance, Elizabeth Freudenthal notes that Hal is in a “pseudoautistic state,” “paralyzed by 
a radical interiority, likely catalyzed by his ingestion of the designer drug DMZ” (200-3), while 
Burn describes Hal as a “hermetic husk of a self that ‘contains’ this character who is unable to 
express his internal thoughts externally” (46). Hager offers a useful addendum to Hal’s state and 
locked-in lucidity of mind, remarking that, “because Hal is narrating the novel at this point… his 
mental faculties appear, to readers, intact.” 
91 See, for instance, the description that “for somebody who not only lives on the same 
institutional grounds as his family but also has his training and education and pretty much his 
whole overall raison-d’être directly overseen by relatives, Hal devotes an unusually small part of 





of evolutionary development” and skull like a “Chesapeake crabshell” (Wallace, IJ 518).92 The 
player is mentioned earlier by a blindfolded Idris Arslanian attempting to cull a similar intuitive 
playing style that threatens to make even John Wayne’s mechanically seamless form seem 
lifeless—Dymphna sees beyond the physical, into a realm of affective coordination. (Indeed, in a 
deleted interview with Dymphna’s trainer, the trainer places his preferred regimen in stark 
contrast to “tennis factories” such as E.T.A. that “build” players like “men build redwood 
decks”93 [Wallace, IJ ‘First Two Sections’ – Wallace Papers].) Dymphna judges “the necessary 
spot of landing by the intensity of the sound of the ball against the opponent player’s string” and 
“float[s] by magic to the appropriate spot,” rather than those still “hobbled by sight” (Wallace, IJ 
568). Beyond other earlier, more likely opponents, Dymphna is set as Hal’s other, his match in 
Hal’s fluid, wraith-like style; Hal claims, “I know he is mine” (Wallace, IJ 17).94 Dymphna is 
likewise a tragic product of the mass toxicity of the Great Concavity, with a softened skull 
leading to his present blindness, reiterating a Mario-like emotional purity resulting from past 
trauma. This is where Hal stands in his final incarnation: a damaged, potentially difficult and 
asocial figure open to an empathic understanding, even if he cannot act. Like Dymphna, he has 
forsaken his external sensory organs and physical proficiency to look inward. Regardless of his 
                                                
92 Burn brings attention to inconsistencies in Wallace’s rendering of Dymphna, such as his age 
that is reported as both “sixteen” and “nine,” his uncertain blindness, and his “ambiguous” roots 
(62). It also seems unlikely that Wallace’s further description of the damaged player as requiring 
“on-court use of only one hand because the other had to pull around beside him a kind of rolling 
IV-stand appliance with a halo-shaped metal brace welded to it at head-height, to encircle and 
support his head” (Wallace, IJ 518) could be possible, given Dymphna’s sweeping victories at 
the WhataBurger; perhaps this debilitating description is just exaggeration on Hal’s part. 
93 The line bears resemblance to Wallace’s description in the final version of James Incandenza’s 
father “build[ing]” James Incandenza as “a promising junior athlete the way other fathers might 
restore vintage autos or build ships inside bottles, or like refinish chairs, etc” (Wallace, IJ 63). 
94 Burn, in tracking the Catholic saint who shares Dymphna’s name and the saint’s alliance with 
those suffering from “unhappiness, loss of parents, [and] mental disorders,” claims the blind 




physical entombment, his intention is open, and thus represents a deeper alignment with self not 
requiring physical modification or excellence. 
 Perhaps then, one might say Wallace injects the body of the novel as a whole with the 
anhedonic stillness of Hal’s frozen husk at the book’s opening. His ultimate mind is unknowable; 
we only know he is “alive,” he feels. Likewise, we are unsure (or rather, unsure of the 
consequences) of Gately’s Demerol drip; does it signify a return to the origin of illness, or the 
enlightened aftermath of rock bottom, and the realization and hence encapsulation of such? The 
minds and interiority of such decisions are hidden from us, such as to greater foreground the 
ineffable quality of empathy that Wallace hopes to suffuse these seemingly religious choices 
beyond the sheer empirical benefit of pragmatic choice. These piercing bouts of interiority, for 
better or ill, are also central to Wallace’s rendition of newly “realist” archetypes ensconced with 
more postmodern-leaning methods. Indeed, epiphanic transformation in IJ has itself been made 
subject to a postmodern relativity. As such, the novel’s structure malleably moves and mimes 
this mentality; the last margin, where the lines of character resolution connect, are likewise cast 
into irresolvable oblivion, only to just as routinely return to the novel’s beginning. The 
temptation to exteriorize pain, to expunge one’s “impotent rage and powerless fear” (Wallace, IJ 
541), is redirected into an alternate form of self-consolidation. Yet this hidden option and its 
exact machinations, like the ultimate unearthing of the Infinite Jest cartridge, are unknowable in 
their sublimity. Wallace had reached a secular epiphany, but fittingly, in the moment the book 









Old Passion Clothed in New Fire: Textual Relationality in Brief Interviews with Hideous 
Men 
Introduction: The Well-Made Box 
 Critics were hesitant to agree with Wallace’s comments on Brief Interviews with Hideous 
Men95 (1999) as having “a fair amount to do with sex” and manifesting an “interest… in 
misogyny” (Wallace, Silverblatt “Hideous”).96 Or rather, they interpreted the book’s function too 
literally as articulating the single-minded fetishisms of men deformed by desire who seek women 
as conduits for their self-serving schemes of emotional narcissism.97 A more accurate and 
theoretical interpretation of this perceived sexual calculation was raised by a long-insightful 
reader of Wallace, Michael Silverblatt, who noted in an interview that the dialogues in the book 
were both “accurate description[s] of a kind of talk and an abstraction of that kind of talk” 
(Wallace, Silverblatt “Hideous”). That is, they presented a back-and-forth tête-à-tête of sexual 
chess-playing that is closer in its metaphysical rigor to philosophical argument (Boswell calls the 
book’s method “dialectical” [182]) than the pop incapability woes of Men Are from Mars, 
Women Are from Venus (of which Wallace was still a fan) (Wallace, Silverblatt “Hideous”). 
Indeed, a deeper understanding of BI requires perceiving sexual desire as a cipher rather than 
                                                
 
95 Referred to hereafter as BI. 
96 One particular review by Michiko Kakutani—which caused Wallace such pain that he could 
supposedly recall lines from memory (Max 254-5)—claimed “it is unclear just what point Mr. 
Wallace wants to make with these boring, repetitious and frequently repellant profiles… his men 
are so uniformly misogynists, his women so uniformly victims that the reader who didn't know 
better might easily surmise that an angry radical feminist had penned them as part of an 
ideological screed.” 
97 See, for example, A.O. Scott’s comment that: “The interviews hold up to hilarious, disturbing 
scrutiny the endlessly inventive duplicity that animates men’s single-minded pursuit of sex.” 
Boswell, with a more nuanced appreciation for the philosophical implications of BI, notes that 
“sex becomes for Wallace’s ‘hideous’ men (and women) another means by which they can 





mimetic imprint used to investigate larger affective and rhetorical problems in readerly 
connection.  
 This notion of sexuality as gamesmanship is expressed most nakedly in “Octet,” a series 
of “interrogation[s]” (Wallace, “Octet” 145, italics Wallace’s), wherein Wallace’s plea to the 
reader is abject enough to resemble “asking somebody over and over on a first date whether they 
like you” (Wallace, “Octet” Typescript), yet necessary to render a sense of “queer” and “urgent 
interhuman sameness” (Wallace, “Octet” 157).98  The means of escape, or a temporary portal 
away from the surface-level exploitation enacted by Wallace’s “hideous” men, arrives in 
moments of affective transcendence facilitated by the elaborate structural schemas meant to 
mirror the Machiavellian tactics of seduction his characters employ—a transcendence that is 
arguably more sexual, or orgasmic, than simple “sincerity” (Kelly) or “belief” (Konstantinou).99 
The mirrors of structural games and refraction toy with, distract, and pull one’s attention away 
from genuine moments of transfiguration. Through “openings” in the text, and the sleight-of-
hand employed in a tempered, fourth-wall-breaking address, Wallace enacts a relationship and 
cooperatively creative endeavor, allowing the reader to steadily replace his authorial 
unassailability before one knows one is being implicated. The calculation and deceptive 
couching of such openings is further revealed by early drafts of “Adult World” and “Octet,” 
newly available for examination. Within this relational model, the “hideous” man is Wallace, 
                                                
98 Wallace’s language in describing the project reiterates this conception: he notes his method of 
authorial interaction as like someone “reaching for something and recoiling at the same time,” 
employing the terminology of a botched romantic overture (Wallace, Silverblatt “Brief”). 
99 Wallace describes in the same Silverblatt interview how the recursions of erotic need and want 
aren’t simply that; the hope was that in the “excruciatingly detailed jot and tittle psychological 
mirrors” “there’s the possibility for great and profound emotional and spiritual and existential 




centered in repeated ploys of direct address while seeking the unveiled body of the reader, in a 
“relationship” that is most accurately described as sexual. 
 Foundational to understanding BI as a game of rhetorical courtship is the alignment 
between postmodern reflexivity and sexual reflexivity. Wallace makes the parallel between 
rhetorical self-awareness in both postmodern fiction and modern courtship explicit in a 2000 
interview, describing how postmodern refraction of viewership is amplified under erotic impulse. 
He claims, “The whole watching/being watched, display/reception of display stuff gets 
complicated and probably creepier when you are in a sexual situation” (Wallace, Schechner 
106). Wallace notes that both author and subject of the “Brief Interviews” story cycles are under 
a multiplicity of gazes and refracted self-consciousness; this anxiety becomes distilled in 
“hideous” characters, revealing their dark philosophical systems involving women (that rape may 
have cosmic benefits, that deformities may be a sexual asset) often as a means of seducing an 
absent interviewer that is likely disgusted by their behavior, yet courted nonetheless through a 
promulgation and seeming awareness of it. Particularly emblematic is the narrator of “Brief 
Interview #20” referred to as the “Granola Cruncher” episode, a likely Yale graduate (based on 
the narrator’s location and demeanor, as noted by Zadie Smith) who describes how his formerly 
jaded secular-humanist perspective was shifted by the story of so-called New Ager he beds at a 
music festival, who describes avoiding homicidal rape through an acutely projected, empathetic 
“focus” on her rapist (Wallace, “B.I. #20” 295-316). The Yalie ends his supposed tale of 
personal transformation with a direct address to the interviewer, who has been rhetorically and 
chemically courted throughout—“A refill? It’s refill time, yes?”–and yet whose disinterest is 
now apparent: “I stand here naked before you. Judge me, you chilly cunt” (Wallace, “B.I. #20” 




potential predator, yet hides this intent behind the manufactured vulnerability (which still may be 
true) of transformation by the New Ager’s purity, however, upon further awareness of this ploy’s 
failure, finally lapses into a direct confrontation—a progression that neatly reflects in many ways 
Wallace’s own method. This refraction is part of what Boswell describes as a “sustained theme 
of the ‘interview’ and of interrogation in general,” in which characters attempt to elude being 
pinned down and, much like a knowing and aloof postmodern novelist, become 
“metafictionalists of their own feelings” (182-4). In response to the particularly self-involved 
story “Octet,” Adam Kelly notes a similar smoke screen of paradoxical vulnerability and 
canniness in Wallace’s technique reminiscent of his hideous men: the direct address in particular 
is a creator’s “weak appeal to the reader to look beyond the text’s self-conscious pre-empting of 
its own reception” (“New Sincerity" 144). Particularly, if one isolates and enlarges this capacity 
of wishing—through elaborate denials, rebuffs, and solicitations—to draw closer to the reader, 
one sees Wallace’s interest in sexuality, and its mercantilist partner in pornography, as disguised 
blueprints for fictional principles. 
 This rhetoric-as-sexuality schema is most evident in Wallace’s early professional 
preoccupation with pornography. Tellingly, at one point he intended to write a novel about 
pornography, the research for which later became cannibalized for an essay on the Adult Video 
News (AVN) Awards called “Big Red Son” (Max 123-5, 128; “Big” 4). To explain Wallace’s 
interest in pornography, Wallace’s biographer D.T. Max relates pornography’s manufactured 
intimacy as similar to that of advertising (an old interest of Wallace’s since his “E Unibus” essay 
days), wherein “received image” replaces “sacral mystery,” speaking also to Wallace’s interest in 
“how media changed the reality it was meant only to record” (Max 123-4). Mediation would then 




writing. Indeed, the constantly invoked moniker of New Sincerity writing—born mostly out of 
Wallace’s declaration for “single-entendre principles” in “E Unibus” (delivered quite early in his 
career) (81)—might be another means of phrasing a “New Intimacy,” given rhetorical veil in a 
“New Pornography” of post-postmodern fiction. Like porn’s elaborate codes and conventions—
“why the lesbian love scene, the masturbation scene?” Wallace queried to his agent, Bonnie 
Nadell (Max 124)—Wallace’s method is to deliberately avoid, but so outline by its absence, a 
central “emotion” and economy of desirous tension, or otherwise the physical intimacy glazed 
over by the mechanics of presentation, whether pornographic or literary. In “Big Red Son,” 
Wallace relates an anecdote told to him by Harold Hecuba, a fellow journalist at the AVN 
Awards, who describes how a local sheriff had returned a cache of stolen pornography to him as 
a cover to relate and inquire on behalf of his long-held fascination with the form. The sheriff’s 
chief obsession, as Wallace relates with great interest, was the potential to view a fragment of 
intimacy within the otherwise hyper-mediated and stilted conventions, “those rare moments in 
orgasm or accidental tenderness when the starlets dropped their stylized ‘fuck-me-I’m-a-nasty-
girl’ sneer and became, suddenly, real people” (“Big Red Son” 16). One might easily say the 
same thing about the rhetorical games and rote operation of high postmodernism and particularly 
the postmodern subset of metafiction. This also explains part of Wallace’s expressed interest in 
“misogyny” as a thematic filter for BI (Wallace, Silverblatt “Brief”): in order to find an 
elemental core of human relational truth, one must use the most exaggerated test case possible. 
Particularly in terms of rendered character subjectivity, Wallace is looking for the glimmer of 
perceived, or imagined, desire in the porn actress’s eye, not a total seismic shift toward “reality.” 
 The use of sexuality as a tangible placeholder for more inaccessible platonic truths is also 




Erotic Communications: Studies in Sex, Sin, and Censorship (1980), has several suggestive and 
informative passages marked and underlined, one intriguingly discussing the glory hole, or hole 
wherein “the ‘customer’—usually at a bordello—sticks his erect prick…[and] on the other side 
of the partition he is manipulated by something to the point of orgasm” present since Roman 
times (243, italics Gordon’s). Sex is first prefaced as holding the crystallizing possibility for 
“reify[ing] an abstraction,” and the glory hole in particular presents the almost alchemical 
process of aligning an acute sensation of pleasure to a mysterious, or unseen source: “first, a 
metaphysic is being reduced to a simple physic… second, an elaborate mysticism is being 
reduced to simple mechanical essentials” (Gordon 243). Further, the notion of the porn actress’s 
fragment of appreciation is housed, for Wallace, within a broader argument about feeling. This 
same dyad is discussed in a passage by Gordon, marked by Wallace, describing the difficulty of 
legislating pornography, much as it offers, and exists in the currency of, an intangible sensation 
that isn’t quite “speech” nor “art.” Wallace underlines the following: “If my collection of porno 
photographs is not protected by the same law that guarantee my rights of self-expression…what 
manner of human communication are we dealing with? An easy answer is ‘feeling,’ pure and 
simple” (Gordon 135, first italics Gordon’s, second italics mine). This mysterious abiding 
element of pornography operating under premises of “feeling,” while ostensibly offering 
anything but, taps into a central mercurial quality of fiction Wallace aspires to enact: how to 
create, in the refracting gazes and artificialities of complex fiction, a genuine fragment of 
transferred sensation? How to reach the other side of fiction facilitated by, but existing above or 
beyond, metafictional games? 
 One answer to this question is “surprise,” achieved by the exaggeration and extrapolation 




career-spanning assessment of Wallace (up to Brief Interviews) that BI “is the one book in 
Wallace’s corpus that, for all its charms, challenges, and singular achievements, does not 
significantly advance its author’s art;” however, he claims the book is still Wallace’ most 
“characteristic” (181-82). Arguably, BI then offers an enlightening microcosm of Wallace’s 
work thus far, exaggerating—as will be shown by the progression from the prior chapter into this 
one—the epiphanic ruptures that were first introduced in Infinite Jest. In an advancement of IJ’s 
technique to vacuum Gately’s final reaction to his “bottom” sequence into the unknown gap after 
the novel’s end, for instance, BI disfigures any such neat climax or anti-climax. 
 Indeed, one must view much of BI’s flirtatiousness as puzzle-like, made so by conscious 
excisions and rearrangements of content. Consider, for instance, the discontinuous “interviews” 
forming the eponymous “story” that weaves through the main text, composed of “four 
pieces…that are themselves divided into nonsequential numbered sections, as though they were 
culled at random from a vast repository of transcripts” (Scott). (Boswell also notes that “though 
each interview is numbered and dated, no particular importance seems to be attached to these 
details” [182].) Or the sequence of stories labeled “Yet Another Example of the Porousness of 
Certain Borders,” of which we are only given, without explanation and seemingly at random, 
numbers XI, VI, and XXIV (Scott). Or of the un-described “interlocutor” of the “Brief 
Interviews” present only as a “journalistic Q” (Wallace, Silverblatt “Brief”), given range of 
expressivity in tonal modulations of this “Q” such as “Q.…” or “Q, Q” (Wallace, BI 91-2). 
Reasons for this conscious rearrangement and scrambling may be found in D.T. Max’s 
biography describing Wallace’s link to Joyce. According to Max, Wallace “had gotten the idea 
of discontinuous interview numbers in Brief Interviews after reading in a biography that Joyce 




understanding, which Wallace will call “click[s],” are more related to unwinding the puzzles 
placed within Wallace’s fiction, rather than to traditional moments of climax “whose approach 
can be charted by any Freitag on any Macintosh” (Wallace, “Futures” 40). 
  Though one would assume Wallace’s chief alignment with Joyce would be in parallels 
between Ulysses and Infinite Jest (mentioned in passing by several critics100), Wallace’s interest 
in complex and deferred “puzzle”-like solutions in BI marks another appreciation and further 
manipulation of Joyce’s “epiphany” concept—a concept, as described before, increasingly 
understood by critics as an unstable, volatile, and human-based entity. Indeed, Wallace in BI can 
be seen to cartoonishly distort the “epiphany” (most explicitly in a meta-textual meditation on 
the triteness of the epiphany, and then actual epiphany, in “Adult World”). And, the moments of 
structural fragmentation that so mark BI—the polyglot grab bag of styles, the interviews, pop 
quizzes, stage plays, fake dictionary entries—are indeed moments of obscuring and disguising 
where a epiphany, or narrative “click,” might potentially occur. As he stated in his now-famous 
interview with Larry McCaffery, when describing his original transfer from modal philosophy to 
fiction, 
What I didn’t know then was that a mathematical experience was aesthetic in 
nature, an epiphany in Joyce’s original sense. These moments appeared in proof-
completions, or maybe algorithms… It was really an experience of what I think 
Yeats called the ‘click of a well-made box’… At some point in my reading and 
writing that fall I discovered the click existed in literature, too. (Wallace, 
McCaffery 35) 
                                                
100 See, for example, Burn (DFW’s IJ, 60), and—more intermittently—Carlisle (67, 95, 112, 179, 




Barring the explicit reference to Joyce, this description is telling in that it both suggests 
Wallace’s beloved talking point of the beneficial aspects of “work” on behalf of reader and 
writer, but also the notion of story as algorithm, and “click” offering a solution to an equation or 
puzzle. How this “click” occurs then might be through the algorithmic processing of narrative 
elements, or the components of a short story used as a more quantitative build-up to a moment of 
narrative insight, often experienced in Wallace, through drastic structural dissolution. 
 Moments of transcendence are filtered through these structural gaps. While A.O. Scott 
described this method as a process “less anti-ironic than (forgive me) meta-ironic,” in that 
through twisting and chipping holes in layered recursions of prose Wallace is critiquing this 
approach, Scott’s emphasis is on the material present on the page rather than unrepresented 
departures. Yet, under the epiphanic mode, in the rhetorical anglings of the hideous men—
Wallace’s rhetoric and the rhetoric of the “come on” becoming one—there is a transcendental 
impulse buried beneath such recursions. This, as mentioned in the Section introduction, might be 
seen as an evolution of transgressive fiction, and the transgressives’ original alliance with de 
Sade’s “hypothetical” aesthetics, gesturing toward an absent space by means of baroque sexual 
configuration. Boswell aligns this with a method reaching toward “honest[y]” beyond all the 
“talk,” as BI “positively brims with talk and more talk, much of it sophisticated and articulate 
and all of it geared toward an ‘honest’ description of hideousness” (184). The work is marked by 
the ghost of this “honest[ty],” as it seeks paradoxically to “invoke indirectly the very things that 
it is not addressing” (Boswell 209, italics Boswell’s). Zadie Smith also discusses this extra-
textual space, claiming that BI’s stories are “attempting to make something happen off the page, 
outside words, a curious thing for a piece of writing to want to do” (143). Adam Kelly allies this 




diced to ribbons by Derrida’s debunking of any an absolute objective point from which to judge 
the authentic, joined with a “sincerity” that—as mentioned before—becomes “the kind of secret 
that must always break with representation” (“New Sincerity” 143). Lee Konstantinou likewise 
fixates on a break that facilitates an unencumbered “belief” in the verity of Wallace (97)—a 
means of reinforcing trust behind the at-times malicious-seeming games. Yet, if the only 
“sincerity,” “honesty,” and “belief” we are discussing is the integrity of the well-made box, and 
Wallace himself suggests his affinity with the puzzle, and rhetorical dissection of what makes a 
story a story, why not look to the margins and interstices for an epiphanic presence as yet 
recognized? Similarly, as the epiphanic impulse implies a transfiguration of the immediately 
perceivable narrative action, and considering Wallace’s interest in the epiphanic click, it would 
logically follow to focus on stories explicitly addressing structural transfiguration and the 
epiphany. 
 
Adult Feelings: “Adult World” (I) and (II) 
 The story “Adult World” presents the densest accumulation of structural sleight of hand 
(breaking down halfway into an outline), most explicit reference to “epiphany” (baldly declaring 
the “epiph unfold[ing]” [Wallace, “Adult (I)” 183], and structuring the formal shift around the 
“epiph”), and perhaps most naked preoccupation with sexuality as an avenue and obstacle to 
“feeling.” Though “Octet”—the central story in the collection, which is framed like a 
symmetrically crafted fugue, with recurrent stories interweaving and interpenetrating 
thematically—is often seen as the heart, or “core” to the collection (Boswell 187), the only story 
with a full revelation hinging explicitly on “epiphany,” with a structure openly facilitating this, is 




“core.” Present too are the unstable shifts between self-love and other-directed-empathy couched 
in the sexual currency of the collection of masturbatory self-sufficiency and the impossibility of 
knowing another’s desire. This sentiment is contained neatly in the opening: "For the first three 
years, the young wife worried that their lovemaking together was somehow hard on his thingie” 
(Wallace, “Adult (I),” 161). The young wife’s other-projected fixation is revealed in her 
obsession with her partner’s localized need, rather than any mutual definition of sexual union. 
Likewise, by looking at an earlier version of the story recently made available in the Wallace 
archive, one can see more forthrightly the alliance of sex with conceptions of empathetic 
sacrifice and understanding (even of oneself), as well as the role of the oblique epiphany 
accessing these realizations. 
 Countering “realist” approaches to the epiphany, and perhaps carving out a sub-niche for 
Wallace within a somewhat skeptically rendered and drastically altered “new realism,” is 
Wallace’s intentional defusing and parody of externally visible changes.101  This conscious 
attention to externality is perhaps most visible is the split between “Adult World (I)” and “Adult 
World (II).” “Adult (I)” offers a third-person-limited perspective of a near-realist story about 
wifely sexual insecurity, while “Adult (II)” is in the form of Wallace’s unfinished story notes, 
loudly broadcasting psychological and structural changes in the narrative. The main crux of the 
story is protagonist Jeni Roberts investigating her husband’s acute sexual dissatisfaction and 
prolonging of orgasm when they are intimate—in searching for reasons, she imagines that, in 
kaleidoscopic sequence, her method is inadequate, her hair is prohibiting proper viewership of 
                                                
101 Recall Wallace’s discussion in David Lipsky’s Although of Course You End Up Becoming 
Yourself (2010) of avant-gardism (of which he includes his own work) being able to better adapt 
to the mimetic sensations of the media-saturated “real world” than realism: “texture…the 
cognitive texture, of our lives: “as the texture, as the cognitive texture, of our lives changes[,]” 
and “the different media by which our lives are represented change,” avant-garde writing 




her oral technique, her husband is overworked and is secretly removed from her in some way 
(Wallace, “Adult (I) 163-4, 168), and so on. She considers various methods of improvement to 
ameliorate his perceived distance, though essentially all are filtered through the practice of 
sexual improvement and amplification, given most grim and inanimate form in practice session 
with a black “Dildo” (ominous capitalization intended by Wallace, later made lowercase) from 
the eponymous sex shop “Adult World” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 188, 164).  
 Through Jeni Roberts’ exploration of “adult” culture as a surrogate for intimacy with her 
husband, she renders the paradox of exterior desire belying hidden interior states (ignored by 
traditional realism), dredged up for her additionally in her investigations of pornography. Jeni 
researches pornography to find a method to please her husband, yet has an opposite reaction to 
the pornography as the Sheriff-cum-pornography-enthusiast in “Big Red Son” and his found 
moments of genuine organic desire in the actresses. To Jeni, “the women’s eyes were empty and 
hard—you could just tell they weren’t experiencing any intimacy or pleasure and didn’t care if 
their partners were pleased” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 168). Likewise, in Jeni’s exploration of her 
own paranoid suspicion by meeting with her facially-disfigured former lover (or in the story, 
simply “F.L.”) at a fast food chain restaurant, to ask about her previous obsession with thoughts 
that he was thinking of another woman during intercourse, she recalls how she allied this former 
lover’s facial disfigurement with perceived emotional occlusion. She notes his “facial 
asymmetry… had helped fuel her uncontrollable suspicion that he had a secret, impenetrable part 
to his character that fantasized about lovemaking with other women” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 179-
80). She likewise later believes she sees a “red & demonic-looking gleam” in his “hypertrophic 
iris,” which could just be a “trick of light” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 185). Jeni’s eventual epiphany 




flush pigment; she goes “100% pale à la Dostoevsky’s Nastasya F.,” which change of “pallor & 
digital palsy” her former lover interprets as “requital/positive response” to his still-lingering 
interest (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 185). Yet, these signs prove to be near-universally wrong: her 
husband is “raw” due to his “Secret Compulsive Masturbat[ing],” her Former Lover was in fact 
not thinking of other women, and Jeni’s epiphany is decidedly more for herself than for the F.L 
(Wallace, “Adult (II)” 184, 186-9). 
 What Wallace is seemingly parodying here is the predictability of such epiphanic 
insights, much as they might aid a formulaic, or MFA-workshop-derived emphasis on “problem-
free” mechanics—a staple of what he called “Workshop Hermeticism” (Wallace, “Futures” 40). 
This is first indicated in the story through discussion of the compulsive-masturbating husband’s 
occupation as a stochastic analyzer of world currency. “Stochastic,” as explained in the story, 
means “random or conjectural or containing numerous variables that all had to be monitored 
closely” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 167). The rhetoric of attempted “calculation,” and its implied 
murkiness of prediction, also negatively infuses Jeni’s interactions with her husband, ringing 
with the falseness of the contrived, or misleadingly projected. During a dream in which Jeni 
imagines intercourse from her husband’s perspective, the notion of “calculation” features heavily 
and literally: “he began thrusting faster in a calculated way and making pleased male sounds in a 
calculating way and then feigned having his own sexual climax, calculatingly making the sounds 
and facial expressions of having his climax but withholding it” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 170-1, 
italics mine). In essence, Jeni cannot grasp the unfathomable “x” factor that allows for a 
consubstantial joining of spirits that marital intercourse apparently holds the potential for. The 
result is a fixation on and extrapolation of this factor through externally visible signs, in a 




currencies (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 163-6), which inevitably rings with the falsehood of artificially 
constructed emotions and fabricated intimacy. 
 Inevitably, in what may be a manifesto for Wallace’s fiction overall, the epiphany, or 
epiphanic change, is described as requiring unpredictability. In an oblique homage to the actual 
psychological phenomenon of epiphanies, Wallace diagnoses an epiphany explicitly in the 
story’s first half, in an explanatory narrative intrusion: “In secular psychodevelopmental terms, 
an epiphany is a sudden, life-changing realization, often one that catalyzes a person’s emotional 
maturation… the person, in one blinding flash, ‘grows up’” (Wallace, “Adult (I),” 176-7). 
Chiefly of concern is the qualifier that epiphanies must be “sudden,” “blinding,” and arrive 
seemingly out of nowhere. However, the problem becomes: how to impose such a lightning flash 
of insight without first defusing it with a preconceived precipitation or trite build-up? Or rather: 
how to maintain the genuine quality of surprise, while the realist tropes enshrouding the 
epiphany (and realism’s emphasis on external signaling towards change) works against any 
possibility of unpredictability? Again, to heighten the stakes of “awareness” for epiphanic 
change, yet also perversely pave his own way toward one, Wallace likewise reiterates, “in 
reality, genuine epiphanies are extremely rare… It is usually only in dramatic representations, 
religious iconography, and the ‘magical thinking’ of children that achievement of insight is 
compressed to a sudden blinding flash” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 177). He also describes, in 
anticipation, the coming epiphany in Part II, claiming many of Jeni’s imagined worries were 
“realized only later, after she had had an epiphany and rapidly matured” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 
163). From such discussion about the artificiality, and realistic impossibility of the epiphany, one 
would assume the author denigrating this technique would never then, in few pages, attempt to 




moving from “dramatic/stochastic,” or the realm of predictable outcomes drawn from a cluster of 
realist data, to “schematic/ordered,” or the realm of overt, near-metafictional narrative devices 
put on display in order to counter-intuitively foster moments of narrative truth (Wallace, “Adult 
(II)” 183). 
 As Robert L. McLaughlin notes in his reassessment of Barth’s “Literature of 
Exhaustion,” Barth’s original blueprint for an ideal postmodern manipulation of narrative form is 
to merge neologistic structures with the underlying pulse of “our still-human hearts and 
conditions” (“Discontent” 56). And indeed, this sentiment is present in Wallace’s explanation of 
“Adult World (II)’s” unique form: “the big reason to have ‘Adult World (II)’ in outline form is 
that for myself as a reader I don’t buy epiphanies dramatically anymore… so some of the stories 
that look the weirdest at least were designed to access emotional stuff in a different way” 
(Wallace, Arden 98). One might say Wallace here is attempting to play up his own apparent 
naïveté in presenting an unfinished, and apparently juvenile, outline as a “story,” which would 
aid narratives of Wallace’s ultimate “sincerity” I wish to dispel. Instead, I believe Wallace is 
attempting to manipulate strategies of pseudo-confession in order to instigate unusual and 
arresting epiphanic moments of insight where one might not anticipate them; his good will is 
rather a ploy to enact a deeper fictional mission. In this fashion, Wallace is fulfilling the dictum 
of Emily Dickinson to “tell all the truth but tell it slant” (Dickinson 494). By framing the 
epiphany in a wholly defamiliarized format of a fiction outline, Wallace is able to both 
externalize the action (through stage-direction-like asides) and give a deeper, more naked insight 
into Jeni’s newly obtained understanding; hence, the “suddenness” and striking nature of the 




 A telling absence exists in the draft version of “Adult World (II)” during the actual 
moment of epiphanic realization. Namely, the earlier version lacks the full extent of the epiphany 
Jeni undergoes, thereby complicating further the story’s seeming divulgences in allowing the 
outline format to “avoid…nasty problem[s]” of “convey[ing] epiphany in narr[ative] 
expo[sition]” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 184). The earlier version’s section “1b” ends with the 
description that Jeni’s “epiphany unfolds while hemispherically atrophic F.L. responds to 
question” (the epiphany indicated shortly thereafter to be about the husband’s compulsive 
masturbation), then moves directly to 2a without describing the full import and extent of the 
epiphany (Wallace, AW Typescripts). This elision internalizes, or renders invisible, the true 
nature of Jeni’s thought processes and psychological revelations as they relate to herself and the 
relationship with her husband. In the published version, a “1c” section has been added that fully 
articulates the newfound potential for empathy she now finds through her “sddn blndng 
realization” that her husband is a secret compulsive masturbator, and hence “has clearly been 
suffering from inner deficits/psychic pain of which J.’s own self-conscious anxieties have kept 
her from having any real idea,” all portrayed in “objective, exterior desc[ription]” (Wallace, 
“Adult (II)” 183-4). Jeni’s realization in the published version has thus been modified to 
enhance, and foreground, the empathetic requirement of understanding her husband’s “inner 
deficits” as the source of his seeming sexual removal, and likewise her attempts to project her 
own narcissistic consciousness onto him as preventing true identification. The epiphany, while 
interior, is rather projected outwards—a realization about empathy piercing the black box of 
another’s consciousness. 
 Similar modifications in Wallace’s draft likewise foreground this “unspoken,” 




wholesale in the published version is how Jeni “weeps for hsbnd’” and realizes “how lonely his 
secrets must make him’” (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 186, italics Wallace’s). She also accepts her 
husband for who he is, as Wallace adds in this final version how she “accepts her ‘unalterable 
powerlessness’ over hsbnd’s secret cmplsions” (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 187). Also, recall the 
subtitle for part II—“One Flesh”—in Wallace’s later implementation of a description of how two 
mutually empathizing, but still self-enclosed, consciousnesses can empathize with one another. 
What in the former draft was simply the assertion that “binding them now is unspoken 
complicity” (Wallace AW Typescripts), is modified in the published version to “binding them 
now is that deep & unspoken complicity that in adult marriage is covenant/love” (Wallace, 
“Adult (II)” 188-189). Wallace transfers what appears to be the jargon of a dirty little secret, in 
the couple’s shared “complicity,” to this unspoken understanding leading to a mutually shared 
“covenant.” Further, this new empathetic understanding is not limited only to the connubial 
union of Jeni with her husband, the masturbator. It likewise infuses, and inflects, the leitmotif of 
masturbation (within a larger book-long frame of sexual conquest as emotional masturbation) as 
still holding a potentiality for self-love. 
 Masturbation actually serves as a co-opted metaphor for Jeni’s slowly developing sense 
of interiority, operating in stark contrast to the lonely, isolated solipsism masturbation represents 
to her husband. Through the epiphany, she is able to realize that her husband’s “‘interior 
deficits’…ha[ve] nothing to do with her as a wife [/woman]” (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 186). 
Indeed, she is able to convert what is, for the husband, a source of shameful deceit and isolated 
self-pleasure, into a possible avenue for self-exploration and self-understanding. Part of the 
“unspoken complicity” (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 188) is that Jeni herself is able to salvage a 




Wallace changes the simple, aphoristic “He masturbates; she masturbates” (Wallace AW 
Typescripts) to “Hsbnd mastrbtes secretly, J.O.R. openly” (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 188)—Jeni’s 
brash reclamation of masturbatory self-love is made open and explicit in contrast to her 
husband’s shamefully secret practice. She even, in a highly detailed section added later, revisits 
Adult World, the store of her husband’s secret fixation, and purchases the following accessories 
for her pleasure alone: “2nd dildo… then ‘Penetrator!!®’ dildo w/ vibrator, later ‘Pink 
Pistollero® Pistol-Grip Massager’” and so on (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 188). Jeni co-opts the 
mechanism of her husband’s shame, and uses it as a highly specialized form for her open display 
of self-pleasure and self-sufficiency. Note also that the ominous black “Dildo,” which she “had 
to all but force herself to practice with” (Wallace, “Adult (I)” 165) and had served as an artificial 
simulacra of her husband’s member, has now become detached from representing a discernible 
attached person; the dildo is simply another point of her “wellspring of personal pleasure” 
(Wallace, “Adult (I)” 188).102 
 Wallace’s strategy in the story, far from simple audience-agitation, is rather to use the 
unconventional arrangement of the second half as a counter-intuitive grain against which to cast 
a heightened, naturalistic phenomena of epiphanic insight. The former ineffectuality of such a 
trite convention as “epiphany” is invested by Wallace with new life precisely through a 
structurally alienating form—Wallace himself isn’t stylistically masturbating, but rather 
revealing overlapping layers of interiority, and how characters may come to know themselves 
however trapped they are within the stilted constraints of realist conventions. Indeed, the 
                                                
102 Boswell, however, sees this final embrace of masturbation as reinforcing the elemental 
narcissism of both Jeni and her husband, further enforced by the glib structural games of the 
story’s concluding half: “Wallace emphasizes the vicious dramatic irony of this conclusion—
namely, that the lovers are linked by the fact that they are both essentially solipsistic 





traditional oppositional forces of interior realization manifest in exterior signs are troubled, 
paradoxically. The epiphany is made explicit and self-consciously overt, yet still surprises by 
arising shortly after its highly prepared introduction. Further, even the act of deriving 
information about interior shifts from exterior characteristics—such as the adulterous “gleam[s]” 
in a former lover’s “sinistral” eye (Wallace, “Adult (II)” 185)—is parodied, yet employed 
nonetheless. The story becomes a story about how one might still jab and puncture the narrative 
skin of a short story in order to facilitate revelations—revelations that are central to Wallace’s 
attempt to cast empathy, and relieve loneliness, in both his characters and readers (fulfilling what 
he continually came to identify the purpose of fiction as). That this arrives in the costume and 
currency of sexual dysfunction is merely part of the larger goal of the collection.  
 
Readerly Consubstantiality / Two Fleshes: “Octet” 
 In “Octet,” Wallace no longer attempts passively to refract and manipulate gazes within 
the text for epiphanic result; instead, the reader is confronted, bludgeoned, and arrested in an 
attempt to coerce an active and collaborative epiphany. Likewise, in the currency and jargon of 
this article thus far, “Octet” represents the starkest solicitation of the reader’s aid in abetting a 
mutual author-reader consolidation of meaning, ultimately ending in an appeal to the reader to 
act as co-author in guiding Wallace’s ghostly hand. The enhancement of this collaborative 
aspect, and the disparagement of Wallace’s own role to facilitate this, is also evident when 
looking to an early draft of the story. In structure, the piece is comprised of a series of pop 
quizzes based on—according to Marshall Boswell—John Updike’s “Problems” (185): “mortise-
and-tenon” (an esoteric type of embedded joint) pieces, or “belletristic” investigations framed as 




the piece as a gauntlet of quizzes, Wallace sets the stakes for his desired, Wittgensteinian 
community of mutual meaning-making: quizzes imply answers, and it is presumably the reader 
who must supply and make sense of them, to then be resubmitted to Wallace for examination. 
The existentially chilling nature of these “quizzes” is immediately evident from their stated 
premises. One asks which of two “late-stage terminal drug addicts,” huddled in an alley “behind 
the Commonwealth Aluminum Can Redemption Center on Massachusetts Avenue” and 
undergoing acute withdrawal, “lived” (Wallace, “Octet” 131). Another asks whether a woman 
giving up her child to a vengeful ex-husband to ensure its financial security makes her a “good 
mother” (Wallace, “Octet” 134-5). A last and final quiz, however, places a new burden of 
amplified hermeneutic duty on the reader, implying not just answers to quizzes, but the overall 
fictional structure of the quiz itself—what Raoul Eshelman might call a post-postmodernism 
interplay of “inner” and “outer” frames, which Konstantinou suggests Wallace employs to give 
us the false impression that we are solving an irresolvable query by sneakily providing a self-
guiding, ameliorative format (96-7). This quiz begins: “You are, unfortunately, a fiction writer,” 
proceeding to unfold an elaborate reasoning for the perceived failure of the prior, incomplete 
sequence of pieces, and a directly asks the reader to somehow redeem their failure through a 
“queer” “urgency” of appeal (Wallace, “Octet” 145, 151). The ambiguous object of address—
self, other, or some intermediary persona—additionally places the supposed audience of the story 
as a merged entity that is part ideal reader, part Wallace. This amorphous no-man’s-land then 
becomes the interpersonal space to be toyed with during reading.  
 A traditional interpretation of the story, and indeed parodied within the confines of the 
piece, is that of rote metafiction (heavily indebted to Barth) attempting to display the rigging and 




is firstly undercut by the author’s own allusion to the self-serving nature and “sham-honesty” of 
this tactic (Wallace, “Octet” 147), both introducing and obviating the approach simultaneously. 
Further, as the “Q” goes on so exhaustively to lay out the “relationship” and “palpations” desired 
by the piece, the narrative structure no longer investigates elements of fiction, but rather 
interpersonal emotional frisson (Wallace, “Octet” 155, 150, italics Wallace’s)—untrodden 
territory for a writer whose work bears the Atlantean weight of “modernism and postmodernism 
heavily, but respectfully, on its back” (Boswell 1). Indeed, it encapsulates the modes of 
interpersonal connection, the deceptiveness of exterior sign as only dimly suggestive of interior 
states, and the baroque methods of seduction in modern courtship, that have marked the 
collection in subject matter throughout. The bizarre quibbling over sincerity and honesty, as well 
as how the directly addressed reader factors into Wallace’s scheme, is then enmeshed with these 
far more socio-erotic currencies. Likewise, these tactics of intimacy and isolation, diffracted 
gazes and direct address are essential in determining whether, under A.O. Scott’s stakes, Wallace 
has broken through to the other side of metafictional gamesmanship or is merely practicing a 
deep and coded solipsism. 
 This piercing manner of connection has inevitably raised discussion in Wallace 
scholarship over the structural effect of “sincerity” and “belief,” each freighted with a different 
direction for where this naked honesty is projected. Lee Konstantinou in “No Bull: David Foster 
Wallace and Postironic Belief” posits that the fourth wall doesn’t open onto the reader but rather 
onto Wallace. Konstantinou reiterates that the meta-commentary on artifice is such that “we 
become aware of the artifice of his fictional exercise,” pleading that we “believe in the total, 
genuine honesty, the ‘100% candor’ (148) of the author—not the narrator, but the author” (94, 




Wallace’s exceptional quality as inspiring just this: belief) is then what can anchor otherwise 
“sham”-like rhetorical games (Konstantinou 93). Zadie Smith, however, believes the gaze of 
investigation is actually opposite, such that Wallace is investigating the moral soundness of the 
reader, running him or her through rhetorical games like elaborate initiation rites. Smith claims, 
“His stories simply don’t investigate character... they turn outwards, towards us…  It’s our 
character that’s being investigated” (Smith 276). Rather than gesture frantically at himself 
through metafictional gimmicks, Wallace—in Smith’s interpretation—offers serpentine 
constructions to provide an intentionally traceable path of cognition. His rhetoric is like Henry 
James’s, whose “syntactically tortuous sentences” are rather punitive and pedagogical than airy 
and aesthetic, “intended to make you aware, to break the rhythm that excludes thinking” (Smith 
274). Smith’s point allies with a larger wave in Wallace scholarship, outlined in Adam Kelly’s 
“The Death of the Author and Birth of a Discipline,” which analyzes “Wallace’s disruption of 
standard models of representation in order to provoke the agency of the reader,” evidenced in 
works like “The Planet Trillaphon” and The Broom of the System that “end in mid-sentence” to 
allow the reader participation “in the text’s imaginative completion.” 
 Adam Kelly, in another essay, posits a mix of Smith’s reader-investigating model and 
Konstantinou’s author-divulging model. In his piece “David Foster Wallace and the New 
Sincerity in American Fiction,” Kelly posits that Wallace, when issuing a direct address in Quiz 
9, is addressing a disembodied version of himself—more specifically, an abstracted proxy he 
self-chastises “like an anguished diary entry” (143). The endlessly circulating diatribes to the 
“reader” are then, in Kelly’s estimation, linked to a depleted sense of authorial “authenticity,” 
which he traces back to Lionel Trilling’s lamentation over postmodernism coming to dominate 




point” to “judge the authentic from the inauthentic” (“New Sincerity” 137-138). Kelly’s oblique 
reference to Roland Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” in his own “The Death of the Author 
and the Birth of a Discipline” is telling—in Kelly’s reading, Wallace has it both ways, existing as 
a ghostly writer surviving as a non-attributed body of text, yet haunting it nonetheless. Or rather, 
in true Wallacean fashion, apologizing for it. In the collaborative mode raised and somewhat 
deflated in “Death of the Author,” Kelly claims that Wallace is Wallace’s own ideal reader, and 
hence, in a roundabout and somewhat sly way, Wallace is the only one who can create meaning 
for Wallace, the whole piece an extended, somewhat morose pep-talk to himself. As Kelly 
writes, “it is only this reader (rather than the writer Wallace addresses as ‘you’) who will ‘be able 
to tell [what] you’re doing; even if she can’t articulate it she’ll know if you’re just trying to save 
your own belletristic ass by manipulating her—trust me on this” (“New Sincerity” 144). 
However necessary and relevant I find Kelly’s teasing and complication of Wallace’s 
author/reader function in the story, I believe the intent of the story isn’t quite so cynical and self-
involved. Rather, with respect to Wallace’s repeated claim in the story to maintain a 
“relationship,” I believe a complex reader-author mode of interpolation, and interpenetration, is 
made available, opening mutual channels for communication and intimacy. 
 In a mixture of Kelly’s, Smith’s, and Konstantinou’s methods, I wish to put forward a 
dynamic of reader and writer that honors a mutual relationship rather than proposes one-
directional provocation. The initial phase in such a relationship is Wallace’s erosion of his own 
authorial agency, which he lays out in the last line of Quiz 9 in a description of himself 
“quivering in the mud” with the reader rather than issuing directives from a 
“gleaming…Olympian HQ” (Wallace, “Octet” 160). Once so debased, Wallace is then able to 




creative, and collaborative timbre to Wallace’s rhetoric currently under-analyzed.103 This 
openness to creative input is hinted at in both the skipping around in quiz numbers (from 4 to 6 
to 7 to 6(A) to 9), as well as the structural arrangement of the final “quiz” of “Octet,” wherein 
potentially discarded, alternative pop quizzes are embedded within footnotes (surrounded, of 
course, by caveats as to their dysfunction) to allow the now enfranchised reader to select the total 
structure of the work. The rich philosophical complexities of these quizzes—such as one about a 
pharmacologist who creates a miracle anti-depression drug and is made miserable by his freshly 
cured and now omnipresent fans, and another about a sadistic Ellis Island administrator who 
gives humiliating English approximations of immigrant names (Wallace, “Octet” 148-151)—
indicate that their consignment to footnotes is less Wallace’s dissatisfaction with them, but rather 
opening our creative agency in choosing to read and include them. Further, his later justification 
for “pok[ing] [his] nose out” through this whole last quiz is to encourage a “revelation” that 
“resonate[s] back through the cycle’s pieces” to make one “see them in a different light”—a 
decidedly user-centric phenomena in reexamining and re-imbuing old stories with power 
(“Octet,” 154, 159). The solicitation for a “queer” felt “sameness” he calls for is decidedly one 
not capable by author alone (Wallace, “Octet” 157). In sum, the “‘reader’ has been cast as 
writer,” as Wallace explicitly declares in a deleted section called “post-metabit” from the earlier 
draft (Wallace “Octet” Typescript), participating in a two-way creative enterprise. 
 First, to accomplish this, Wallace must erode his identity as a capital-A “Author,” 
unimpeachable in authority. As becomes clearer when looking at the earlier draft of “Octet,” 
                                                
103 Konstantinou notes that Wallace’s “use of the second person, and his presentation of the final 
section as yet another pop quiz, interferes with directly conflating the character (“you”) with 
Wallace,” and that “this block…necessitates that readers decide whether to make the 
identification” (96). Konstantinou does, to the exclusion of this slippery mutualism posited here, 
as the “last quiz is so long, detailed, and specific…it is hard not to understand it as a direct 




Wallace amplifies his language in the published version regarding the servile, and lowly, posture 
required by the author in order to facilitate, or experience, this transaction of desired “feeling.” 
This extends beyond simple “aw-shucks” self-deprecation (omnipresent in his nonfiction), or the  
“sincerity” and “belief” Kelly and Konstantinou respectively argue for. Indeed, in Wallace’s 
early draft, “sincerity” is present as the foundational tactic for the “meta” technique to come off: 
“The trick to this solution is that you’ll have to be sincere. When you step out and ask the reader, 
there can be nothing coy or performative about it” (Wallace “Octet” Typescript). This same 
sentiment is amplified in the published version to include jargon indicating an utter helplessness, 
marked by almost militaristic diction indicating an unarmed, vulnerable position of potential 
victimhood. Wallace claims in the embellished passage in the published version: “you’d have to 
be 100% honest. Meaning not just sincere but almost naked. Worse than naked—more like 
unarmed. Defenseless” (Wallace, “Octet” 154). He expands on this concept of “defenselessness” 
to add the tinge of emotional neediness implied in the direct appeal. As Wallace explains in a 
passage added later, “one of the very last few interpersonal taboos we have is this kind of 
obscenely naked direct interrogation of somebody else… It looks pathetic and desperate,” and 
that “anything less than completely naked helpless pathetic sincerity and you’re right back in the 
pernicious conundrum” (Wallace, “Octet” 154). This degree of self-flagellation is indeed a step 
removed from simple “sincerity”—merely revealing the need for the appeal is sincere enough. 
Wallace’s process is closer to self-annihilation in order to then open up a space for the reader’s 
self-rendering in the position abandoned by the author. 
 Similarly, with the author so lowered, Wallace’s chosen terminology for the author-
reader interaction becomes one of intimate contact and manipulation. Fittingly, the word Wallace 




“palpate” (user earlier) in a footnote seeking an alternative for “demonstrate,” ruminating on how 
“demonstrate” “might not be the right word; you might want to use the word ‘evoke’ or maybe 
even ‘limn’” (Wallace “Octet” Typescript). In the published version, however, he adds and 
labors over the thwarted concept of “palpate”: “palpate’s been overused already, and it’s 
possible that the weird psychospiritual probing you mean it to connote by medical analogy won’t 
come across at all to anybody” (Wallace, “Octet” 155). “Palpate,” as an alternative to “limn” and 
“evoke”—is offered as the style of analysis the pieces employ, yet is fully transferable to the 
reader relationship. While palpation seems one-way, it is still a means for Wallace to “reach out” 
and begin stimulation of a mechanism that will bare fuller collaboration. However discarded—
these self-deprecations should be ignored, as even fully fleshed out quizzes and scenarios are 
“discarded”—Wallace’s description of the practice’s “psychospiritual probing” is, this phrase 
accurately describes both the transgression of the textual boundary as well as the desired effect 
of intrusive readerly jostling (Wallace, “Octet” 155). Like Wallace’s underlined passages about 
the mysterious veil of the glory hole in the Roman Bordello, the text exists a smoke screen 
through which authorial-readerly “palpation” can occur.  
 Beyond this slightly one-sided stimulation, Wallace also addresses the reader in such as 
way as to then involve and implicate him or her into his rhetorical decisions. Debunking any idea 
that Wallace is only addressing himself, or a phantasmal reader, the narrator describes, “there are 
right and fruitful ways to try to ‘empathize’ with the reader, but having to try to imagine yourself 
as the reader is not one of them” (Wallace, “Octet” 152, italics Wallace’s). This sentiment is 
important in that it casts Wallace’s description, and caveats, regarding the proper way to end his 
malformed “quartet” (Wallace, “Octet” 159) as not simply an attempt to see from the reader’s 




reader may herself take over his position (recall again Wallace’s deleted assertion that in fact the 
“‘reader’ has been cast as writer”). A modification to the ending of the entire story further 
reiterates this reader-as-author sentiment. Wallace finishes the draft version with “Q: Self-
evident” (Wallace “Octet” Typescript), missing in the published version, effectively making the 
prior information simply a scenario with answer implied, requiring no further action from the 
reader. The published version, however, ends provocatively with no discernible question, and 
instead embeds the provocation “So decide” (Wallace, “Octet” 160) as the last line of the text, 
asking the reader to supply a meaningful ending rather than simply take part in a “self-evident” 
exercise. 
 The slow shifting of authority from author to reader is most clearly evident in the 
narrative suggestions Wallace issues, firstly addressing himself and the practice at hand, yet 
expanding more into a discussion of narrative construction, and the reader’s choices, in 
particular. These, again, become more evident in the evolution between drafts. In an early 
footnote missing from the draft version, Wallace bandies about the issue of the piece’s no-
longer-fitting title: “You’re still going to title the cycle ‘Octet.’ No matter if it makes any sense 
to anybody else or not. You’re intransigent on this point” (Wallace, “Octet” 152). Here, we are 
still in the world of Wallace and addressing concerns very specifically related to the original 
schema he created for the story. The caviling is over the specific name of the piece indicates we 
are in the real world just beyond the exterior frame—Wallace as author in the process of 
composition. Yet, the tone of these second person asides quickly shifts to areas of potential 
malleability that the reader should have agency, or say within, indicated by the increasing 
culpability of his second-person address. He claims that “if you decide to use the 




right out and use it, the dreaded ‘R’-term [Relationship], come what may” (Wallace, “Octet” 
155). The slipperiness of the suggestive phrase “you’re probably going to have to,” still indicates 
that we might be in the world of authorial creation, yet in “probably,” indeterminacy is beginning 
to slip in, with the added phrases “naked honesty” and “dreaded ‘R’-term” further reiterating the 
erosion of authorial power. A final-version page later, however, Wallace is fully advising us on 
whether we “may or may not want to spend a line or two” reflecting on how there are “literally a 
billion times more ways to ‘use’ somebody than there are to honestly just ‘be with’ them,” 
though “this’ll be a matter for you to sort of play by ear” (“Octet” 156)—the phrase also added in 
the published version. Somehow, Wallace is now advising us on probabilities of success with 
regard to specific lines, rather than merely using the fourth wall as a sounding board for his own 
ideas. Then, by the next footnote, Wallace is imploring us for a decision on our behalf, claiming, 
“All I can do is be honest and lay out some of the more ghastly prices and risks for you and urge 
you to consider them very carefully before you decide. I honestly don’t see what else I can do” 
(“Octet” 156). This tone of helplessness is marked next to Wallace’s original perfunctory advice: 
“Just be aware of some of the prices up front, before you decide” (Wallace “Octet” Typescript). 
In the span of two final-version pages, Wallace refers to the text at hand as a wholly estranged 
entity, now shifting abstractly into the reader’s ownership, with which we can implement certain 
strategies with varying degrees of success advised by Wallace. 
 Wallace’s full transference is perhaps most apparent in how he chastises the work of this 
new reader-author. In what might be a projected recrimination for his own feelings of attempted 
sincerity, he tersely informs us, “Yes: you are going to sound pious and melodramatic. Suck it 
up” (Wallace, “Octet” 156). Further, by the quiz’s end, Wallace has near-completely abdicated 




hold your hand” (Wallace, “Octet” 159). Somehow, we have progressed from Wallace’s 
disembodied proxy to the one holding ownership of the artistic object being reprimanded. What 
is particularly revealed by this increase in tension, anxiety, and ultimate brusqueness, is 
Wallace’s desire for the reader to acknowledge the full difficulty of the readerly act. (Wallace 
alludes to the difficulty of this rhetorical construction in his failed or inadequate execution of 
Pop Quiz 6, beginning a recurrent iteration Pop Quiz 6(A) with the declaration “Try it again” 
[“Octet” 135].) We have been given the “imaginative access to other selves” that Wallace claims 
good fiction must allow (Wallace, McCaffery 22); yet, here it leads to the author himself—a 
transference, in the context of the collection, that is inevitably erotic (a favorite word of 
Wallace’s [Max 42]). Perversely, in Wallace’s reprimand, the reader has made transference of 
agency complete, enacting the “queer” “sameness” he sought out (Wallace, “Octet” 157), sharing 
a mutual role of reader and writer between the text and user. 
 In light of these developments, Wallace’s fascination with pornography and the near-
pornographic, affectless games of modern romance are evident in a rhetorical method finding 
glimmers of sentiment in otherwise cold, cerebral mechanics. By running such falsity at 
maximum speed, the devolution of these mechanisms, and the living, sentient qualities of both 
author and reader, are revealed. Such intentional breakdown is also apparent in Wallace’s 
evolution between drafts, undercutting any assumption that the ruptured seams we finally see are 
due to carelessness or desire for simple spectacle. Likewise, ironically, Wallace’s post-
postmodern tactics also cast the unspoken alternative of altered realism, present in peers like 
Jonathan Franzen, as itself lonely, hermetic, and inactive. There is no direct appeal in 
“hysterical” realism, nor is there an ability to perform actual, meaningful, two-way games such 




these tropes that Wallace is able to feint, and then blindside readers with the realist-tinged 
concept of the epiphany. Wallace’s characters are marked in only being able to receive self-
realization where it runs up against the fringes of traditional textual boundaries and organization. 
Stephen J. Burn’s precept of post-postmodern characters as realizing they are in a mediated 
textual construct, yet ignoring it, is taken here to the fullest extension possible—characters 
rupturing traditional frames, be it pop quiz or authorial outline, to receive enlightenment beyond 
the mediation of the fictional scheme at hand. Through these excisions, ruptures, and fractures, 
Wallace is able to pursue a true relationship with the reader beyond abstracted, Wittgensteinian 
semantics; we must actively fill in the holes, taking over the role of Wallace before we realize we 
have done so. In the discourse of eroticism Wallace posits in BI, this is where textual 
communication is able to reach “One Flesh,” as “Adult World (II)” is subtitled. Rather than 
accept the shallow surfaces of a postmodern method that had become so emptied as to evoke 

















 In this dissertation, I have outlined the “inoperable machine” of late twentieth-century 
postmodern American fiction, reaching its peak and quickly-following stagnation point during 
the mid-to-late 1970s and 1980s, caught between the daunting strictures of its print-based legacy 
and a revolution in new media. Further, I have also traced how the fictional generation 
succeeding this period, encapsulated in post-postmodernism and the bridging genre of 
transgressive fiction, can be seen to at times successfully blend—in flickering fits and starts—
these two monumental forces. I have also demonstrated how the faulty processes and 
degeneration of this “flicker” are precisely what allow the new form’s affective thrust; at the 
point when this systematic print form disintegrates, what emerges is a new sort of “feeling” and 
“connection” that was previously thought impossible from the solipsistic husk of postmodernism. 
Further, such indeterminacy births a new form of relativistic character interiority—personas only 
appearing whole when viewed askance, contingent on unseen elements, and never fully settling 
into stability. Given this relationship between style and technology-mimicking operation, 
however, the question then logically becomes: what happens when such strategies are allied to 
newer technologies, to communication forms that are in their very nature fragmented, collage-
like, and disassembled?  
 This would be the point of another iteration of “post” after “post-postmodern.” At this 
proposition, sighs inevitably ensure, and one would rather examine a dust mote on the 
windowpane with great concentration than confront the idea. Yet, there is something in the very 
fabric of contemporary fiction, as of this dissertation’s writing in 2015, that contends with this 
unknown space—an aim to fulfill in its own unique way Zadie Smith’s prognostication for an 




with narrative tricks dependent on print. The impact of—again, undoubtedly soon obsolete—
GIFs, blogs, and image-streams of seeming unrelated content is just now beginning to creep into 
the writing style of younger, technologically influenced writers who, themselves, are marked by 
this glitchy, jumpy, and Internet-enabled aesthetic. Rather than wholly appropriate narrative into 
a noncompliant and resisting new media form, they are turning prose itself into the mimetic 
reflection of increasingly strange forms of media. The imprint, however, of postmodernism’s 
decline, and those maximalist forms immediately tackling its legacy, is undeniable in this brave 
new world of mediated, yet still formally constrained, text kept independent of a quick-fix 
technological bandage. 
 One can only hope the stewards of such new fiction are mindful of this lineage. 
Behemoths may have come and gone, waved away for their encyclopedic and seemingly 
deadened and Gollum-like hoarding of scientific disciplines, mythologies, and philosophies, but 
even now the despairing derision felt in believing such a horde empty inflects even the most 
minimalist and small writing. Perhaps this hollowness, then, might birth a new literature that was 
in its last stages interested in disruption rather than coherence, glimmering refuse rather than 
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